

BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1850.

ART. I.—1. *Del Primato Morale e Civile degli Italiani.*

Per VINCENZO GIOBERTI. 2 Edizione di Losanna. Losanna. 1846. 3 tomi. 8vo.

2. *Introduzione allo Studio della Filosofia.* Per VINCENZO GIOBERTI. 2 Edizione riveduta e corretta dall' Autore. Brusselle. 1844. 4 tomi. 8vo.

3. *Del Bello e del Buono. Due Trattati.* Per VINCENZO GIOBERTI. 1 Edizione di Losanna. Losanna. 1846. 8vo.

WE have, on several occasions within the last two or three years, introduced the name of Gioberti, sometimes with praise, sometimes with blame, and some attempt to appreciate his influence as an author, or to determine the practical tendency of his writings, can be neither misplaced nor mistimed; for he is, unquestionably, a man of rare genius, of acute and profound thought, a highly polished intellect, and various and extensive erudition. He appears to have mastered the whole circle of the sciences, and to have made himself thoroughly acquainted with the past and the present. He has studied profoundly the spirit of our age, and we have met with no one who better understands its dangerous tendencies. He possesses a genuine philosophical aptitude, and is unrivalled in his exposition and criticism of modern philosophy, especially as represented by the later German, French, and Italian schools; and as far as concerns the refutation of false systems, and the statement of the first principles and the method of philosophical science, he is eminently successful. The best refutation of sensism, pantheism, radicalism, and socialism, and the clearest and most satisfactory statement and vindication of the several truths op-

posed to them, with which we are acquainted, are to be found in his writings. He never fears to make a bold and manly profession of the Catholic faith, and it is from the point of view of Catholicity, and by the aid of Catholic doctrine, that he refutes the modern errors and heresies he attacks. He seems, also, save in the ascetic region, whenever he has occasion to present Catholic theology, to present it in its highest and most rigidly orthodox forms. According to him, the true human race does not and cannot subsist out of the Catholic or elect society; and he energetically maintains, that out of the Catholic Church man is in an abnormal condition, and incapable, under any aspect of his nature, of attaining to his normal development. He attacks Gallicanism, and asserts in their plenitude the spiritual and civil prerogatives of the Papacy, which French, German, and English theologians, especially during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, have so generally denied, or but ambiguously admitted. He maintains that civil society is of sacerdotal origin, derives all power, civil as well as ecclesiastical, from God through the sacerdotal order, and makes the Pope, who embodies in himself the whole priesthood, the representative on earth of the full and universal sovereignty of God.

But we cannot read Gioberti's works without feeling that, along with this, and by ordinary readers not easily separable from it, the author introduces remarks and opinions, and exhibits practical aims and tendencies, which, in our times at least, go far to neutralize his orthodox influence, nay, to throw his influence into the scale of modern liberalism and socialism. We do not judge a book by the personal conduct of the author; but as far as Gioberti's conduct, whether in power or out of power, is known to us, it does not appear to have harmonized with the high-toned Catholic principles he has, at least, the air of professing. His present position with regard to the Holy See, unless we are wholly misinformed, is not that of a dutiful and affectionate son, and contrasts unfavorably with that of Rosmini, or even with that of Padre Ventura. Professedly opposed to all violent revolutions, claiming to be a man of great moderation, and occasionally using language which would lead one to suspect him of being a delegate to the Peace Congress, he nevertheless undeniably had a large share in preparing and precipitating the recent shameful Italian revolutions, and plunging his own sovereign, the late Charles Albert, into his disastrous and unprovoked campaigns against Austria. Professing to disdain modern liberals, to hold democratic politicians in contempt,

and to address himself only to the wisdom and solid judgment of the enlightened and virtuous few, he aided, indirectly, to say the least, in stirring up that infuriated mob which drove the Jesuits out of Italy, assassinated Count Rossi, exiled the Holy Father from Rome, persecuted the religious, massacred the clergy, and enabled Mazzini and his fellow-miscreants to establish the infamous Roman Republic. Asserting in the most unqualified terms the infallibility of the Holy See in the definition of doctrines and the condemnation of books, he has, we believe, never submitted a single one of his own publications to its judgment, and up to the present time has refused to submit to its condemnation of his *Gesuita Moderno*. It is true, and we take pleasure in saying so, that, when at the head of the Sardinian government, he refused to acknowledge the infidel and sacrilegious Roman Republic; but he also refused to co-operate with the Catholic powers of Europe in restoring the Holy Father to his temporal sovereignty, and sanctioned encroachments of the civil on the spiritual power, which but too clearly preluded the sacrilegious Siccardi laws, the imprisonment of the illustrious Frasoni, and the persecution of the clergy in the Subalpine kingdom, which so deeply wound the heart, not only of our Holy Father, but of every sincere Catholic. These things, which we are unable to deny, or satisfactorily to explain away, coupled with the fact that he is usually surrounded, not by men venerable for their doctrine and their piety, but by a knot of young Italian atheists and misbelievers, compel us to pause in our admiration, and ask if there be not, after all, some grave fault in the author as well as in the man. With our high estimation of his genius, his talent, his clear and profound thought, his erudition, and his polish and eloquence as a writer, as well as of the soundness of his doctrines on many of the most vital points of philosophy and theology, we must naturally be disposed to place the most favorable construction possible on both his speculations and his acts; but, considering what has undeniably been the practical influence of his views and tendencies, as a political writer and statesman, on the disastrous and shameful revolutionary movements of his countrymen, we cannot but believe that there is something rotten in his writings, and that, with all his high-toned orthodoxy on so many important points, there is yet something in his thought, as well as in his heart, not compatible with Catholic doctrine and Catholic piety, and which we are bound to reprobate.

We took up and read Gioberti's works at first from curiosity, and to find out the truth they might contain, and we were charmed and carried away by his learning and eloquence, to an extent we are ashamed to acknowledge, although we had all the time a secret feeling that he was not altogether healthy in his practical influence ; we have since re-read his writings, to discover, if possible, the error concealed in them, or the source of that unhealthy influence. We think we have discovered it, and our chief purpose in noticing the volumes we have introduced is to point it out to our readers, and, if our review should chance to fall under his eyes, to the distinguished author himself. Several books of greater or less magnitude have been written against the author, but we are unacquainted with their contents. We have read nothing against him, except some high commendations of him in *The North British Review*, a Scotch Presbyterian journal, intended to perpetuate the spirit of John Knox, and some two or three articles, feebly and unsuccessfully attacking his philosophy, in a respectable French periodical, conducted by a layman whose learning and good intentions we hold in high esteem. Our judgment, whether sound or unsound, has been formed by the simple study of the volumes before us, and the school to which their author obviously belongs, and of which he is the most distinguished member.

Our purpose in our present article is not to review Gioberti so much under a philosophical as an ascetic, a speculative as a practical, point of view ; and perhaps we cannot better introduce the criticisms we propose to offer, than by reverting to a fact which we have often insisted on, namely, that there is in modern society a fatal schism between the ecclesiastical order and the temporal, and between spiritual culture and secular. There is not, under Christianity, that harmony between the two orders that there appears to have been under gentilism in Greek and Roman antiquity. In classic antiquity there seems to have been, for the most part, a perfect harmony between religious and secular life, spiritual and secular culture ; and in the great men of Livy and Plutarch, regarding them simply as men, we find a balance, a proportion, a completeness, and, so to speak, roundness of character, in its order, that we do not find in the men of modern times. In modern society the two orders are not only distinct, but mutually repugnant, and we are able to devote ourselves to the one only by rejecting or opposing the other. Civil government opposes,

and, as far as possible, subjects the Church ; philosophy rejects theology ; the sciences are irreligious in their tendency ; and secular literature and art foster unbelief and impiety. The individual and society are alike torn by two internal hostile and irreconcilable forces, and we have no peace, — hardly, at rare intervals, a brief truce. This schism, taken in its principle, may be regarded as the source of all the evils which afflict modern society, whether temporal or spiritual.

It is from the fact we here state, more especially as it exists in Italy, the author's own country, that Gioberti appears to start. He assumes that this schism is practically remediable, that it ought to be healed ; and hence his chief inquiry is as to its causes and the means of healing it. The principal cause, if we understand him aright, is, that the sacerdotal society has lost its control of the lay society, by having lost its former moral and intellectual superiority over it, and yet insists on retaining the dominion it rightfully exercised when it possessed that superiority ; and the remedy is to be sought in the voluntary cession, as far as civilized Europe is concerned, on the part of the sacerdotal society, of that former dominion, become incompatible with modern civilization, the new conditions and relations of peoples and nations, the emancipation of the civil order from the sacerdotal tutelage, and a union, alliance, or interfusion of sacerdotal and lay culture, of the sacerdotal and lay genius, of the Christian spirit and the spirit of ancient Italo-Greek gentilism. He denies, indeed, the right of the lay society to assert its emancipation by violence, and thus far condemns modern liberalists, but contends that the clerical order should voluntarily concede the emancipation, and invest the lay order with an independence that was denied it, and very properly denied it, in the earlier mediæval times. We shall amply prove, before we close, that this is the author's view of the matter ; and, indeed, it is evident from almost every page of his writings, and especially from his long discussion in the *Del Primato* on the difference between the civil dictatorship exercised by the Popes immediately after the dissolution of the Western Empire by the Northern barbarians, and the arbitrariness which he contends is now for civilized Europe all that can or should be exercised by the sovereign pontiffs, except in the Ecclesiastical States.

That, in pointing out the causes of this schism, and proposing the remedy, Gioberti refutes much false philosophy, demolishes many false systems of politics, ethics, and society, and brings

to his aid truths in philosophy, theology, morals, and politics of the highest order and of the last importance, there is no question; but he has nowhere the appearance of doing this for the sake of a genuinely Catholic end. The end for which he brings forward Catholicity, he says expressly,* is not the salvation of the soul, or the advancement of faith and piety for the sake of heaven, eternal beatitude, but the advancement of civilization for the sake of the "earthly felicity of men," and "the temporal well-being of nations." And hence he presents himself as a political and social reformer, in reality as a socialist in relation to his ends, differing from the vulgar herd of socialists only in the respect, that his instruments of reform, of reconstructing society, and of advancing civilization and social well-being, include, instead of rejecting, the ideal philosophy and the Church. In doctrine, in formal teaching, he is the antipodes of our modern socialists and liberalists, but in heart and soul, in spirit, in aim, and practical tendency, he is, after all, with them, and hardly distinguishable from them. Speaking in general terms, his error lies here, and is practical rather than theoretical,—in what he is laboring to effect rather than in the doctrines he formally and expressly teaches or attempts to apply to his socialistic purposes; and hence you feel, in reading him, that he is carrying you away in an anti-Catholic direction, although you cannot easily lay your finger on a direct and positive statement that you can assert to be in itself absolutely heterodox, or that directly and unequivocally expresses the error you are sure he is insinuating into your mind and heart.

Nevertheless, in his practical doctrine, as we have just stated it, there are clearly errors both of fact and of principle. He says expressly, — "*La declinazione delle influenze civili del clero in alcuni paesi cattolici nasce appunto dall'aver lasciato che i laici di sperienza, di senno, di dottrina, e di gentilezza lo avanzassero.*"† And it is clear that he means to lay this down as a general principle, and to maintain that the decline of the influence of the clergy in the civil order is owing to their having suffered "the laity to surpass them in experience, wisdom, knowledge, and cultivation," or, in other words, to the fact, that the sacerdotal society has lost its moral and intellectual superiority over the lay society. But he knows little of human affairs, and of the world at large, who can seriously hold that the

* *Del Primato*, Tom. I. p. 95.

† *Del Primato*, Tom. II. p. 255.

influence of a class, clerical or laical, is always in proportion to its moral and intellectual worth, or to its knowledge and cultivation. Wisdom and virtue do not, naturally, attain to dominion in the affairs of the world, and ignorance and vice always govern, except when God, supernaturally, intervenes to secure the victory to the good over the bad. Every man knows that this is true in the sphere of his own experience ; for every one knows that, if he follows nature, he goes to destruction, and that it is only by grace that he is able to conquer evil, and secure the dominion to wisdom and virtue. What is true thus of men individually is true of them collectively ; and this, being true of the individual, must be equally true of society, which can, therefore, be saved from destruction only by supernatural protection, only by grace, of which the sacerdotal order is the minister. If influence was always exerted in proportion to moral and intellectual worth, the wisest and best, the *optimates*, would always be at the head of affairs, and have the management of the republic, which, we need not say, is by no means the fact. Moreover, if it were so, Gioberti would have nothing to complain of ; for to place the *optimates* at the head of affairs is precisely what he contends for as that which will perfect the political and social constitution.

There is, again, in the principle here assumed, a suspicious approximation to the pretensions and aims of Saint-Simonism. It is lawful, no doubt, to learn from an enemy, but we are not prepared to admit that Catholicity is insufficient for itself, or that it is under the necessity of making any important loans from those who are studying to supplant it. The essential principle of the Saint-Simonian constitution is the organization of society, hierarchically, under its natural chiefs, the natural aristocracy, that is to say, the *optimates*. These, from the fall of the Roman Empire to the age of Leo the Tenth, the Saint-Simonians assert, were the Catholic clergy, under their supreme chief, the Pope ; but at the latter period they ceased to be the natural chiefs of society, because they ceased to advance in the same proportion that advanced the lay society, and suffered themselves to be surpassed in civil wisdom, knowledge, and cultivation by the laity. No one familiar with the writings of the Saint-Simonian school can read Gioberti without being pained to find him too often speaking as one of its honored disciples.

Finally, we deny the fact assumed. The clergy have never,

in relation to the lay society, lost their former moral and intellectual, or scientific and civil superiority ; and if they sometimes seem to have done so, it is only because the lay society has opposed to them false morality, false society, and false science, in place of the genuine. The clergy have never ceased, even in the most polished nations of Europe, to surpass the laity ; never have the laity been able to be their teachers ; and in every instance where they have claimed to be, they have been able to do so only on the ground of their having departed in religion, morals, politics, or philosophy from sound doctrine. Abelard was a layman, — reputed a learned man, a great philosopher, an able dialectician ; but his influence served only to promote nominalism, poorly disguised under the name of conceptualism, and to ruin philosophical science. Bacon and Descartes were laymen, and Gioberti holds them in no higher estimation than we do. Except, perhaps, in mathematics and some of the physical sciences, which are only secondary matters, and whose predominance marks an infidel age, the superiority of science and doctrine has always been on the side of the clergy, and we are aware of no contributions of any real value ever made by the laity. The fact is not as Gioberti assumes. The laity, having acquired a smattering of science and learning, have become filled with pride and conceit, and refused for that reason to recognize the just influence of the clergy. The decline of the influence of the clergy in some Catholic countries is not owing to their having suffered the laity, in wisdom, doctrine, and cultivation, to surpass them, but to the overweening pride and conceit of the laity, which have taken the place of humility and docility. The most truly learned, scientific, and cultivated among the laity are, even in our own age, the most docile to the clergy, and the most ready to assert and vindicate their general moral and intellectual superiority ; for we do not reckon your Mazzinis, Caninos, Mamianis, and Leopardis among the distinguished laymen of our times. They and their associates are not to be named in the same day with an O'Connell, a Montalembert, a De Falloux, a Donoso Cortès. Moreover, where are the laymen who in our days rank above Balmez in Spain, Wiseman or Newman in England, Moehler in Germany, and VINCENZO GIOBERTI in Italy, not to mention hundreds of others of the clerical order in no sense their inferiors, but who happen to be less known to our American public ?

The author assumes, virtually, that, when the clergy find

their influence decline, it is owing to their own fault and the growing virtue of the laity. It is only on this assumption that he can justify his demand of concessions to the revolting laity, and the union or fusion of sacerdotal with lay culture. The contrary of this is the truth. The clergy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when their influence had much declined, were, in relation to contemporary society, not one whit below what they were in the previous ages, when their influence was the greatest; and in no age have the laity shown themselves more superficial, more ignorant, more indisposed to severe thought and solid studies, or less virtuous, or more immoral, than in the eighteenth century, and in France, where the influence of the clergy was nearly null, but where their faith and virtue were by no means null, as was amply proved in the hour of trial. The clergy never obtain, and never maintain, in any country, their influence by mere personal qualifications, or personal superiority to the rest of the community, although this superiority may be a fact; but by the superiority of their doctrine and the sacredness of their office, — by the fact of their being priests and doctors, — the depositaries of the Christian mysteries, and the dispensers to the people of the bread of life; and their influence declines just in proportion as the people lose their faith in these mysteries, and their relish for this bread, or become wedded to the flesh and the world.

With all deference, then, to the distinguished author, we must dissent from his representation of the first element of the cause of the evil which we, as well as he, deplore. We cannot revive our youth, and join again with those who ascribe, in whole or in part, the acknowledged evils of society to the clergy, or the decline of their influence, in most countries, to the loss of their former moral and intellectual superiority; and just as little can we ascribe their loss of influence to the growing intelligence and virtue of the lay society, for this growing intelligence and virtue is not a fact, and if it were a fact, it would only render the lay society so much the more docile and submissive to the sacerdotal society. Individual clergymen, no doubt, there are, who do not by any means adorn their profession, or walk worthily in their high vocation, of which our author is, perhaps, a notable example; but, taken as a body, throughout the world, it is not the clergy that need reforming, but the laity, — not those of the laity, again, who are docile and submissive to their pastors, but those who are indocile,

rebellious, and require the clergy to come to them, instead of recognizing the fact that it is for them to go to the clergy.

We find it equally difficult to agree with Gioberti, that the fatal schism is continued by any censurable disposition of the sacerdotal society to hold on to the shadow of a dominion which, as to its substance, has long since escaped them. He contends that the civil dictatorship belongs, *in radice*, to the priesthood in all times and in all countries, but that its exercise is practicable or desirable only during the infancy or minority of nations, and that when a nation attains its majority, as we say of children, it is entitled to its freedom, and should and must be emancipated. The priesthood should then resign its dictatorship, and be contented to fill, in regard to civil society, the simple office of arbitrator, or referee. He says, — “When the priesthood delay beyond the proper time the civil emancipation of the people, as well as when these presume to hasten it, and attempt its possession prematurely, grave dissensions spring up and disturb both the Church and the state, until sound reason triumphs, and the true order of things is restored; for the sacerdotal tutelage of *infant* nations and the civil independence of *adult* nations are equally two laws of nature, which may be resisted for a time, but which no human power can wholly annul, or permanently suspend.”*

In accordance with this view, the author appears to charge the clergy with having failed to recognize the fact that modern nations have attained their majority, and of being in some measure the cause of the present schism between the two orders, by attempting to retain them under their tutelage beyond the proper time. They are behind their age; they have not taken sufficient account of the changes which have been going on, and the progress of civilization, or civil and social culture, which has been effected. They are not aware that the Middle Ages have passed away, and that a new order has sprung up, and is henceforth, for civilized Europe, the only legitimate order. Hence, they are found in opposition to the secular movements of the day, which is disastrous for them, and still more disastrous for society. They cannot hinder these movements, and by opposing them they lose all control over them, and all influence for good on their age. In consequence of their opposition, — in plain language, of their opposition to the demands of the age for liberal governments, free institutions, and a generous and par-

* *Del Primato*, Tom. II. p. 253.

tially independent secular culture, — they lose the lay society, and the lay society loses the guidance and salutary control of the sacerdotal society. This thought runs through all of Gioberti's writings that we have read. It is clear to the intelligent reader that he is dissatisfied with the political order he finds existing, especially in Austria and Italy, and that he finds the clergy in the way of such changes as he wishes to introduce. Perhaps the Pope, certainly the College of Cardinals, the regular clergy, especially the Jesuits, and no small portion even of the secular clergy of Italy and Austria, are opposed to all organic changes in the existing constitutions. He is not, or was not when he wrote, prepared to attempt the changes in spite of them, and therefore he writes to win them over to his side, and attempts to set forth a theory which shall make it appear to them that they not only can favor the revolution he demands, consistently with the highest-toned Catholicity, but that they are required to do so by the most rigid forms of orthodoxy, and the soundest philosophy, as well as by the interests of secular society and civilization.

But after all, he only sings us the song sung by Lamennais, and the whole swarm of the so-called Neo-catholics, and simply proves that he is a slave of the age against which he is everywhere so sarcastic, not, as he no doubt honestly believes, one of its masters. It is remarkable, too, that with him, as with Lamennais, Ultramontanism and high-toned orthodoxy are far more apparent than real. Even we ourselves are, in reading his *Del Primato*, occasionally startled by some of his strong assertions of the civil power of the Pope; but as we read on, we find that we had no reason to be startled, and that the power of the Pope dwindles down into a very commonplace affair, as he somewhere says, only the power infidels readily accord to a respectable parish priest, — and is, after all, merely a power that grows out of the accidental condition of nations in space and time, rather than a power held and exercised by virtue of the positive and express institution of Almighty God. So Lamennais made a furious onslaught upon Gallicanism, and yet ended by making the authority of the Church herself depend on the *consensus hominum*, and resolving the Christian religion into pure socialism. Gioberti attacks Gallicanism with great strength of language, and great force of argument, and yet winds up the controversy by telling us, — “The principal error of the famous Gallican Declaration of 1682 consisted in asserting as universal what is and must be only particular. It is beyond

doubt that, in nations that have attained to civil maturity, the government, in temporal things, is wholly independent of the Pope and the clergy, and that the clergy, *participating in the general culture*, possesses by good right certain canonical and disciplinary liberties which should be respected by all ; for it is a general rule, applicable to all ecclesiastical as well as to all civil government, that absolute and arbitrary authority is good and legitimate only in barbarous ages, and even then only because *no other order is then possible*." * That is to say, Gallicanism is, in the main, true, when asserted of a given time and place, or of nations that have attained a certain grade of civilization, though false when asserted as true of all times and places, and of nations through all the stages of their civil development. This implies that the *actual* powers of the Papacy derive, not from the positive and immediate grant of our Lord to Peter, but from those political and social accidents which demand them ; that is, they grow out of the wants or necessities of society, and inhere in the Papacy solely because it is in the best condition to assume and exercise them for social organization and progress, which, in principle, is the assertion simply of the government of the *optimates*, — of the Pope, not because he is the Divinely appointed sovereign, but because, in reference to time, place, and circumstances, he is the wisest, and best able to govern, — the doctrine which Thomas Carlyle, the inveterate pantheist, has been for these fifteen or twenty years harping upon *ad nauseam*. The right to govern, whether in Church or state, depends on the Divine appointment, not on the personal qualifications of the governors, and the *optimates* are always those who are legitimately invested with authority, and are such solely because so invested. The right gives the capacity to govern, not the capacity the right.

It is undoubtedly true, that the Sovereign Pontiffs do not, and cannot in the existing state of the secular order in Europe, exercise all the powers they did in the earlier ages of the modern world, and therefore we readily grant that those powers are now to some extent in abeyance. But it is one thing to recognize this as a fact, and another to recognize it as a law. We are aware that Gioberti holds to what he calls "moderate optimism," as was to be expected from an ardent admirer of Leibnitz ; but we are not aware that in this respect Catholic faith requires us to agree with him, and we confess that we have

* *Del Primato*, Tom. I. p. 219, note.

never been able to agree with the pupil of Lord Bollingbroke, that "Whatever is, is right."

Because such political and social changes have taken place in the world, as render the exercise of certain powers on the part of the sovereign pontiffs impracticable or inexpedient, it does not follow that the Papacy does not still actually possess them, or that the well-being of society does not as imperiously demand their exercise now, as before the changes occurred. The fact that they cannot be exercised may be a social calamity, instead of a social progress; and it is very conceivable, that, if society had continued to follow the Christian law, their exercise would not have become impracticable. We agree that regard must be had to time and place, and that certain powers must be exercised by the clergy in certain circumstances which in other circumstances they are not required to exercise in the same form. We concede that to attempt the practical assertion of what Gioberti calls the dictatorship would in our times most likely be productive of evil rather than good; but we do not concede that this is so because modern nations have attained to civil majority, and therefore do not need it. The reason is, simply, that modern nations have, to a great extent, lost their faith, and will not heed the commands of their father. It is as necessary for them to receive and obey the paternal commands as ever it was, but they have grown so rebellious and stubborn that they will not.

Gioberti's theory about the minority and majority of nations is no doubt plausible; and if it were true in fact, that a nation ever does attain to civil majority, we should not seriously object to his doctrine, nay, we could not, without contradicting doctrines heretofore advanced in our own pages. But the truth is, save in regard to the department of mere industry, no nation ever attains to majority, and every one is as much a minor when in the most as when in the least advanced stage of its civilization. We hold, with Gioberti, that civil society is the creature of the priesthood, and that it is in all times and places through the priesthood, not, as modern demagogues pretend, through the people, that Almighty God invests civil society with its authority to govern; therefore we also hold with him, that the civil no less than the spiritual sovereignty under God vests immediately in the Divinely instituted priesthood, and in civil society only *mediante* the sacerdotal society. With what he says on this point we cordially agree, and we had maintained sub-

stantially the same doctrine in *The Democratic Review*, while still a Protestant. But that there ever comes a time when the priesthood is required to abandon its civil sovereignty and recognize the independence of the civil order, we are not prepared to concede; for, among other reasons, there never comes a time when the independence of the civil order does not conduct the nation to barbarism. All civilization is of sacerdotal origin, and must be lost just in proportion as society escapes from subjection to the priesthood. The reason of this is, that the elements of civilization are from the supernatural order, and the elements of barbarism are inherent in human nature, reproduced in every new-born individual, and retained in the bosom of every human being as long as he remains in the flesh. Barbarism has its seat in the carnal mind, the inferior soul, the natural passions, propensities, appetites, and instincts, which are always, when left to themselves, even in the saint while in this world, opposed to the law of God, and never cease to lust against the spirit, in order to bring us into captivity to the law of sin and death. The essence of barbarism is in the freedom and independence of this lower nature, in the predominance of inclination, passion, concupiscence, over reason and will. Civilization is precisely in the subjection of the inferior soul in the community to the superior, and in the assertion and maintenance of the sovereignty of right reason, that is, **THE SUPREMACY OF LAW.**

But this supremacy is secured by no possible secular culture; for it is the work in the individual, and therefore in society, not of natural reason and will, but of supernatural grace, of which the priesthood is the minister. It is of faith, we believe, that man, in his lapsed state, cannot without grace fulfil even the law of nature, and this grace is as necessary in the case of the learned, the cultivated, the refined, as it is in the case of the rude and simple. No natural training, no merely secular culture, is sufficient to subdue the barbarous elements in our nature, and the Christian maintains his virtue, and the constant predominance in his own bosom of the essential elements of civilization, only by constant vigilance, and continual recourse to the means of grace. If he relaxes his vigilance, if he neglects the sacraments, if he foregoes prayer and meditation, if he trusts to the training he has already received, to the habits already formed, or which have been infused into him by the Holy Ghost, he loses his spiritual freedom, fails to maintain the supremacy of reason, suffers the animal nature, the beast that is in him, to

become independent, predominant, and lapses into the barbarian and the savage.

This, which is undeniably true of the individual, is equally true of communities and nations. No nation remains civilized without the constant presence and activity of the powers that originally civilized it, any more than creatures continue to exist without the immanence of the creative act which produces them from nothing. In consequence of retaining always and everywhere in its bosom the germs of barbarism, which no culture can eradicate, and which are ever ready to spring up, blossom, and bear fruit, the moment the sacerdotal vigilance and authority are withdrawn, or even relaxed, the nation in regard to civilization remains always in the state of a minor, and never does and never can attain to majority, — to a state in which it need be no longer under the parental dictation, and can safely be trusted to set up for itself. This has been amply proved by the modern revolutions in France and Italy, the two most civilized nations in the world; and both, especially France, if especially France, the moment the temporal order set up for itself, and asserted its independence, have exhibited a barbarism that it would be difficult to match in the annals of the old Vandals, Goths, and Huns. We have never seen grosser barbarism than Paris exhibited under the Convention, or Rome under the recent Triumvirate, and the nations of Europe, as did those of Asia and Africa, approach barbarism just in proportion as they break from the parental authority of the Sovereign Pontiff. This proves that these nations have not attained to civil majority, and that whatever sacerdotal authority is demanded by nations in their infancy is demanded equally by them through all the stages of their existence. We cannot, therefore, agree with the learned and philosophic author, that the principal error of Gallicanism was in asserting as universal what is true only in particular cases. Gallicanism is either universally true, or it is universally false, and it was no more applicable to the France of Louis Quatorze than to the France of Pepin or Clovis.

It is not true, again, that the clergy, as Gioberti insinuates, rather than expressly asserts, show themselves reluctant to concede the civil emancipation of nations, and determined to continue their tutelage beyond its proper time. The clergy have never shown any thing of the sort, and, if any fault is to be charged against them, it is the fault of having been too yielding to the temporal power, of not having always asserted with suffi-

cient firmness, constancy, and energy their own rights and pre-rogatives against its grasping ambition and sacrilegious encroachments. If the clergy have sinned at all, it has not been against the civil order, as distinguished from the ecclesiastical, it has not been in too strenuously asserting the sacerdotal dictatorship, but in not asserting it, in siding, for the sake of peace, or now and then for the sake of their revenues, with the temporal prince, as mere laics, instead of rallying to the support of their spiritual chief; that is, in doing the very thing in principle that Gioberti counsels them to do, and in not doing the very thing he accuses them of having done. The grasping of power over the civil order, or tenacity in clinging to it, has never been a vice or failing of the Christian priesthood, and they have always shown themselves ready and willing to yield to the temporal authorities all that could be yielded without giving up the faith, or sacrificing the freedom of religion, as the early rise and wide prevalence of what is called Gallicanism abundantly prove.

The schism is not caused or exaggerated by the efforts of the clergy to retain an undue control over the secular order, and those who have followed Gioberti's advice, and yielded to the modern spirit, have effected nothing towards healing it. The countenance some of them showed, from 1845 to 1849, to the revolutionary movements in Italy, served only to weaken their legitimate influence, to diminish reverence for the Church in her spiritual character, and to please, embolden, and strengthen the enemies of religion and society, — to give up Rome to the savage Mazzinis and Garibaldis, and to subject their own order to a bitter persecution, which we fear is yet far from being ended. They were applauded for the moment by heretics and infidels, Freemasons and Carbonari, Red Republicans and Socialists, and some persons were simple enough to regard these applauses as indicating a growing respect for the Church, and a return to Catholicity, whereas they really indicated only the demoniacal joy of the enemies of truth and sanctity, that the clergy themselves were destroying the Church by bringing her to them, instead of insisting, as formerly, on their coming to her. When the modern liberalists applauded Pius the Ninth, it was not because their feelings towards the Church had changed, but because they believed, or hoped to make the Catholic population believe, that the Pope was himself a liberalist in the chair of St. Peter; and when he was obliged, in order to undeceive them, or to prevent them from deceiving the faithful, to protest against their interpretation of

his acts, they cried out, "Death to Pius the Ninth!" and compelled him to flee from Rome, and seek a refuge in exile.

This leads us to consider the remedy proposed. Gioberti would retain the supremacy of the Church, — in words, certainly, — and preserve for the Pope the civil arbitratorship. Yet his means of healing the schism are not the absolute subjection of the temporal order to the spiritual, as demanded by his own dialectics, but, as we have said, the union, alliance, or interfusion of the two orders, that is, of the sacerdotal and lay culture. As the case now stands, sacerdotal culture is mystical, excessively ascetic, and does not make sufficient account of earthly felicity and the advance of civilization, or temporal prosperity of nations; and secular culture is weak, mean, contemptible, disgraceful, because it lacks the order of truth, of which the priesthood is the sole depositary. A true culture and a true and noble civilization are possible only by the union or coalition of the two orders of culture, rendering the one less unworldly, and the other more ideal, or philosophical. To do this is the business of the priesthood, because the priesthood is the creator, in the order of second causes, of civilization.

Religion, throughout Gioberti's works, as far as we have read them, is considered only as the grand civilizing agency of mankind, and civilization is held to be in itself, not indeed the supreme good, but a real good, which we are to seek for its own sake. The advancement of civilization for its own sake, and the earthly felicity it secures, is set forth as a noble and laudable aim, and as an end to which the Church should exert, directly and intentionally, her various powers and influences. After having established his first principles, and attempted to show that, according to them, all life and all dialectics are in harmonizing extremes, conciliating opposites, or contraries, he proceeds to say, —

"The application of these principles to our subject is not difficult. The religious and universal society which is called the Church and Catholicity is a complex of forces, which, in so far as finite and having a temporal aim, are subjected to the general laws of every dynamic process. The action of this grand community is in the preservation and development of the ideal principles, in the twofold order of things and cognitions, and therefore works and manifests itself as doctrine and as art. As doctrine, it is the guardian of the ideal principles in their primitive purity and integrity, and the deduction of all the secondary truths included in them; as art, it is

the application of the doctrine to active life in order to the production of the earthly felicity of mankind ; for I am considering here religion only in so far as it is the supreme dialectics conciliating human forces on the earth, and the system of civilization directed to the temporal well-being of nations, not as the direct instrument of celestial salvation, or of eternal beatitude." — *Del Primato, Avvertenza*, Tom. I. pp. 94, 95.

That the author holds that this mode of considering religion is proper, and that religion, as a civilizer and promoter of earthly well-being, may be distinguished from religion as the medium of salvation, and considered apart, is clear, not only from the passage just cited, but from the whole tenor of his teachings. His primary charge against the Jesuits is, that they do not seek to advance civilization, do not allow free and independent thinking, and that they discourage the developments of genius and the attainment of mental excellence, — a charge itself full of meaning. He adds : —

" Understanding (*l'ingegno*), informed and strengthened by virtue, produces the precious fruits of civilization and science, which are two inseparable things, since the former is only the practical use and application of the latter. To oppose civil progress, and the cognitions which effect it, is an attempt injurious to God, repugnant to the order and design of the world, fatal to mankind, and contrary to the spirit, the precepts, and the purpose of Christianity. It offends God, because civilization is divine, like religion, to which it is inferior only inasmuch as it aims directly at time instead of eternity. But as eternity, in respect to creatures, presupposes temporal duration, and is, so to speak, its consummation, he who disrelishes and discountenances worldly interests prejudices the heavenly, as every one opposes the end who weakens or obstructs the aids by which it is to be gained. Civilization and religion alike import the superiority and victory of the soul over the body, of reason over sense, of will over instinct, of law over brute force, of the spirit over nature, of man over the other terrestrial beings, and of finite intelligences over the corporeal universe. So that it may be said that religion is absolute and perfect civilization, as secular culture is an initial religion, which bears to the other the relation of a part to the whole, or of the beginning to its completion. Both are alike universal, dialectic, conciliative ; both combat the same enemy, that is, blind and fatal forces, and tend to repress without destroying them, by subjecting them to the directing authority of intellect and reason : and hence, as their powers are gradually developed, they are transformed one into the other, and their effects prove them to be identical." — *Ibid.*, p. 140.

This is intelligible, and very much to the purpose. But here is something more.

“ The maxims of a falsely understood mysticism, and its abusive effects, to which science and civilization give occasion, lead many persons of good faith, but of narrow minds, if not wholly to repudiate, at least to distrust and discountenance, these two noblest parts of understanding. It appears to the abettors of an exaggerated asceticism as a sort of sacrilege to regard temporal things as of some account, and to occupy ourselves with them, since our ultimate end, our abiding country, is not on the earth, but in heaven. Moreover, finding that we are in a fallen state, and that our present life is intended to be an expiation, a penalty, it seems to the exaggerated mystics, that to improve our earthly condition would be to favor the corruption to which it is subjected, and to lessen or destroy the expiatory penalty, which is the only possible profit to be drawn from it. But this doctrine is not Christian, since, according to the teachings of the Gospel, nature, although greatly impaired, is not substantially changed, and the germs of good nestle in its bosom by the side of the contrary powers. It is, therefore, our duty to regenerate it, and ameliorate it as much as possible, but not to neglect what it retains that is good, far less to exterminate it. Manichæism, and the pantheistic systems connected with it, admit, indeed, the essential malignity of the corporeal world ; and not far removed from this heresy are they who, exaggerating the dogma of the Fall, presuppose that it has changed and perverted the essence of nature. Now, if the natural orders have not essentially changed, it follows, that, notwithstanding the introduction of evil, the primitive condition of the earth has not varied, and that it is always, as in the beginning, a place of probation, of progress, and of melioration to its inhabitants. The only difference there is between the primitive state and the present is, that in the beginning man had only to develop and cultivate the seeds of good, whereas now he is obliged, in addition, to extirpate those of evil which are sown among them. Hence life, which in no case could have been idle, is now not simply business, but also toil, or rather a fatiguing business, in which the duty of expiation does not essentially alter the reasons of earthly existence, or change in regard to it the universal properties of every dialectic work. This, consisting in evolving and harmonizing diversities and contrarieties, and not in annulling the sound and the positive that is found in them, is at all times the office of man on the earth ; and in this respect our globe does not differ from other stations of the universe subjected to the course of ages, and to the great law of development. Now, what else is civilization, in so far as it depends on us, but the continuous development of terrestrial forces ? The conclusions of Christianity, then, accord with those of a severe and profound philosophy,

which, unable to deny the coexistence of good and its opposite, must impose upon us a double correlative duty, the fulfilment of which is civilization or religion, as referred to this life or to that which is to come." — *Ibid.*, pp. 142, 143.

It is evident from these extracts, that the author holds civilization and religion to be alike divine, and that to live and labor for earthly happiness and the temporal prosperity of nations is, as far as it goes, as much to serve God, and to keep his commandments, as to live and labor for eternal beatitude. No doubt the temporal end is to be held inferior and subordinate to the eternal, but it is nevertheless equally sacred, and is not to be sacrificed to it. The two ends are both substantive, so to speak, and are to be harmonized without the destruction of either. The harmonizing of these two ends authorizes the union or alliance of the two orders, the two cultures, sacerdotal and secular, or rather is itself that very union or alliance of which we have spoken. Hence the author's condemnation of the mystics, the exaggerated (?) ascetics, and especially the old Oriental monks and the modern Jesuits, whose teaching is, that man should immolate himself to God, and earth to heaven. This teaching he cannot endure.

"Another exaggeration," he says, "is the disregard, the contempt, and hatred of profane literature, and that rich, intellectual patrimony of eloquence, taste, imagination, invention, memory, institutions, which the ancients have transmitted to us, as if the Christian religion could be the enemy of that which embellishes, consoles, strengthens, and even meliorates, humanly speaking, our mortal life, and as if the spirit of the Gospel consisted, not in the subordination and wise direction, but in the immolation, of the body to the soul, time to eternity, earth to heaven, — a supposition most foreign to that faith which is invoked to justify it, injurious to Providence, and contrary to his designs in the ideal history of the world; for civilization, although of inferior excellence, is no less divine in its principle, in its essence, and in its terminus, than religion." — *Ibid.*, p. 112.

Even Bossuet, according to our Italian Abbate, runs into intemperate ascetism, especially in his indiscriminate censure of the modern theatre, and never made sufficient account of this world. He adds in a note to his *Del Primato*, —

"A worthy French writer belonging to the clerical order, and a great admirer of Bossuet, confesses that Bossuet had a very imperfect conception of Providence, and he excuses him by casting the blame on his age. 'In the age of Bossuet,' he says, 'the opinion

of the Middle Ages which requires man to live exclusively for eternity (*qui jette l'homme entier dans l'éternité*), which treats things of time with a disdainful indifference, and holds them to be unworthy to draw down the judgments of heaven upon them, still survived.' He elsewhere asserts that Bossuet was ignorant of the true genius of modern civilization."—Tom. II. p. 403.

It is not difficult to understand what the learned, philosophical, and we wish we could add, pious author means by "intemperate," "excessive," "exaggerated," asceticism; and the doctrine he opposes to it seems to us to be plain enough. We certainly are not among those, if such there are in the Church, who regard religion as inimical to civilization, or to any thing which is really useful to men in this life. That religion promotes or creates civilization, that, so far as received and obeyed, it provides for and secures the temporal prosperity of nations, cultivates the human mind and heart, favors science and the fine arts, fosters industry, and diffuses earthly happiness, we hold to be unquestionable, and we cannot understand how any right-minded man, with ordinary information, can pretend to the contrary. Thus far we certainly have no quarrel with our author, but agree with him most fully and most heartily. But it does not do this by teaching us to set our hearts upon these things, to value them for their own sake, or to make them direct objects of pursuit. This world is not our home, and we are never permitted by religion to regard it as such. We are, *in hac providentia*, beings with one destiny, not with a twofold destiny, the one earthly, the other heavenly; and therefore earthly felicity, the temporal prosperity of nations, and the melioration of the globe and of our condition on it, are not and never can be our lawful end, or lawfully consulted, save as a means and condition, if such they are or can be, of attaining our heavenly destiny,—eternal beatitude. We are not permitted to consult them as ultimate, even in their own order, or to regard ourselves as keeping the commandments of God, because we accept and use religious authority, dogmas, and institutions for securing them. Religion knows no earthly end; it knows no end but God himself, and no good for us but in returning to him as our final cause, and beholding him in the beatific vision. It does not and cannot, therefore, allow us to distinguish an earthly destiny from the heavenly, and to make it a direct object of our affections or of our pursuit. Here, it seems to us, is the primal error of our author. He professedly considers religion only in so far as it is an in-

strument of civilization, of earthly individual and social well-being, and avowedly waives its consideration as the instrument of salvation, of eternal beatitude. This, he must permit us to say, he has no right to do, *because religion thus considered is not true religion*, and because, so considered, *it is and can be no instrument of civilization, no medium even of earthly felicity*.

Religion promotes, or, if the author chooses, creates, civilization, secures the temporal prosperity of nations, and provides for earthly felicity, only inasmuch as it draws our minds and hearts off from these things, and fixes them on God and eternal beatitude. No well-instructed Christian pretends that we secure heavenly beatitude by simply laboring for earthly happiness, eternity by devoting ourselves to time; but just as little do we, or can we, secure earthly happiness by making it an object of pursuit, or time by devoting ourselves to time. The earthly, in so far as good, has its root in the heavenly, and time is simply the extrinsication of eternity. The author's own dialectics establish this, and all experience proves it. We lose the world by seeking it. Wealth sought for a worldly end does not enrich, pleasure does not please, knowledge does not enlighten. The fact holds true, whether you speak of the individual or of the nation. No nation, even in regard to this world, is more to be pitied, than that which places its affections on things of the earth, and its religion wholly or partially even in seeking temporal power, greatness, prosperity, and felicity. It never attains really what it seeks. Its prosperity, however dazzling it may be to the superficial beholder, is rotten within, — its apparent felicity a gilded misery; and its highest glory is that of the ghastly and grinning skeleton dressed in festive robes and crowned with flowers, for the Egyptian banquet. Hence our Lord says, — "If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, take up his cross, and follow me. For whosoever will save his life shall lose it."* The reason of this is obvious enough. Man can find good, temporal or eternal, only in living his normal life, and he lives his normal life only when he lives to the end for which he was intended by his Maker, that is to say, his ultimate end, which is God as the Supreme Good, the end of all things. Whenever, then, he loses sight of God as the Supreme Good in itself, or as his supreme good, he abandons the source of all good, and falls into a condition in which there is no good for him.

* St. Matt. xvi. 24, 25.

The author tells us, indeed, that he is not writing a book of devotion, and we are not so unreasonable as to ask, in a work on philosophy or on politics, an ascetic treatise ; but we must be permitted to say, that when he leaves out the consideration of religion as the instrument of celestial salvation and eternal beatitude, or the duty of seeking these, and the means, agencies, and influences by which they are gained, he leaves out all that renders religion efficient in the work of civilization, of securing earthly felicity, and the temporal prosperity of nations ; because it is only by instructing us in the principles of eternal life, by directing our minds and hearts to the gaining of our true end as the one sole business of our lives, and infusing into us the graces, and furnishing us with the helps, necessary to gain it, that religion affords us any aid in subduing barbarism, in advancing civilization, or securing the blessings of time. Considered merely as civilization, or as an agent in promoting civilization, religion is not religion, becomes merely human, and passes wholly into the secular order, and therefore necessarily loses all power or influence over it. The author, although not writing a work expressly on devotion, was, inasmuch as he presented religion as a civilizer and promoter of well-being on earth, bound to present her under that point of view in which she is able to do, and does do, what he claims, and therefore was bound to present her as the instrument of celestial salvation and eternal beatitude, since it is only because she is that instrument that she is an instrument of civilization and earthly happiness.

The author errs, as it seems to us, not as to the fact of the civilizing influence of religion, but as to the *rationale* of that fact. Christianity secures us all the goods of this life, and enhances them a hundredfold ; but she does it, not by stimulating and directing the pursuit of them, but by commanding and enabling us to immolate them, morally, to the goods of eternity. Hence our Lord says, “ Be not solicitous for your life, what ye shall eat, nor for your body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than the food, and the body more than the raiment ? Behold the fowls of the air, for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns, yet your Heavenly Father feedeth them. Are not ye of much more value than they ? And which of you by thinking can add to his stature one cubit ? And for raiment, why are ye solicitous ? Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow ; they labor not, neither do they spin. And yet I say unto you that not even Solomon in all his glory was arrayed as one of these. Now, if God so clothe the

grass of the field, which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the oven, how much more you, O ye of little faith! Be not solicitous, therefore, saying, What shall we eat, or What shall we drink, or Wherewith shall we be clothed? *For after all these things do the heathen seek.* For your Heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things. Seek ye, therefore, first the kingdom of God and his justice, *and all these things shall be added unto you.*"* The doctrine here is too plain to be easily misapprehended. It is not, that you must seek the kingdom of God and his justice more than you seek the world, but that you are to seek them as the principle, and the world only in them and for them, as is evident from the 24th verse of the same chapter: — "No man can serve two masters, for either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will hold to the one and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and Mammon." If this be so, the teaching of our Lord is plainly the immolation — the moral immolation, of course, not the physical — of ourselves to God, of the body to the soul, time to eternity, earth to heaven, — the very contradictory of Gioberti's doctrine, as we understand it, — and that when we so immolate ourselves and all secular interests to God, making a complete moral abnegation of the whole, all these things, that is, all temporal goods, in so far as goods, and of which our Heavenly Father knoweth we have need, are added to us, as our Lord here says, and as he teaches us when he tells us that "whosoever will save his life shall lose it; and he that will lose his life for my sake shall find it." The principle we here insist upon, that earthly goods are attainable only in so far as we abnegate them, turn our backs upon them, and seek only heavenly goods, not by laboring to lay up treasures on the earth, but by laboring exclusively to lay up treasures in heaven, Gioberti seems to us to have overlooked, and hence his condemnation of the ascetics, his war against the Jesuits, his great admiration of gentile culture, of heathen civilization, and the worldly tendency and influence of his writings.

The author does not appear to us to be just to the mystics, or ascetics, for he evidently means to include among them many whom the Church has beatified, and proposes to the veneration of the faithful, — the anchorites of the Thebais, St. Anthony, St. Pachomius, St. Simon Stylites, and the Oriental monks generally, as well as some modern religious who happened

* St. Matt. vi. 25 - 33.

not to be Italians. That some pantheistic and dualistic systems have led in the pagan world to extraordinary austerities on the one hand, and a censurable quietism on the other, may or may not be true, for with them we have at present no concern; but that the asceticism found in the Church, practised by Catholics, and especially by Catholic saints, has ever been affected by any obvious or secret taint of the doctrine of the inherent malignity of matter is not true. The mortifications and self-denials practised have always had another and a truly Christian reason, — the reason, on the one hand, of discipline, and on the other, of expiation. It is a great mistake, also, to suppose that none but the active orders are useful to others than themselves. The contemplative orders are, to say the least, no less useful. Our Lord did not place Martha above Mary, and we have entirely misapprehended our holy religion, if even a St. Simon Stylites was lost to mankind by giving himself entirely to God. It will not do to forget that our temporal as well as our spiritual blessings come from God, and that he is moved to grant both by the prayers and intercessions of his saints. Moses holding up his hands in prayer contributed not less to the victory of the children of Israel over the Amalekites, than Josue, who led them forth to the battle. They who set at Jesus's feet and listen to his words choose the good part, and he loves them, and who can tell us how much he has done and daily does for us poor worldly sinners, in answer to their prayers? Perhaps, if our deserts were filled with holy hermits and devout anchorites, whose life is one unremitting prayer, the world would not be overrun with infidelity and irreligion; and we have no doubt that the prayer and mortification of a single pious contemplative, however obscure or remote from the busy haunts of men, is worth more for the conversion of the unbeliever than all that Gioberti or any other philosopher has ever written or ever will write. Doubtless, all are not called to be contemplatives; doubtless the saints have done things which are not to be proposed for the imitation of every one; but what men like our author would term extravagance, exaggeration, or sublime folly, perhaps is no extravagance, exaggeration, or folly in them, and always in proportion as we approach that which is wise in the sight of God do we approach that which is foolish in the sight of the world.

The author in his condemnation of asceticism, and in his attempt to unite the world and God, earth and heaven, time and eternity, philosophy and theology, heathenism and Christianity,

lay culture and sacerdotal, or, in a word, if he will permit us to say so, to combine the service of mammon with the service of God, seems to us to depart from his own ideal formula, no less than from the Gospel. His formula, as we understand it, asserts not the harmony of the two orders, but the absolute supremacy of the one, and the absolute subjection of the other. This formula is, *L' Ente crea l' esistenze* ; *Ens creat existencias* ; or, Being — that is, God — creates existences ; as we are taught in the first verse of Genesis, in the first question of the Catechism, and the first article of the Creed. It is intuitively evident to us, but is and can be presented to the mind as an object of reflection, or of distinct thought, only in language, which is in its origin a Divine revelation. We accept this formula as axiomatic, as the *primum philosophicum*, and regard the author, in having restored it to modern philosophy, vindicated its truth, and shown its fecundity, as deserving the gratitude of all who wish to be able to refute scientifically sensism, pantheism, and nullism.

This formula is a synthetic judgment, *a priori*, and, like every judgment, contains three terms, the subject, the predicate, and the copula. The subject is *God*, the predicate is *existences*, and the copula is *creation*, or the creative act. The predicate *existences* is affirmable only by means of creation, for it is only *mediante* the creative act of God that existences exist, or that there are existences, as distinguishable from *Ens*, or God himself. The creative act produces them from nothing, causes them to be, and therefore their relation to God cannot be the relation of co-subsistences, or independent entities, harmonized or conciliated by a middle term, but must be that of the creature to the creator, and therefore that of absolute dependence, and hence of absolute subjection.

This ideal formula, according to the author, and in this we agree with him, is the ontological basis of all dialectics,— for the order of cognition must in all respects correspond to the order of being ; and since it is the basis of the whole created order, it must reappear in every fact of the universe, and therefore in every fact of human life. God as creator enters universally, and therefore must be represented universally as the subject, in the order of second causes. Consequently there must also always enter or be represented in the same order the other two terms, that is, predicate and copula, answering in their degree to creature and creation in the order of the first cause. Now, in relation to the question before us, the subject is the priest-

hood, the predicate is civilization, and the copula the creative act, in the order of second causes, whence the formula becomes, *The priesthood creates civilization*. Consequently, the relation of society or civilization to the sacerdotal order is that of creature to creator, and therefore that of absolute dependence, which is the assertion of the absolute subjection of the secular order, under God, to the spiritual. The two orders are not, therefore, two independent, coexisting orders, to be reconciled or harmonized one with the other by a middle term. No union, alliance, or marriage between them is supposable ; for these terms imply a certain degree of independence or autonomy on the part of the secular order in relation to the sacerdotal, which is denied by the ideal formula, and is as inadmissible as the assertion of an autonomic power on the part of existences in relation to God creating them, authorizing them to say to him, in some measure, what and with what qualities he shall or shall not make them. In demanding, therefore, as he does, the emancipation of what he calls adult nations from sacerdotal tutelage, or their civil independence, and the union of sacred and profane literature, of sacerdotal and secular culture, that is to say, in order to speak without disguise, of Christianity and gentilism, the author obviously departs from his own ideal formula, and misapplies his own dialectics.

The author very properly recognizes two cosmic cycles, the one the procession of existences, by way of creation, not emanation, from God as first cause, and the other, the return of existences, without being absorbed in him, to God as final cause. God is the final cause, as he is the first cause, of all existences, for he has created all things for himself. Now, all practical life, all manifestation of created activity, belongs to this second cycle, the return of existences to God. The end, or final cause, is the legislator,—imposes the law ; and God, as our sole end, or final cause, is therefore our sole and absolute legislator. The law he imposes is absolute, universal. God alone hath true and complete autonomy, and in the order of second causes that only is in a secondary sense autonomic which represents the subject in the ideal formula. Man before God as final cause has no more autonomy than he has before God as first cause, that is to say, none at all. He has before God, then, no rights, no independence, but is bound to absolute submission to his law. The law is the copula, the ligament that binds man to his final end, or supreme good, and is in the second cosmic cycle what the creative act is in the first ; that

is, the law in the order of *palingenesis* is what the creative act is in the order of *genesis*. As there is no physical cosmos save *mediante* the creative act of God, so is there no moral cosmos save *mediante* the law of God. As all physical existence is from God as first cause, *mediante* creation, so all moral existence is from God as final cause, *mediante* obedience to his law. Without seeking God as final cause, as his law commands, there is no proper morality, any more than there is or can be holy living, or supernatural sanctity.

The priesthood, as Catholicity teaches, is the sole depositary, guardian, and interpreter of the law of God, and therefore represents for us the sole and absolute legislator, not, of course, by virtue of the humanity of its members, but by Divine constitution, appointment, and assistance. The authority of the priesthood, then, extends to the whole of practical life, and that practical life is moral, therefore good, only inasmuch as it is submissive or obedient to the law as they promulgate and declare it. There is, then, and can be, no order of life, individual or social, that has or can have any autonomy in the face of the Church, or that is or can be pronounced morally good, save in so far as subjected to her and informed by obedience to her as representative of the authority of God as universal, absolute legislator. This, if we understand the author, is what his own dialectics require us to assert. Secular culture, then, in order to be moral, in order to have any right to be, must be the product of sacerdotal culture, receive its law and its informing spirit from the Divinely authorized priesthood, and be in all things dependent on it, and subject to it. Hence, the schism we spoke of in the beginning is not to be healed by a union of secular culture with the sacerdotal, but by the absolute subjection of the former to the latter, because the former, in so far as it does not proceed from the latter and depend on it, proceeds from human activity, not subjected to the law of God, and therefore is not moral.

We do not suppose that Gioberti really means to deny this conclusion, although much he says is not easily reconcilable with it. He earnestly contends that all civilization is of sacerdotal origin, but he seems to us to suppose that in a truly civilized state the proper office of the priesthood is restricted to the dispensation of the mysteries of religion, or the revelation of God as the superintelligible, and that the revelation of God as the intelligible is free to the lay genius, which has the right to cultivate it without any dependence on the sacerdotal order, so

long as it does not run athwart any supernatural dogma. He very properly asserts two orders of ideal truth, one the natural, or revelation of God as Idea, or the Intelligible, and the other supernatural, or the revelation of God as the Superintelligible. The former revelation is philosophy, the latter faith, objectively considered. Both are given originally in language, supernaturally infused into the human mind with language, which is itself a Divine revelation. So all science is originally a Divine revelation, not a human invention, creation, or discovery. But one part, the revelation of the Intelligible, though not naturally discoverable, is yet, when presented in language, naturally evident, that is, intuitive, or evident *per se*. Thus language is the medium through which the mind apprehends it, but not the authority on which it receives it, or assents to its truth. The other part, the revelation of the Superintelligible, being mystery, is not only apprehended through the medium of language, but is received on the authority of language alone, that is, on the authority of the hieratic language, preserved from corruption, and in its purity and integrity, by the infallible hieratic society, or priesthood.

The primitive science of both orders was transmitted without division till the epoch of the dispersion of mankind, but since that epoch, or the time of Phaleg, it has been transmitted through two different channels, the one orthodox, running through the patriarchs, the synagogue, and the Catholic Church, down to us ; the other heterodox, running through the Egyptian, Hindoo, Italian, Greek, and Roman, or, in a word, pagan priest-hoods. There is a double tradition, the tradition of the supernatural revelation and of the scientific, and a double channel of tradition, the orthodox and the heterodox, or the Catholic and the pagan. In the orthodox, the Church, or the elect society, the tradition of the revelation of the *Superintelligible* has come down to us in its purity and integrity, in the infallible language or speech of the orthodox priesthood. In the pagan, it has been more or less corrupted, and wholly lost, or so travestied that it is hardly possible to detect some traces of it in the various heathen myths and fables. Yet the author seems to us to hold that the revelation of the *Intelligible*, that is, philosophy, the scientific tradition, has been transmitted in greater purity, and with fuller and grander developments, by the old heterodox or pagan priest-hoods, than by the orthodox priesthood, and that in this respect the ancient gentile world was superior, if not to the ancient, at least to the modern, orthodox world. In

other words, that the gentile culture, including philosophy and all that pertains to strictly secular life, — what we call *lay* culture, for we recognize no *priestly* character in the heathen priest-hoods, — was superior to that which attains under Christianity, and that we should now, instead of denouncing it as of the Devil, accept it, and endeavour to effect a union between it and Christianity ; and this he appears to think we may do without departing from the ideal formula, because the basis of this culture was the primitive revelation of the intelligible in language, and because it was the work of the pagan priesthoods, heterodox, indeed, and therefore without authority in the order of the supernatural truth, yet, as descending from the primitive priest-hoods, legitimate in the secular order, since the loss of religion, as the Council of Constance has defined in the case of the Wicliffites, does not forfeit secular rights.* Pagan culture, therefore, may be regarded as in some sort a sacerdotal culture, and therefore as created by the ideal, and in its turn in a degree autonomic.

“The speculative spirit,” says the author, “is feebler in the moderns than in the ancients. If we compare modern philosophy with that of Greece and India in their flourishing periods, we shall find on our side greater truth of doctrine (which, however, cannot be said of the larger number of modern thinkers), and greater rigor of analysis, but not, indeed, greater, or even equal, synthetic force and contemplative aptitude, in which philosophical genius principally consists. . . . We certainly cannot pretend that we surpass, or equal, the cultivated nations of antiquity, even in respect to moral qualities, such as nobleness of soul, fervor of sentiment, constancy of opinion and action, magnanimity of thought and deed, in a word, the several virtues which appertain to civil life. We must distinguish here, as in ideal cognition, the works of men from the effects of institutions, and in institutions themselves human inventions from the suggestions of religion. Under its religious aspects, our civilization is immeasurably superior to that of the most cultivated pagan nations, and surpasses it as much as the

* The learned author misapplies the decision of the Council. The Wicliffites contended that the prince who falls into mortal sin forfeits his civil rights, because, as they pretended, these rights depend on personal sanctity. This the Council condemned. But the cases are not parallel. The secular rights of the priesthood are the consequence of their spiritual rights, and spiritual rights are of course forfeited by heresy or apostacy. The pagan sacerdocies had, as sacerdocies, no legitimate secular rights or powers, because they were no legitimate priest-hoods at all. The members were really nothing but laymen, and had, as have Protestant ministers, only the rights and powers of laymen.

Gospel surpasses gentilism; and as religion, the supreme dominatrix, exercises her salutary influence on every department of individual and social life, there is no branch of our culture in which Christianity has not effected important meliorations. But however large the space occupied by religion, and however operative and efficacious it may be, it is not alone; by its side is found the nature of man, yielding to or resisting its action, enhancing or diminishing its beneficial effects. Civilization, being the mixt result of these principles, may give place in the same time to diverse qualities, and be at once good and bad, strong and weak, flourishing and declining, in the way of perfection and of degeneracy, as the matters on which it turns are referred to one or the other of these two causes. This distinction is of the greatest importance, and he who does not distinguish accurately between the natural elements and the Christian is in danger either of adulating the age or of calumniating religion; — and, in truth, some philosophers, like Machiavelli and Rousseau, do impute many defects of modern civilization to religion itself, mistaking excellences for defects, or confounding religion with superstition, — a monstrous paradox, which it is now no longer necessary to combat.

“The special characteristic of the modern man by the side of the ancient, if we speak merely of natural dispositions, is frivolity. This extends to manners, the sciences, literature, politics, opinions, and beliefs, and embraces and pollutes every branch of human thought and action. The ancients in their bloom, as, for instance, when the Italo-Greek civilization was at its height, have, in respect to us moderns, the same proportion that the full-grown man generally has to the boy. The men of Livy and Plutarch, in comparison with us, are more than mortals, or we are less than men; that is, in regard to force of mind, vigor, firmness, constancy, perseverance, courage, and all those qualities which are alike applicable to virtue or vice; for the ancients carried even into vice and crime a greatness unknown in modern times. Some would persuade us that this is a mere poetical illusion, and that this alleged superiority of the ancients proceeds from the *prestige* which imagination lends to distant objects, and the rhetorical art of the ancient authors. But this is not true. The facts speak for themselves, and there is here no question of style, eloquence, or rhetoric, but history; for Greek and Roman facts, narrated as rudely and as nakedly as you please, are still wonderful. Salamis, Thermopylæ, Sparta, Leuctra, Homer, Pythagoras, Socrates, Epaminondas, Timoleon, Camillus, Scipio, Fabricius, Cato, the Roman Senate, law, and jurisconsults, the games and theatres, the literature and arts, of those times, — alone perfect, because they join simplicity and polish to force, — stand as unique portents in the world; and they are so attractive, that, were it not for Christianity, and the incóparable benefits with which it has en-

riched even this life, whoever has the heart of a man, and a single generous feeling in his soul, would be disposed to murmur at Providence for having given us our birth amid the meanness and filth of the modern world. Other parts of antiquity, and even mediæval facts, are also remote in place and time, and have a certain poetic charm when embellished by the art of the historian; but nevertheless they do not approach Greek and Roman excellence. The Middle Ages are, no doubt, admirable for their Christian genius, and the people then, so far as animated by the Catholic idea, certainly surpassed the most cultivated gentile world; but I know not what there is in their annals to admire, except what they directly or indirectly derived from religion; and the modern eulogists of Feudalism, Chivalry, Gothic Architecture, and the Crusades, strike me as being little reasonable and very dull. The knightly heroes, and all those fearless or lion-hearted warriors, with their mad adventures and silly love-making, appear to me very much like those one finds in Boiardo and Ariosto, and Cervantes, who hits them off in his inimitable way, I am inclined to believe, partakes often of the philosophical historian not less than of the satirical poet. There may be something laudable in their strong muscles and reckless generosity, but assuredly they lack simplicity and common sense, and therefore true greatness. Their courage is rendered ridiculous by the lack of worthy aim, and by effort, pomp, and ostentation. We do not find in them the prudence, the naturalness, the true valor, and the sane and tranquil fury of Themistocles, Epaminondas, and Scipio, and they amongst us who revive the chivalric practices, and fancy themselves advancing the civilization of the age, only succeed in getting themselves laughed at. If you really wish to advance the age, and have really at heart to change its manners and customs, — which, by the way, is no joke, — leave the old romances and chronicles, and turn to history; add the superhuman excellences of the Gospel to the ancient spirit of Athens, Sparta, Samnium, and Rome; assemble and melt into each other Plato and Dante, Brutus and Michael Angelo, Cato and Hildebrand, Lysurgus and Charles Borromeo; fuse together these elements, which we marvel to find separated in history, so necessary are they each to the others' perfection, and cause to come forth from their fusion a new civilization, higher and more exquisite than the world has hitherto known. This should be the great endeavour of the age, and especially of us Italians." — *Introduzione*, Tom. I. cap. 2, pp. 164–168.

We might easily extract much more to the same purport, but this is sufficient for our present purpose, and, unless we wholly mistake the author's meaning, or unless he attaches a ridiculous importance to mere external polish, fully bears us

out in our assertion, that he holds that in civilization and strictly secular culture the heterodox and pagan world surpassed, at least the modern orthodox world, and that what is now demanded for the advancement of mankind is the union of polished gentilism and Christianity; which, since polished gentilism, in so far as it has any thing not truly of Christian origin, or not created or inspired by the orthodox priesthood, is the product of the lay genius, is the union of the lay society and the sacerdotal, of secular culture and sacerdotal culture. We are not disposed to deny that the Græco-Roman civilization retained some valuable portions of the primitive revelation in the order of the intelligible, and that these gave it a certain worth, in some respects even a certain grandeur; but we do deny that the heathen world, even in its least corrupt nations, and in its most blooming periods, retained any portions of that revelation not retained by the chosen society, or the orthodox priesthood; and it seems to us not a little strange, that a writer who makes a boast of high-toned Catholicity, and holds the Catholic priesthood to be infallibly assisted and protected by the Holy Ghost, should send us from it to an acknowledged heretical and corrupt society to find portions of truth and manifestations of virtue not to be found in that priesthood itself, assumed to have always preserved the revelation in its purity and integrity. It is not an ordinary genius that would think of sending one in search of pure water from a pure to a corrupt fountain to obtain it. Gioberti tells us, over and over again, that philosophy cannot be preserved, or successfully cultivated, outside of orthodoxy and the Catholic society, yet he sends us to the old Pythagoreans and Platonists, and among the moderns principally to Leibnitz and Reid, that is, to heathens and heretics, to study it. The men he most praises are almost without exception heretics, infidels, or at least men of very questionable orthodoxy and piety. He praises Vico, indeed, but even Vico, as we have read him in a French translation, was hardly less pantheistic as to the foundation of his thought than M. Victor Cousin, whom the author wars against. He appears to hold Malebranche in high esteem, it is true, but whether this is well or not we are unable to say, for we know Malebranche only at second hand. But Leibnitz was an eclectic, as Cousin justly asserts, and the father of German rationalism, which Gioberti condemns and refutes. Dr. Reid was a Scotch Presbyterian minister, a mere psychologist, a sort of feeble prelude to the German Kant. The Pythagoreans, as Gioberti

himself confesses, held to the heresy of the eternity of matter, and Plato he owns was a moderate pantheist. Yet it is to these impure and corrupt sources he sends us to draw the living waters which are to refresh and revivify our drooping scientific world !

We confess we are not edified by finding the Abbate proposing, as the condition of producing a higher and more perfect civilization than the world has yet known, the tempering together, or fusing into one, of "Plato and Dante, Brutus and Michael Angelo, Cato and Hildebrand, Lycurgus and Charles Borromeo." Dante would have been improved by more frequent prayer and meditation, by a more strict conformity to the teachings, the spirit, and the requirements of his religion, which would have softened the asperities of his temper, sweetened his affections, and relieved the darkness of his passions, and made him more amiable as a man, without detracting from his strength, or his sublimity as a poet ; but we know not what Plato had which would have made him a more elevated or perfect character. An infusion of St. Francis of Sales, or of Fénelon, would, no doubt, have been an improvement, but not an infusion of Plato. Michael Angelo was far enough from being perfect, but we had always supposed that his defect consisted in his being too much, not in his being not enough, of a heathen, as was the case with but too many of his Italian contemporaries. What the weak-minded Brutus — if Marcus Brutus be the Brutus meant, — the ingrate, the conspirator, the assassin, the self-murderer, who conspired against his best friend, plunged his dagger into the only man worthy to govern Rome, and when defeated fell pitiably on the sword of his companion, exclaiming, "O Virtue, I have worshipped thee as a god, but I find thee an empty name !" — had which it would have been to his advantage to possess, we are quite unable to conjecture. We know nothing in Brutus to admire, unless we are prepared to inaugurate the worship of the dagger, and to proclaim the right of every man to assassinate whomsoever he takes it into his head does not understand liberty as he does, or who is not favorable to what he chooses to call patriotism.

Then, what had the stoical pedant, Cato Uticensis, — the Cato we presume the author means, — stuffed with a double quantity of the superlative pride of his sect, shrinking as a poltroon from defeat, reading Plato on immortality, and cutting his own throat, — to add to the elevation, or completeness, or finish of the character of the sainted Hildebrand, the illustrious Gregory the Seventh, who, not from pride, but from humility, never

bowed but to his God, and never lost an opportunity of asserting truth and sanctity, of withstanding the lordly, royal, or imperial oppressor, or of befriending the friendless, protecting the weak and innocent, and helping the helpless, — who, when sacrilegiously driven from Rome to Salerno, bore his exile with true Christian fortitude, in resignation, and without a murmur, and exclaimed, in yielding up his pure and heroic spirit, “ I have loved justice, and hated iniquity, — therefore I die in exile ” ? Or what could the great Cardinal St. Charles Borromeo — the learned, polished, enlightened, wise, energetic, tender, vigilant, brave, faithful, and eminently meek and affectionate Archbishop of Milan, who conferred by his heroic virtues blessings on Italy and the world, not yet exhausted — borrow to perfect his character as a man, a prince, a priest, or a saint from the stern old Spartan lawgiver, who legalized theft, adultery, and murder, forbade whatever could charm or embellish life, and rejected every virtue not a virtue of the camp ? Really the learned and philosophic Abbate must be joking, or else he must suppose that we have forgotten to study history.

We ourselves, like most men, at some period of their lives, who have studied Greek and Roman antiquity, and read the classics, especially Livy and Plutarch, have at times been disposed to rank the Græco-Roman civilization above its merits, and, indeed, we have not long since expressed our views of it in terms not fitly chosen, and which require qualification ; but we have never dreamed of commending it in the sense in which we now understand Gioberti to approve it. The heathen standard of greatness and the Christian are different, and in all important respects diametrically opposed one to the other. Tried by the heathen standard, the great men of Livy and Plutarch had qualities which the moderns have not in an equal degree ; but tried by the Christian standard, in respect to either of the qualities demanded or tolerated by our religion, they shrink, even as men, into insignificance, before the great men of the Bollandists. The principle of heathen greatness is pride, and if pride is the principle of true greatness, we certainly ought, with Gioberti, to sympathize with and admire the Græco-Roman civilization, and to hold that in the human order it far surpassed the modern. That kind of culture which takes man instead of God for its principle, and substitutes the glory of man for the glory of God, pride for humility, and earthly pleasures for heavenly, we believe was really carried, by the

ancient Greek and Roman people, to a degree of perfection to which no modern Catholic nation has as yet succeeded in carrying it. Thus far Gioberti's doctrine is unquestionably sound and undeniable.

But when it is proposed to combine this gentile culture with the superhuman excellences of the Gospel, the question changes. The spirit of ancient Athens, Sparta, Samnium, and Rome was the spirit of the world, and proposed as the end the glory of man, individual or social, and the embellishment and enjoyment of this mundane life. Now is this spirit compatible with the spirit of the Gospel? Here is the question, and we know on Divine authority that it is not; for our Lord expressly opposes his maxims to the maxims of the gentiles, and tells us that the spirit of the gentile, the heathen, — and, let Gioberti say what he will, his favorite Italo-Greek or Pelasgic nations were heathen, — was what we have just described it to be. “For after all these things do the heathen seek,” that is, what shall we eat, what shall we drink, and wherewith shall we be clothed, or, in other words, the goods and pleasures of this life. He bids us not be like them, but “seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto” us. There can be no union between the two, no alliance between pride and humility, Christ and the world. Our Lord says, Blessed are the poor in spirit, that is, the humble; the heathen adored pride. The Lord says, Blessed are they who weep; the heathen said, Blessed are they who rejoice. The Lord says, Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice's sake, and blessed are ye when men shall revile you and persecute you, and say all manner of evil against you falsely, for my sake; the heathen thought this a calamity, and more than flesh could endure. The Lord says, Lay not up treasures on earth, but lay up treasures in heaven; the heathen said, Lay up treasures on the earth. The Lord directed us not to look for our reward here, but to wait for it in heaven; the heathen said, Seek your reward in this world, and study to enjoy yourselves here, eat, drink, and be merry, while life lasts, for we know not what comes after it. Now, though Gioberti talks much about conciliating contraries, and harmonizing opposites, we have found in his dialectics no way by which these two opposite, contradictory spirits can be reconciled, and brought to operate in unison. The one can live only by the destruction of the other. Hence the perpetual warfare which rages in the bosom of Christian individuals and Christian nations, — a warfare

unknown for the most part in heathendom, because the heathen religion chimed in with the worldly spirit of the people. As they had broken away from the orthodox instruction, rejected the worship of God, and "liked not to have God in their knowledge, God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not convenient. Being filled with all iniquity, malice, fornication, covetousness, wickedness, — full of envy, murder, contention, deceit, malignity, — whisperers, detractors, hateful to God, contumelious, proud, haughty, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, foolish, dissolute, without affection, without fidelity, without mercy. Who, having known the justice of God, did not understand that they who do such things are worthy of death, and not only they who do them, but they also who consent to them that do them."* This is the description which an inspired Apostle gives us of the heathen, and therefore of Gioberti's noble Italo-Greeks, and we can easily understand from it that there should have been in their case a completeness and roundness of character, reference had to the order of character to which it belonged, a proportion between their religion and the daily life of the people, which we cannot find or expect to find among Christians, on the one hand striving after the supernatural virtues of the Gospel, and on the other drawn away by their corrupt nature in the opposite direction, towards the vices, the crimes, and the abominations of the heathen.

The author tells us, that in civilization there is, besides the religious element, the human element, and his pretence is, no doubt, that the human element of civilization was more perfect among the cultivated Gentiles than it is among the moderns. This view we ourselves took when we wrote the essay in our number for July, 1849, on *The Church in the Dark Ages*; but the study of Gioberti's own dialectics which we have since made has of itself served to convince us that it is not true, and that the Christian cannot consistently entertain it. Civilization he makes the creation of the priesthood, and, as we have seen, he identifies it with religion; then in civilization proper there is and can be no human element distinguishable from the religious; for it is only as instructed and informed by the sacerdotal culture that man is, or can be, *civilized* man. The sum total of the life of a so-called civilized country is, no doubt, a mixed result, composed of a religious and a human element, but

* Rom. i. 28 - 32.

this life, in so far as distinguishably human, is defective, and not yet civilized. Thus far religion has not been able to subdue the human element, and transform its acts into religious acts, therefore into civilized acts. If the priesthood creates civilization, then civilization cannot be a mixed result of the human and Divine, in any other sense than is religion itself as exhibited by men a mixed result, but must be a pure result of the religious element acting on and subduing the human. Then, again, if man is in his normal state only in the Catholic society, how can it be possible for the human element to attain a more perfect and exquisite development out of that society, and therefore, as Gioberti contends, as well as we, disjoined from the true human race, — the human race living in the unity of the ideal, therefore in communion with God, — than it can or does in that society itself? If this were so, we should be obliged to assume that the abnormal is more perfect and exquisite than the normal, — a monstrous paradox.

We are pained to be obliged to remark, that Gioberti nowhere, so far as we can discover, recognizes the influence in promoting civilization of the sacramental principle of our religion. As far as we have been able to ascertain, he holds that religion operates as dogma and government, as doctrine and authority, but we do not find that he recognizes in it any other mode of civilizing action. Now he places the seat of barbarism in the flesh, as well as we, and he attempts to identify civilization with religion, for the reason, among others, that it gives man a dominion over instinct, passion, the body. But religion can, in this view of the case, promote civilization only by the means she adopts to give us a victory over the flesh, in which are the seeds of barbarism. These means are not simply dogma and precept, for the devils know these, and believe and tremble, but joined to these mortification, prayer, meditation, and the sacraments, as set forth in an excellent tract entitled *Influence of Catholic Prayer on Civilization*, by Father Tappelli, translated from the Italian, and published in this journal for July, 1848. The surest way to destroy barbarism is to destroy its cause, or to dry up its fountain. This is done, as far as it can be done, by the practice of asceticism, and the purity and strength obtained from the sacraments, especially, after Baptism, from Penance and the holy Eucharist. After all, then, the devout mystics, and the pious ascetics, who, in the view of Gioberti, are rather the enemies than the friends of civilization, take necessarily as such the most, and, we may

add, the only, effectual way of advancing or securing it. No doubt there are evangelical counsels distinguishable from evangelical precepts, and we are far from pretending that, in strict law, we are all obliged to lead the life of the religious. The life of seculars is lawful, but that of the religious is higher and more perfect, and the nearer we approach its elevation and perfection, the better for us, and the better our influence on the world, both for time and eternity.

We intended to offer something more, and we may resume the discussion hereafter, but for the present we must content ourselves with what we have already said. We frankly acknowledge that on many points we have been enlightened by reading Gioberti's writings, and had we not read them, we could hardly have given the statement we have of the truth opposed to his errors ; we also acknowledge, nay, contend, that his errors do not necessarily grow out of his fundamental philosophy, but are distinguishable from it, and in fact opposed to it. They have another origin, and ought not to lead us to reject the philosophy itself, because he has bound them up with it. Nevertheless, as these errors chime in with the grand heresy of our age, — that is, the secularization of Christianity, the rehabilitation of the flesh, the revival of paganism, and the conceptions of the carnal Jews, who expected a temporal prince and temporal prosperity, instead of a spiritual ruler and the salvation of the soul, — they are precisely that in his writings which will give them their popularity with the mass of readers, and determine their practical influence, and therefore are exceedingly dangerous. They seem also to indicate the practical results the author has had in view in writing his philosophy. Hence, however sound may be the philosophy itself, the author's writings cannot be safe, and we have felt it our duty to admonish our readers to be on their guard against them.

As to Gioberti himself, while we have not spared him where we have thought him wrong, we have aimed to treat him with candor and respect. It is possible that he began writing with good intentions, with the sincere and earnest desire to promote the cause of truth and piety ; but the tone and style of his works are not such as to win our confidence in him as a sincere, humble, and devout Catholic priest. They are laical ; and his spirit is proud, his bearing haughty and disdainful. He strikes us as a politician, or as a man of the world, rather than as a spiritual father. We miss in his writings that unction which so charms us in Fénelon, and especially in St. Francis

of Sales, and we cannot help feeling that he has spent an undue proportion of his time in studying philosophy and profane literature, and has reserved himself too little to spend at the foot of the crucifix in prayer and meditation. We are sorry to think so, for we see in him a man whom God has endowed with extraordinary gifts, and who might be an honor to his country, and a useful servant of the Church; but so we must think, till he breaks his present silence, submits to the Holy Father, responds to the affectionate entreaty of Pius the Ninth, and sets himself earnestly at work to purge his writings of their mischievous errors.

- ART. II. — 1. *Sermons on the Obedience of Faith.* By the Right Rev. SILLIMAN IVES, Protestant Episcopal Bishop of North Carolina.
2. *Pastoral Letter on the Priestly Office.* By the same.
3. *Pastoral Letter on the Salisbury Convention.* By the same.
4. *A Voice from Connecticut.* By SAMUEL FARMER JARVIS, D. D., Historiographer of the Protestant Episcopal Church.
5. *Auricular Confession in the Protestant Episcopal Church.* By a Protestant Episcopalian.
6. *The History of the Confessional.* By JOHN HENRY HOPKINS, D. D., Bishop of the Diocese of Vermont.

OUR readers must not imagine that we have undertaken to furnish them with a bookseller's catalogue; we have only placed on our list a few out of many publications which have been recently issued on the great controversy concerning Confession. This has been chiefly an internal dispute in the Protestant Episcopal Church, occasioned, we imagine, by the efforts made on the other side of the Atlantic to restore the practice in the Established Church of England, of which a distinguished advocate (Mr. Maskell) has recently passed to our communion. The Protestant Episcopal Bishop of North Carolina, a few years since, became an ardent supporter of the same views, which he urged on the consideration of his hearers throughout his diocese. The publication of his sermons gave form and consistency to the reports which were spread abroad of his Roman tendencies, and notwithstanding the caution with which he expressed himself, and the protection which he sought

under the bulwarks of the English Establishment, he was denounced at home and abroad, by presbyter and layman, as a dangerous innovator. A North Carolina Senator of the United States rebuked his assumption; a presbyter of the diocese and a New York presbyter, a native of North Carolina, undertook to refute him; the aged historiographer of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States sent forth his warning voice, with oracular solemnity, from Connecticut; the late editor of *The Churchman* resumed his pen to trace the precise limits of the midway course to be pursued between orthodoxy and Protestantism; and last, not least, the chivalrous Bishop of Vermont appeared on the battle-ground, encased in the ponderous armour of antiquity, to make a diversion by attacking the Roman camp, instead of leading back his too adventurous fellow-knight, who was incautiously advancing in that direction.

We regret that decision and firmness have been wanting, on the part of Bishop Ives, throughout this whole controversy. Although he exposed himself to considerable censure by recommending confession as a salutary practice, in some instances necessary, he shrank from the odium of inculcating its absolute necessity, in virtue of the Divine ordinance, and sheltered himself beneath the English rubrics, and the authority of Anglican divines. Now and then he ventured to refer to the power of forgiveness granted by Christ, and condemned "that presumption which leads neglecters and violators to trust for pardon to a vague and general repentance, a repentance not accepted by the representatives of Christ, who alone have charge of the discipline of his Church, or the power to remit or retain sins." * He asked with earnestness, "How can the merits of Christ be applied now except through that priestly judgment, intercession, and absolution, authorized and made binding by his express commission, 'Whosoever sins ye remit,' &c.?" † He insisted that confession is "a remedy for sin, which the experience of the one Catholic and Apostolic Church has ever sanctioned." ‡ He ventured to affirm that it was, in some cases at least, indispensable. § But he had not courage clearly and unequivocally to avow that it was Divinely commanded. On the contrary, not content with the qualifying terms

* *Pastoral Letter on the Priestly Office*, p. 24.

† *Sermon on Self-examination*, p. 113.

‡ *Sermon, Obedience the Way to Knowledge*, p. 151.

§ *Sermon, The Case of the Baptized without Self-discipline*.

which were interwoven with his strongest phrases, he openly declared that "private confession is not regarded by his branch of the one Catholic Church as generally necessary to salvation."* This weakness and hesitancy can scarcely merit sympathy. The imperfection of his mental vision is the only excuse which charity can suggest for a course of conduct utterly inconsistent with the general character of the effort to re-establish the practice. If he were convinced that confession is a necessary condition for the exercise of the power of forgiveness, he should have stated it broadly and openly; if he judged it to be a mere disciplinary observance, — a medicinal appliance to diseased souls, — he might have recommended it; but he should scarcely have disturbed the tranquillity of his diocesans by insisting on its adoption.

It is an undeniable fact that the English *Book of Common Prayer* contains an exhortation to the communicants to confess any weighty matter which may disturb the tranquillity of their conscience, with a view to obtain absolution as well as comfort. Dr. Hopkins is of opinion that this rubric was inserted "to favor the feelings and habits of a large proportion of the nation, in whose judgment the principles of the Reformation had not yet become fully established"; or rather, "to agree as far as possible with the system of the German Reformers, Luther and Melancthon, who called absolution a sacrament, and required auricular confession and priestly absolution of every one, as a regular preparative for the Eucharist." Whichever motive influenced the compilers of the *Book of Common Prayer*, their work is, in this respect, true to its general character, — equivocal and vague, — so that it may be employed by the advocates of confession, which it insinuates and recommends, and by its opponents, since by implication it denies its necessity. Dr. Hopkins bitterly laments that the rubric was inserted, and rejoices in the expurgated American ritual, which Dr. Jarvis shows to have been the result of compromise. To every unbiased mind it must be manifest that no argument can be derived from the English rubric in support of the practice, save as a relief for weak minds, and as the last vestige of a rite which the spirit of innovation sought to abolish. It may serve to recall those who glory in the recollections of the Anglo-Saxon Church to earlier and better times, when the clergy and faithful people sought relief for their distressed souls in the tri-

* *Pastoral Letter on the Salisbury Convention.*

bunal of penance, and with contrite hearts confessed their sins before they approached the Holy Table. The absolution, in a deprecatory form, which is still pronounced after the people have acknowledged that "they have done what they ought not to have done, and have left undone what they ought to have done," corresponds with the prayer which the Catholic priest pronounces before he administers communion ; but it is not an exercise of the absolving power, so that with Protestant Episcopalians there remains not even the shadow of that power, which Bishop Pearson regarded as distinguishing the Church of Christ from the followers of the Novatian heresy. It is not easy to understand how it is that the revised prayer-book varies, notwithstanding, in no essential matter from the formularies of the mother Church of England.

Although Dr. Hopkins professes to have undertaken his work, because "no author in the English language had hitherto treated the subject as extensively as its importance deserves," we notice some omissions of authorities, even of some quoted by his predecessors in the controversy. St. Irenæus, whose testimony is recited by the anonymous writer, speaks of women who for a time had followed the heretic Marcus : — "These, often converted to the Church of God, confessed that, having their bodies exterminated, as it were, by him, and influenced by lust, they loved him to excess." Of another he says : — "Penetrated with grief, she spent her whole time in confessing and bewailing her sins, (*in exomologesi*,) and lamenting the crime which she had been led by this magician to commit." The answer given to these testimonies is far from being satisfactory. *Exomologesis*, it is said, on the authority of Tertullian, is a public act, and the confession was a general one, imposed by ancient discipline ; but Dr. Hopkins informs us that the system of canonical penance, of which public confession formed a part, was not regulated by any formal code until the fourth century. True, he maintains that it existed in substance in the days of Tertullian ; but if this be admitted, it necessarily follows that, before any special legislation on this head, penance, as it was afterwards formally prescribed, was practised in virtue of the great principles of Christian doctrine. The prominent place which confession occupied is manifest from its being chosen as characteristic of the whole process. It can scarcely be contended — and certainly it cannot be proved — that public confession was generally required, at that early period, if indeed at any time, in regard to secret sins ; so that, as

confession of some kind was necessary, the inference is in favor of private or auricular confession. This may have often been followed by public demonstrations of sorrow on the part of those who, like the deluded followers of Marcus, had given scandal by their adherence to an heretical teacher. They may have been induced to make a public avowal, in order to unmask the teacher of error, when urged to it as a duty by a confidential adviser, such as a confessor; but if private confession was not practised, it is difficult to suppose that any would have followed their own sense of duty so far as to make so humiliating an acknowledgment. Origen, in effect, warns the sinner to use great care in selecting his spiritual physician, that, in case he should judge proper that his disorder should be stated and healed in the presence of the assembled church, it might be done with profit and edification. The observation of Dr. Hopkins, that any prudent Christian, having experience, may be meant by this physician, is refuted by another passage, in which Origen describes the penitent as "not blushing to confess his sin to the priest of the Lord." From a comparison of these various testimonies, it is evident that private confession regarded all sins without distinction, and that public confession was confined to such as might be declared before all without scandal, or danger to one's self or others. When, in the fifth century, some endeavoured to enforce the open confession of secret sins, St. Leo rebuked the rash attempt, and declared that it was sufficient to confess them to the priests of the Lord in private.*

We are willing, however, to meet Dr. Hopkins on his own ground, and we leave him to choose whether public or private confession be meant by the early fathers; it is enough for us that confession—the acknowledgment of special sins—was demanded. We ask him how he can dispense with public and private confession, when, long before any ecclesiastical enactment was passed to this effect, confession of some kind was urged under the most awful penalty. Exomologesis, according to Tertullian, implied "the falling down before the priests, the kneeling to the beloved of God," "a manifestation of one's self, which many through a false shame delayed from day to day, consulting more for their feelings than for their salvation, like those who conceal from the physician their secret maladies." Its necessity was such, that the stern moralist address-

* *Ep. ad Universos Episcopos*, Tom. I. p. 356.

es the reluctant sinner, — “If you hesitate to confess, think on hell, whose flames are quenched by confession.” This evidently implies its absolute necessity, which, as none assert it concerning public confession, — at that time not prescribed by any canon, — must be understood of that which is auricular. It is impossible to restrict what Tertullian and the other fathers have written on this subject to confession made to God in secret. He, indeed, calls it “confession to the Lord,” because it is made in the Divine presence, and with a view to obtain pardon from God. “This act,” he says, “is *exomologesis*, whereby we confess our sin to the Lord, not indeed as if he knew it not, but inasmuch as satisfaction is prepared for by confessions. Penance proceeds from confession, and God is appeased by penance.”* This implies self-manifestation, “*publicationem sui*,” which — since, as we have shown, it does not extend to a public confession — must mean the disclosure of our sins to our spiritual physician. This passage may throw light on many others which we meet with from time to time in various fathers, who speak of confession of sin to God, plainly meaning that which is made to his ministers, in compliance with his command. It is of this St. Cyprian speaks, when he explains the practice of confession in regard to ordinary sins, and insists strongly on the criminality of admitting to communion those who had abjured the faith, and had not atoned by penance. “Since sinners guilty of lesser sins do penance during a suitable time, and come to confession according to the order of discipline, and receive the right to communicate by the imposition of hands of the bishop and clergy; now in a time of peril, whilst the persecution still continues, peace not being yet restored to the Church, these men are admitted to communion, and their name is recited; and before they have done penance, before they have made a confession, before the hand of the bishop and clergy has been laid on them, the Eucharist is given them, although it be written, ‘Whosoever shall eat of the bread or drink of the chalice of the Lord unworthily shall be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord.’”† This abuse called for strong condemnation from Cyprian, who exhorted the faithful to confess their sins whilst confession made to the priests of the Lord is acceptable.

The term *exomologesis*, used by all these ancient writers, is borrowed from the Acts, in which the verb from which it is

* *De Pœnit.*, Sect. IX.

† *Ep. ad Clerum.*

formed is used in regard to the believers who, on witnessing the visitation of God on the sons of Sceva, came forward to the Apostles, "confessing their deeds," * and evincing the sincerity of their compunction by consigning to the flames a vast amount of superstitious books which they had in their possession. Bloomfield and other Protestants admit that they made a special acknowledgment, not only of the sin of magic, but of other sins, and the perfect participle, which is employed, denotes that they were persons who had long since come to the faith; yet Dr. Hopkins, with this fact under his eye, boldly asserts that "there is no example in the Acts of persons confessing their sins, after baptism, either to the Apostles or to any one else." St. Basil thought otherwise, since he alleges this example in support of the principle, that "we must confess our sins to those who are intrusted with the dispensation of the mysteries of God." † But Dr. Hopkins does not hesitate to say, "he was plainly mistaken"; and yet he has ventured to designate the illustrious doctor as his tenth witness!

In the selection of his witnesses he has not been fortunate; but the confidence with which he calls them his own may deceive some readers. His first witness is Tertullian, who insists on confession under threats of hell-fire. The second is Cyprian, who states that persons guilty of sins far less heinous than apostasy must confess them, and extols those who reveal their sinful thoughts. The third is Lactantius, who makes our hope of pardon depend on our satisfying God by confessing our sins, and gives confession and penance as the characteristics distinguishing the true Church from pseudo-Catholic conventicles.

If a father of the Church speak of the forgiveness of sin by God, Dr. Hopkins hastily concludes against the delegated power of the priesthood, and wrests most unscrupulously to an unnatural meaning other passages which clearly affirm it. Thus has he distorted its emphatic vindication by St. Ambrose, and referred to the public reconciliation of penitents what is said, without restriction, of sacerdotal absolution. He might have learned the necessity of confession from this admirable passage: — "If thou wilt be justified, confess thy sin: for the modest confession of sins looses the bonds of crime." ‡ Of this saint his contemporary biographer relates that he wept in receiving confessions, so as to move the penitent to tears, and that he communicated only with God on the sins declared to him. Most

* Acts xix. 18.

† Inter. 288.

‡ L. 11, *de Penit.*, c. VI.

truly he avowed that in loosing the sinner he was guilty of no usurpation, but on the contrary obeyed a Divine command.*

St. Jerome has employed the well-known similitude of the physician, used by Origen and Tertullian, to enforce the acknowledgment of sin to our brother and master, since medicine cannot be applied to an unknown disease ; and has ascribed to the priesthood the right of prejudging the cases of sinners, that they may escape the final judgment. Dr. Hopkins twists and turns his expressions, and still calls him his witness, as if he hoped by the boldness of his assertions to obscure the splendor of his testimony in favor of confession. With St. Augustine he deals less reservedly. Although he also is claimed, his principles in regard to penitential inflictions cannot pass without positive reprobation. "Now here Augustine advances a principle, which, I am bound to say, is equally unscriptural and dangerous. From this false principle thus advocated by Augustine sprang all the corruptions of satisfaction to God as a part of penitence. . . . Here is the root of a dangerous delusion." Yet the very principle here referred to is expressly laid down by Tertullian, in a passage which Dr. Hopkins has recited ; and both, nevertheless, are witnesses in his behalf ! Let our readers imagine to themselves a lawyer offering to prove his case by evidence. "Gentlemen of the jury," he cries, "I shall prove you my client's case by a number of most respectable witnesses." Yet on hearing their testimony he qualifies his commendation by observing that one is plainly mistaken, another utters a gross absurdity, a third is a fool or knave.

The Divine obligation of confession is not a mere inference from the power of binding or loosing, forgiving or retaining sins ; it is directly proved from the perpetual practice of the Church. The usage was prior to the writing of the Gospels, being the exercise of the ministry of reconciliation which Christ intrusted to his Apostles. The fact is fairly deducible from the avowal of Calvin that "the usage is most ancient,"† and the manifest impossibility of establishing it without a Divine sanction. If the Apostles had not required it, could their successors have made it a condition of forgiveness ? The difficulty of inducing men to disclose their prevarications shows that the general recognition of the obligation must have been the result of the im-

* This is the meaning of "*servimus imperio*," which Dr. Hopkins has rendered, not felicitously, "*serve his government*."

† *Inst.*, Lib. III. c. IV. n. 7.

memorial teaching of the prelates of the Church uninterruptedly from the Apostles. Individuals may choose to reveal their griefs to a confidential friend ; some may venture to make known their worst disorders ; but these rare occurrences cannot account for a usage so general as that of confession, connected with the universal persuasion of its necessity. The commission given to the Apostles is the only satisfactory explanation of its origin ; and the argument thence derived serves to support the usage, which is by no means the result of constructive interpretation. Confession is of Divine obligation, because it has always been recognized as a necessary condition for the exercise of the discretionary power of forgiveness granted to the Apostles. It is in vain for Dr. Hopkins to cavil at the analogies employed by St. Thomas Aquinas in illustration of this duty, which to others may not appear quite so absurd. "Boetius," he remarks, "in his book on Consolation, says, if you desire the aid of the physician, you must manifest to him your disease : now it is necessary for salvation that man receive the remedy of his sins ; therefore it is necessary for salvation to disclose his disease in confession. Moreover, in civil tribunals the judge is different from the culprit : now the spiritual tribunal is the prelate ; therefore the sinner, who is the culprit, should not be his own judge, but should be judged by another ; and so should confess to him." * It is easier to sneer at these analogies than to point out their unfitness. But in what language shall we express our disgust at the boldness of the critic who ventures unblushingly to assert that the Angelic Doctor, in his endeavours to support the doctrine of the Church by analogies, "exhibits an example of the most flagitious private judgment, not to be surpassed in the whole history of heresy" !

It must always puzzle those who deny that confession was practised in the Apostolic age to account for its introduction at any subsequent period, and for its general prevalence prior to any legislation on this subject. The first general enactment enforcing it was that of the Fourth Council of Lateran, in 1215. No one can seriously pretend that it was then first established or introduced, since even Bishop Hopkins has gathered together decisive passages from the fathers, in which its necessity is positively affirmed. Nearly eight centuries before, St. Leo wrote that it is sufficient to confess secretly to the priests alone,

* III. *Par. Suppl.*, Qu. VI. Art. 1.

which, in far plainer terms, Basil had previously declared to be necessary.

The argument which Dr. Hopkins derives from the statements of Fleury concerning the period at which confession was enjoined is a weapon which turns back on him with destructive power. The enactments do not bear the character of mere positive laws ; they enforce a recognized duty, — they add canonical penalties as sanctions of existing obligations. Since it is proved that confession was inculcated and practised ages before, it must have its foundation in the doctrine of Christ himself, — in the power of forgiveness which he delegated to his Apostles.

When the nature of sacramental confession is considered, we should not expect to find the same striking evidences of the practice as are furnished of solemn acts of public worship. It is a private and confidential communication of the penitent with the priest. The necessity and frequency of the usage depend on the special condition of the conscience of each individual ; and the fact of having confessed becomes known only as far as the penitent chooses to manifest it. In ages of persecution it was not advisable to erect public confessionals, the chair of instruction being easily adapted to the purpose. In the Roman catacombs, however, stone chairs are found in a position which favors the belief that they served as confessionals ; whence arose a foul calumny of the heathens, from the humble posture in which penitents were sometimes discovered kneeling before the sacred ministers.* The works of casuists, and books for the use of penitents, did not then exist, because all was conducted with the utmost simplicity, with reference to the Gospel maxims, which each priest applied according to his best judgment. Since ecclesiastical laws have been multiplied, and theologians have discussed moral principles in great detail, the study of moral theology in connection with the confessional has become extensive and somewhat intricate. These aids and appendages — the results of progressive study and legislation — could not be expected at a time when scarcely any thing was committed to writing but apologies addressed to the persecutors, or instructions regarding the first principles of ecclesiastical organization, or other matters rendered necessary by circumstances. The sacred ministers learned their duties chiefly by oral instruction from more experienced priests, and the faith-

* Minucius Felix.

ful confessed their sins according as their conscience reproached them with delinquency against the Divine law, or the injunctions of their lawful superiors. Nevertheless, their delicate sense of the obligation, even in the early ages, appears from the testimony of St. Cyprian, who extols the piety of those who confessed having entertained the thought of adopting some unlawful stratagem to escape persecution. "How superior in faith, and better in fear, are those who, although defiled by no act of sacrifice, or certificate of conformity, since however they thought of it, confess this very thing with sorrow and simplicity to the priests of God." *

The popular argument against confession, namely, its corrupt tendency, is presented by Dr. Hopkins in a manner wholly inconsistent with his fair professions of basing his arguments on the evidence acknowledged by ourselves. Despite of this declaration, he adopts the Jansenist Pascal's caricatures of Jesuit teaching, and gives them as correct pictures of the general principles of confessors, in order to lead his readers to believe that the practical influence of the confessional is to sanction licentiousness, perjury, and bloodshed. We can pity the blind prejudice of the man who sincerely believes that such is the fact; but we should feel contempt for his hypocrisy, did we suppose that he affected soft tones and honeyed accents only more effectually to mislead the unsuspecting by the aid of satirists and slanderers. The Jesuits whom Pascal traduced were eminent for learning, piety, and zeal, and their lives were a splendid refutation of the relaxed system of morality which they were supposed to patronize. Voltaire himself could not deny that the Society had produced men of extraordinary merit, and that even in his day it numbered many such among its members. Their general reputation was that of exemplary men, whose conduct defied reproach. If any of them erred in theological speculations, it was owing to their solicitude not to multiply the obstacles to salvation, by condemning what admitted of probable justification. The mild system which most of them defended was subsequently advocated by St. Alphonsus de Liguori, whose purity of life and zeal for the salvation of souls are celebrated throughout the whole Church. It would have been more becoming in Dr. Hopkins to have used his works to show the practical operation of the confessional, although even these are misunderstood by the carnal-minded, who confound moderation of sentiment with relaxation and indulgence.

* *Lib. de Lapsis.*

We ask the calm attention of our readers to the fact, that St. Alphonsus de Liguori — although, from the innocence of his life, unacquainted with vice — studied the science of morals in all its most disgusting details, and discussed every most delicate question in a body of moral theology, composed for the use of the missionaries of the congregation which he founded, and of priests generally. All those points which the Jesuit Vasquez treated of in his work on marriage, to the great annoyance of persons of refined sensibilities, are brought under review by the saint, and closely examined. It is beyond a doubt that he himself had the most delicate sense of purity, and shunned with extreme caution whatever might sully his virginal innocence. As a religious superior he was jealous, in the highest degree, of the purity of the members of his institute ; as a bishop, he watched over the morals of his clergy with unceasing solicitude. Can we suppose that he put into their hands a book calculated to tarnish their conscience, and to enable them to tamper with those who might seek their guidance ? Since he has examined with so much minuteness every possible deviation from virtue, — since he has taken the pains to qualify each sinful act, — since his eye has pierced the nuptial veil, and his hand has traced what is lawful and what is forbidden in the matrimonial relations, — we must be convinced that his long experience in the confessional — reaching beyond half a century — taught him that the accurate knowledge of all these details is highly important for the direction of souls, and that it can be acquired and used without detriment to the virtue of the spiritual physician. It may be perilous to the weak and to the self-confident, but the danger is remote for those who, in the fear of God, study the greatness of human disorders with a view to apply suitable remedies. How many weak youths were won to holy purity by the secret exhortations of St. Philip Neri, whose purity of life appeared in the words of admonition which he uttered ! How many lost ones were drawn to the confessional by the preaching of St. Alphonsus, there to experience the power of Divine grace, stopping the issue which no medicine could heal, and imparting strength unattainable by mere human effort !

The questions put by the confessor are referred to by the two writers whom we have before us as an immediate occasion of revolting abuses. Do they suppose that it is the practice of confessors to question penitents generally on all possible deviations from the code of morals ? They should know that confession is a duty of the penitent, to aid whom interrogatories

are occasionally used, only as far as they may be deemed necessary, according to the age, sex, and circumstances of each individual. If a child presents himself, the innocence of his heart is not endangered by any inopportune question; whilst the hoary sinner, whose iniquities are multiplied above the hairs of his head, often desires the aid of his spiritual father to recount over the transgressions of his misspent years. The chaste virgin is not assailed with interrogatories, such as may sometimes be necessary to probe the deep wounds of the child of misfortune. In the Ritual, discretion, reserve, and caution are strongly inculcated to confessors, whilst brevity and modesty are prescribed to penitents. We can safely appeal to the general experience of all who practise confession, who will testify that it is conducted with the utmost delicacy, and that its tendency is to produce a loathing of sin, and a love for virtue.

The horror which some affect for the mention of sins alluded to in tables for self-examination, and more fully discussed in theological works, is truly Pharisaical. They read with eagerness the most morbid descriptions in popular novels; they enter into all the revolting details of unnatural crimes which the newspapers furnish; they witness without remorse the most exciting exhibitions; and yet they shudder at the idea of the possibility of certain sins in the present advanced state of civilization and morals! Alas for poor human nature! What crime is there on record that cannot find its counterpart in our age and country? It is much if the moral sentiment be maintained, and public decorum respected; but it is vain to deny that individual frailty is extreme. We have no wish to depreciate the morals of the community; we will consent to regard the sins referred to in our prayer-books as mere possibilities; but we deny the prudence of keeping them wholly out of view, lest some who may have transgressed blind themselves to the malice of their acts, and go forward in the career of perdition. From what sources, we ask, have these details been derived? Is it not from those very Scriptures which are put into the hands of children, of either sex, from an early age? Do our books designed for popular use represent those excesses as vividly as St. Paul? Do not our theologians themselves follow closely on the track marked out by the Apostle, as well as by Moses? Can any thing be found in the discrimination of what is lawful and what is forbidden, as given in theological works, so exciting as the plain narrative of unnatural crimes presented by the Sacred Historians?

St. Chrysostom justly remarks that St. Paul, writing to the Romans, found it necessary to speak of unnatural crimes with sufficient distinctness to be understood, and yet so as not to shock modesty by its plainness, — two qualities which it is extremely difficult to combine ; “ for if you speak with delicacy, you can scarcely make your hearer feel his guilt, so that, if you aim at making him deeply sensible of it, you must clearly and distinctly attack vice. This prudent and holy soul succeeded in uniting both qualities, rebuking the sinner in the name of outraged nature, yet using a kind of veil that modesty should appear in the manner of his speech.”* The prudence and delicacy of the Apostle are closely imitated by confessors. They do not ordinarily put questions concerning the heathenish vices against which he inveighs ; but they listen to the sad narrative which the sinner makes of his own offences, and they warn him of the punishments which await him who, with the knowledge and grace of the Christian dispensation, degrades himself by excess. The confessional thus presents an opportunity for reproving vice without exposing it to the public gaze, and of inspiring a loathing for sin without naming it, the accusation of the sinner affording the ground for the paternal admonition of the confessor.

Some points of morality are by general consent banished from the pulpit, which, nevertheless, the Holy Ghost has marked in the plainest terms in the Scripture, adding most awful facts to impress them.† For the thousands who cannot read, and others who have not adverted to these special passages, these facts and principles are utterly unavailing, except through the confessional. Conscience, indeed, if free from improper influence, might discover the wickedness of certain practices ; but unhappily she is easily blinded, and her still, small voice is unheeded by many who present an exterior marked by the strictest regard for morality. Others struggle with their convictions, half stifle remorse, and for want of counsel live on in partial blindness and interior conflict. Although it is not the duty or practice of confessors to interrogate unnecessarily on matters of this kind, the penitent here finds an opportunity for relieving mental anxiety, and learns that the natural law and the Divine are above all considerations of human respect, personal inconvenience, sickness, and poverty. From the reserve of confessors, it still happens that some who frequent the tribu-

* *In Ep. ad Rom.*, iv.† *Gen.* xxxviii.

nal live on in a state which God has marked in the Scriptures as very wicked ; but how much more frequent must this culpable delusion be in those who have no one whom they dare consult on matters of such extreme delicacy ! The holiness of the tribunal and of the place, the sacredness of the office, inspire a confidence which in no other circumstances can be entertained.

We regard it as a counsel of Divine Providence that the confessional has become the chief matter of controversy in this age and country. The foul vituperation of its assailants serves to direct attention to the strictness of our moral code, which regulates the most delicate relations of human life, and with nice discrimination determines right and wrong in thought, word, and action. The turpitude of sin is inherent : it is not the result of theological inquisition, or of the scrutiny of the confessional.

The formularies of confession which Bishop Hopkins has collected from the Middle Ages show that sins of all kinds were considered to be matter of accusation, whenever the conscience of the penitent reproached him with their commission. It cannot, indeed, be supposed that the bishops, to whom several of these formularies are ascribed, were guilty of the enormities which they detail ; but it is likely that they were composed by them, or by their authority, for the direction of penitents, who might appropriate to themselves such portions of them as they found applicable to their own case. It is quite improbable that each one recited the entire formulary, accusing himself in general terms of every kind of sin ; for this would imply falsehood, and would amount to nothing, the formulary being common to all. They served, we imagine, the same purpose as modern tables of sins, and were used with such modifications as the individual found necessary to represent the real state of his conscience. Questions directed to this end are prescribed in the penitential work of John the Faster, who sat in the patriarchal chair of Constantinople at the time when the monk Augustine laid the foundation of the Anglo-Saxon hierarchy. This proves that private confession continued to be practised in the Church of Constantinople, notwithstanding the abolition of the office of public penitentiary by Nectarius, who, in leaving each one at liberty to approach communion conformably to his conscience, did not free him from the Divine law of having recourse to the priest for absolution.

The advantages of the confessional must be obvious on

the slightest reflection. It is a means of securing the practice of the maxims and laws of Christ, since the penitent is charged to compare his conduct with the Gospel standard, and state with candor wherein he has transgressed. Considering human frailty, we cannot hope that Christians will be altogether without sin. It is much to entice them to reformation by the hope of pardon on condition of repentance. Men easily content themselves with a moral exterior regulated by public opinion. Confession obliges them to search into their own hearts, to discover their secret offences, to weigh the motives of their conduct, and to labor to remove every stain from their conscience. The scrutiny is left chiefly to themselves, — the accusation must be spontaneous, and the pardon depends on their fidelity in preparing for its reception by compunction and virtuous resolution. The judge appointed to receive their confession, and pronounce forgiveness, is bound by his office to study the Divine law, and to see that it be understood by the penitent, and applied to his conduct. He is to judge without fear or favor, having God only in view, in whose name he acts, and the salvation of the sinner. At the peril of his own soul he is charged to exercise his ministry in accordance with the unchangeable principles of the Gospel.

The two writers, among those on our list, who have dilated most on the horrors of the confessional, — Dr. Hopkins with affected delicacy; and Dr. Hawks under a visor, — particularly advert to its secrecy, and describe the dangers to female innocence in a private apartment, at the mercy of a confessor whose acts or speeches are concealed even from her own mother under an impenetrable veil of secrecy. This has one, at least, of the characteristics of poetry, — it is pure fiction. The confessional, according to the prescription of the Roman Ritual and the general usage of Catholic countries, is a box with two distinct apartments, the penitent being entirely separated from the priest, with whom she communicates only through a lattice or grate. It is placed in an open and public situation in the church, and is generally surrounded at the time when confessions are heard by a number of persons, so that priest and penitent are alike under observation. Secrecy is incumbent on the penitent only so far as it may be dishonorable and unjust to expose the confessor to censure or injury for any advice conscientiously given; but in case of any abuse of the ministry, even in the slightest degree, by an improper insinuation, so far from secrecy being enjoined, the denunciation of the prevaricator to

his ecclesiastical superior is absolutely commanded. This must be known to both these writers, since they dwell with satisfaction on the Papal decrees regarding the abuse of the confessional. But how shall we reconcile this knowledge with the effort to persuade their readers that a patent is given for the most unbridled licentiousness by the inviolable secrecy enjoined on the penitent? The privileges of the tribunal are in her favor, and for her protection.

In regard to the alleged frequency of such abuse, the testimony of Llorente — a traitor to his religion as well as his country — is utterly worthless. The extension said to have been granted by the Spanish Inquisitors of the time for denunciations, is likely to have arisen rather from their scarceness than from their number. The allegations of apostates, on which Dr. Hopkins relies, are self-refuted, since they ought long before to have abandoned a ministry which they represent as essentially corrupt. Above all statements and conjectures is the well-known fact, that the use of the confessional is regarded as a means of sanctification by all Catholics of every age, sex, and condition of life, — especially by those who frequent it. If it were, as it is represented, a sink of corruption, it would be shunned by the virtuous; its very name would excite horror, and its approach would be forbidden under the severest penalties by every parent, every husband, every guardian of unprotected innocence.

The triumphant vindication of the confessional is found in the confidence which is universally entertained in its purity, which far outweighs the foul suspicions of carnal-minded men, and the fouler charges of licentious lecturers or unprincipled pamphleteers. The homage rendered to it, on both sides of the Atlantic, by men of high moral character not of our communion, more than compensates for these slanderous assaults. The conversion of several of the most eminent among them, Maskell, Forbes, Huntington, Preston, MacLeod, is an earnest of the great number who by this means will be led back to the ancient paths. Bishop Ives does not hesitate to say, — “On this doctrine of priestly absolution the great battle of Christ’s authority in the Church is to be fought.” We must, however, again express our regret that he does not exhibit the high qualities which should distinguish a leader who combats for the truth. The weakness with which he yielded last year to the Salisbury Convention was not fully redeemed by his prompt disclaimer of the interpretation which they gave to his words; for although

he assumed the tone and swelled to the dignity of a real bishop, he neither acknowledged his error unequivocally, nor avowed the truth in its fulness. For a moment he appeared in a grand attitude, and spoke as one having authority, rebuking with becoming severity the presbyters who had sat in judgment on their prelate : — “ I am a bishop. Who are you who usurp the judgment seat ? I have retracted nothing : I shall never retract any thing.” But the grandeur of that scene soon passed away, the high tone of authority subsided ; and now with faltering accents he qualifies and modifies his assertions, in order to silence the murmurs of his clerical subordinates. Men look in vain for the spirit of an Ambrose and a Basil in the shadowy representatives of the episcopate.

The history of the confessional cannot be written by the pen of man : it is the narrative of the secrets of Divine mercy. The angels who rejoice at the conversion of a sinner constantly hover around this tribunal, blotting out the sins as they are uttered, wiping away the tears that trickle down the cheek of the penitent, knocking off the chains which hold the sinner a bondman of Satan, and whispering peace. Who that has opened his mouth in humble confession, with a contrite and afflicted spirit, has not felt, at the moment when the priest pronounced absolution, an inward and mysterious change, the token, if not evidence, of pardon ? The consolation which confession imparts, the hope which it inspires, the strength which it communicates, show it to be a heaven-born institution, a boon of Divine goodness. Let those calumniate it who are strangers to its healing virtue ; but the wretched whom it has comforted, the lost whom it has reclaimed, the dead whom it has restored to life, will bear witness that it is a work of Divine power unto salvation. We shall close with the simple statement of a fact. An aged Lutheran minister, whose convictions and affections tended strongly to Catholicity, once avowed to us his deep sense of the necessity of such an institution. “ I know,” said he, “ that I have sinned ; and I dread going forth to meet my Judge, without any previous assurance that my repentance has been such as he demands. I would fain hear from the lips of his ministers, ‘ The Lord hath taken away thy sin.’ ” As he was dying, the priest was called in, barely in time to bid him go in peace.

ART. III. — *Poems and Prose Writings*. By RICHARD H. DANA. New York: Baker & Scribner. 1850. 2 vols. 12mo. pp. 443, 440.

MR. DANA is one of the patriarchs of American literature, and we are not called upon to treat him as an author making his first appearance before the public. The contents of his volumes were written many years ago, and have long been familiar to the grown-up generation of the author's countrymen. They have already passed the ordeal of the critics, and their author's reputation is too well established to be much affected one way or the other by the comments of reviewers. All that need be done on the appearance of any new edition of them is simply to announce it. Nevertheless, we are unwilling to let this new edition pass without making it the occasion of paying the tribute of our respect to the author, and of throwing out some suggestions which may not be wholly unprofitable to our younger aspirants to artistic excellence and literary glory.

We are reviewers by profession, but reviewers of the subjects, doctrines, principles, or tendencies of books, rather than of books themselves, as mere literary productions. We prize literature and art only as they subserve Christian doctrine and morals. Apart from their relation to these, they have little value in our eyes; for so considered they cease to be genuinely artistic, and have at best merely the form, without the substance, of art. We esteem no literature which treats of matters and things in their generality, without touching any thing in its speciality, for the general without the special is mere possibility; and we belong to that class of moralists who hold that every human action is either moral or immoral, either good or bad, and that no human action is ever morally indifferent. To us the end is no less important than the principle, and the philosophy that denies the final cause is as atheistic and absurd as that which denies the first cause. Our theology determines our ethics, and our ethics determines our æsthetics. Theology is the queen of the sciences, and they have no rights or reason of existence but to be employed in her service. Art in its most general sense is simply the application of science to practical life. Hence we are always obliged, whether we are reviewing a work of science or of art, to review it under its relation to Catholicity, and to judge it by its bearing on Catholic doctrine and morals.

This is not a fashionable mode of reviewing, we admit, and is generally regarded as narrow, illiberal, and bigoted ; for it is in our days thought to be a mark of wisdom to deny the unity and universality both of the first and of the final cause of the universe, to separate philosophy from theology, truth from revelation, Christianity from the Church, morality from religion, and art, or, as it is improperly called, *æsthetics*, from morality. But this is a fact not precisely to the credit of the age. Catholicity, in the order of ideas or principles, is the truth and the whole truth, whether the truth evident to natural reason, or the truth revealed and affirmed to us by supernatural authority. It therefore necessarily extends to every department of human thought, feeling, and action. Nothing, then, in any order, or under any relation, is really separable from it, exempted from its law, or commendable save as inspired by it and as it conforms to it. Falsehood either as to the principle or as to the end is never commendable, and moral deformity is no less repugnant to the beautiful than physical deformity. The *Wahlverwandtschaften*, or *Elective Affinities*, of Goethe is as offensive to good taste as shocking to the moral sense.

We do not say that the beautiful is not, in some sense, distinguishable from truth of doctrine and soundness of morals, but we do maintain that it is never separable from them. All art or æsthetics must be addressed to man under one or all of three relations, — 1. The intellect, or understanding ; 2. The will ; 3. The imagination. The proper object of the understanding is truth ; of the will, moral good ; of the imagination, if you please, the beautiful. All literature, or any other species of art, in order to meet the demands of intellect and will, must be true and morally good, therefore must be grounded in Catholic doctrine and morals ; for aside from these, in the intellectual and volitive orders, all is false and immoral, neither true nor good. The imagination is commonly regarded as a mixed faculty, partaking both of the rational nature and of the irrational, and in some sense as a union of the two, so to speak, of the soul and body. But it is primarily and essentially rational, or intellectual, and moves as intellect before moving as sensibility ; or, in other words, it is intellectual apprehension before it is sensitive affection, as the life and activity of the body are from the soul, not the life and activity of the soul from the body. The beautiful, then, as the proper object of the imagination, must be really objective and intelligible, and therefore belong to the order of the true and the good, and be at bottom identical with

truth and goodness ; for the true is, in reality, identical with the good. Consequently imagination, therefore æsthetics, demands truth and goodness for the basis of its operations, as much as does Christian theology or Christian ethics.

This is undeniable, if imagination is considered on its intellectual or rational side, and it is not less so if we consider it on its sensitive or irrational side. Undoubtedly, we may be and often are delighted, charmed, with what is neither true nor good, pleased with a literature or an art which Christian doctrine and morals do and must repugn ; but this is by virtue of the irrational and sensitive side of our nature, which, in consequence of original sin, is in an abnormal state. The understanding by the Fall has been obscured and the will enfeebled, but the lower nature, concupiscence, the flesh, has been turned wholly away from God, so that in it dwells no good thing. Physically, it has not, indeed, been essentially changed ; but it has morally escaped from its original subjection to reason and the law of God, in which it was, prior to the Fall, held by grace ; and it now follows its natural tendencies, — all of which are towards the creature instead of the Creator. If we follow these natural tendencies, or seek their natural gratification, we convert intellect and will into slaves of appetite and passion, and are brought into bondage to sin and death. These tendencies are not destroyed, or changed, by the infusion of sanctifying grace. The flesh remains after baptism, continues to lust against the spirit, and as long as he lives the Christian must combat it unceasingly, and labor by self-denial, mortification, and prayer to overcome or subdue it, as revelation teaches us, and as all experience proves.

There are two modes in which art may affect us on this side of our nature, — one by exciting corrupt appetites and gratifying perverse tendencies, the other by allaying or tranquillizing the passions, and so diverting us from the sensitive affections as to prevent them from obscuring the understanding, or enslaving the will. The art that operates in the first-mentioned mode is not unknown, nay, is quite common. It is the fashionable art of our age, especially if we speak of literature. Under its category we must place the principal part of the poetry of Byron, Moore, and Shelley, all the fashionable novels from Sir Walter Scott down to George Sand, and the light, with no small part of the grave, literature of the day, and which the young man or the young woman can no more read without being corrupted than one can touch pitch and not be defiled. But art of this

sort is a counterfeit or false art ; because just in proportion as we follow the sensitive nature, we run away from God, "the first good and the first fair," the supreme and absolute truth, the supreme and absolute good, and the supreme and absolute beauty, and tend towards the creature as final cause, or ultimate end, therefore towards supreme and absolute falsehood, and consequently towards supreme and absolute nullity, since the creature separated from God is a nullity, and absolute nullity must needs be as far removed from the beautiful as it is from the true and the good.

The beautiful is not a human creation ; men do not make it ; it is real, and independent of the genius that discovers it or seeks to embody it in works of art, in poetry, eloquence, music, painting, sculpture, or architecture. It then, like all reality, has its origin in God, and even as created beauty must be, though distinguishable, yet inseparable from God, and like every creature in its degree an image of God. God creates all things after the ideas or archetypes in his own Divine mind, or infinite intelligence. These ideas or archetypes in his intellect are indistinguishable from his essence ; for, as St. Thomas, after St. Augustine, teaches, "*idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam essentia Dei.*" It is precisely in this image of God in which all things in their degree and according to their nature are created, that reside the truth, goodness, and beauty of things. Whatever obscures this image, or leads us away from it, or substitutes for it the image of the creature, obscures the beautiful, and leads us away from it, into the deformed and the inane, which is evidently the case with the art that takes for its object the pleasure or satisfaction of the inferior soul, or the corrupt appetites and passions of our nature. Whence it follows that only the art that operates in the second mode we have defined, that is, to allay concupiscence, to tranquillize the passions, and enfeeble their force, can be true and genuine art, or the art that really and truly embodies the beautiful. This it can do only by elevating us into a region above the sphere of the sensitive soul, above the merely sensible world, into the intelligible world, by exciting in us noble thoughts, lofty aspirations, and so charming the rational soul, the intellect and will, with spiritual truth and goodness, that the sensitive soul, so to speak, is for the time being overpowered and rendered unable to disturb us. This is what the Church has always aimed at in her sacred art, whether manifested in her noble hymns, her grand cathedrals, her splendid ritual, or her solemn chants and soul-subduing music ; — not,

as shallow, heretical, and infidel travellers would fain persuade us, the positive enlisting of the senses, the passions, and sensitive affections in her service.

Some would-be philosophers and moralists, indeed, attempt to steer a middle course between the two extremes we have indicated. They would condemn the purely sensual art as opposed to true beauty, and yet would not require all art to be purely ascetic. They persuade themselves that the artist, the poet, the orator, or the rhetorician may lawfully avail himself up to a certain point of our sensitive emotions, passions, affections, tendencies, if he only recognizes at the same time that he delights and charms us by exciting and employing them, that we must not forget to be orthodox and moral, and takes care to caution us against suffering them to run into excess. They assume that nature is essentially good, and that its tendencies are all proper to be consulted, unless unduly excited, and inordinately strengthened. They see evil only in their excess, — in suffering them to exceed a certain proportion, — and charm us by their indulgence and moderation, by their suavity and condescension to our weakness. But for this very reason they are the most dangerous class of philosophizers and moralizers we have amongst us ; they soothe and lull the conscience while they delight the flesh. Their error is subtle, and not easily detected by the ordinary mind. They deceive many, and would, if it were possible, deceive the very elect.

Physically considered, we grant that our nature is good, and so is the nature of the Devil himself ; as follows from the fact that *summum ens* is *summum bonum*, and every creature of a perfect and good creator must be itself good. Of this there is no doubt ; and hence no ascetic, no master of spiritual life, ever demands of us the physical immolation of ourselves, either in whole or in part. But morally considered, our nature is not good ; on the contrary, it is corrupt. True, physically considered, our nature was not essentially changed by the Fall. We had the same lower nature in the state of innocence that we have in our lapsed state, and the natural ends and tendencies of that nature were then, in themselves considered, precisely what they are now ; but they were then subordinated to reason, and through grace held in strict subjection to understanding and will, which were themselves by the same grace held in strict subjection to the will of God. Their natural objects were not then pursued inordinately, nor for their own sake ; and the action of the man, in so far as he sought those objects,

did in no sense terminate in them. He ate, but not to enjoy the pleasures of the palate, nor merely to preserve the life of his body ; but to preserve the life of his body for the sake of God, of employing himself in the service of his Maker. But when he sinned, he lost the grace which held concupiscence, or the inferior powers of the soul, in subjection to the higher or rational powers, and escaping from the dominion of reason, they recovered their natural freedom, and henceforth operated according to their own inherent laws for the various sensual ends to which they all naturally tend, when unrestrained by reason and grace. The common end of all these tendencies is sensual pleasure ; sensual pleasure is derivable only from the possession of sensible objects or sensible goods ; and hence the sensual man, the natural or carnal man, seeks always sensual pleasure as his ultimate end, and the possession of sensible goods as the means of obtaining it. Intellect and will — the nobler part of his nature — are for him only “instrumental faculties,” as the Fourierists expressly denominate them, and he esteems and cultivates them only as means of gaining these sensible goods, and for procuring sensual pleasure. This carnal or natural man, following his natural tendencies, and seeking his own sensual pleasure, is intellectually and morally dead. The end and the objects he seeks are in the created order, and his activity terminates in the creature, and therefore he acts in a direction from God, and adopts as his final cause, or ultimate end, a final cause or ultimate end opposed to God, who is his sole final, as his sole first cause, his last end, as his first beginning. He sins, then, intellectually, by assuming a false final cause, denying his true, and asserting a false, ultimate end ; and he sins morally, by rejecting God as his sovereign, and devoting himself to a false sovereign, and giving what is due to God alone to the creature who has no right to it. We may lawfully seek the creature in God, for the creature is in God as his beginning and end ; but not God in the creature, as our modern socialists and neologists falsely teach, for, morally considered, God is not in the creature. To set our affections on the creature, to propose the creature as our final cause, as the end of our activity, or any portion of our activity, is to turn our backs upon God, is to march from him, to depart from our supreme good, and to rush into falsehood and sin, the death of the rational soul, which lives and can live only by virtue of truth and moral good. This lies in the very nature of things, and God himself cannot alter it, for not even

Omnipotence itself can make the creature the creator, or seeking the creature seeking God himself, as final cause. As all morality, or all truth of conduct, lies precisely in seeking God as our final cause, or ultimate end, every act that rejects him as that end, and terminates in any created object, is immoral, and tends to kill the soul. As this is the case with every act of concupiscence, or every act of ours having for its end, no matter in what degree, sensual delight or satisfaction, there can be no compromise in the case, and the attempt of the artist, in any degree, to avail himself of our natural emotions, passions, or affections in their natural order and relations, within whatever limits he may intend to remain, is of a false and immoral tendency, and therefore unartistic.

All Christian moralists, all masters of spiritual life, teach that humility is the foundation and root of all the virtues, and that pride is the foundation and root of all sin. But pride is simply the assertion, in the moral order, of our own self-sufficiency, that is, the denial of God as our final cause, and the assertion of ourselves as our own ultimate end ; that is, again, the blasphemous assertion of ourselves as God, and sovereign lawgiver, according to the words of the serpent to our first parents, "Ye shall be as gods." In its essence, every act of pride is the absolute denial of God in the moral, and therefore in the physical order, and the assertion of the absolute supremacy of man, of me, myself, not vaguely hinted in Dr. Channing's doctrine of the "dignity of human nature," in which, one of his brother ministers was accustomed to say, the eloquent doctor "made man a great god, and God a little man." Humility is the opposite of pride, that is, the absolute denial of man's supremacy, and the assertion of the absolute supremacy of God, in the moral order, — the annihilation of the creature as final cause, and the assertion of God as final cause, and sole final cause, or ultimate end in all things whatsoever. Pride is a stupendous lie, and as gross a violation of dialectics as of ethics ; humility is simply the assertion of the truth, and conformity to it, since God, as sole creator of man, must needs be his sole final cause or ultimate end. Humility simply recognizes and practically conforms to this truth ; and to recognize and practically conform to this truth in all our actions is the whole of virtue. It follows, then, that just so far as we seek sensual or natural pleasure, and make the creature the termination of our activity, we act contrary to virtue, and are immoral. We know no way to avoid this conclusion, undeniable in the nature of things.

It follows from this that these *via-media* philosophers and moralists are mistaken in assuming that the evil lies in the excess, in the undue lengths to which we suffer ourselves to be borne by our natural tendencies, appetites, passions, and affections. It does not lie in following these too far, but in following them at all. Their natural direction, from their very starting-point, is away from God towards the creature, that is, from the end we are bound, either explicitly or implicitly, actually or habitually, to seek at all times and in all our actions, great or small. Here is the fact. We cannot serve two masters ; and we cannot serve God in seeking our own pleasure. The sensitive nature must be subordinated and completely subjected to the rational ; and as this has become impossible since the Fall, for the carnal mind is not subject to the law of God, neither can it be, nothing remains for us but to resist it, — by the grace of God to fight it, and to fight it unceasingly, as long as we live. We can make no compromise, no truce even, with it, and the least relaxation of our vigilance gives it the victory over us, and enables it to bring us again into bondage to sin and death. There must be no dallying with the flesh, any more than with the world and the Devil. They who fancy that there is no necessity of being so *very* strict, who flatter themselves that they can yield somewhat to concupiscence, and give a portion of their time, thoughts, and affections to the world, to its pomps, its shows, its vanities, and dissipations, without danger, labor under a fatal delusion. It requires no violent effort to live for the world ; our natural tendencies are to it, and before we are aware of danger, we become so absorbed in it, that we have no longer the courage or the energy to throw it off and return to the duties of religion. Authors who set out with the lax notions we are combating, disposed to stop every now and then to gather the flowers of sense that border the path of life, without wholly losing sight of religion, always delay longer than they intend, and in the ordinary course of things finally stray from the path and lose themselves, either in gross sensuality, or in open, decided heresy. None of our natural passions or affections can be trusted ; the trail of the serpent is over them all ; they are all branded with the curse of original sin, and the purest and best of them, — conjugal love, love of children, love of parents, love of country, love of mankind, — when indulged for their own sake, place us on the declivity, whence it is difficult only not to slide into the hell burning at the foot.

These views are necessary, not merely to our own justification as reviewers, but also to all who aspire to artistic excellence and literary glory. These should remember that they must know and will, as well as feel, study as well as dream, and labor to rise above the merely sensible world, and fill their minds and invigorate their hearts with the highest order of intellectual and spiritual truth that Almighty God has revealed or made accessible to the human mind. It is not enough to study human nature, and to become able to address successfully, or acceptably, the various natural passions and affections from the point of view of the objects to which they naturally tend. In doing this one only speaks from fallen human nature to fallen human nature, and the truth we attain to is only truth to man in his abnormal state, which, since what is abnormal is false, is after all only falsehood, and alike remote from the good and the beautiful. Our popular authors, we are sorry to add, seem not to have considered this important fact, and hence our popular literature, almost without exception, expresses only the truth and beauty of our corrupt nature. Indeed, among non-professional writers, it is rare in these days to find an author who even aims, whether he speaks in prose or verse, at any thing more than delighting and charming us on the sensitive or irrational side. It is the tendency of the age, and indeed, as to that matter, of the world in every age; to forget that man's glory is in his intellect and will, in his reason, by which he is made but a little lower than the angels, and through grace able to rise to the contemplation of God himself and to the exhibition in his life of sublime and heroic virtue, and to place it simply in that which he possesses in common with the animal world. To divert him from all deep and masculine thought, to divest him of all rational or spiritual truth, to render him dead to all religious affections and aspirations, and to reduce him to a better sort of animal, — to a creature of mere sensation, or weak and silly sentimentality, — is seriously regarded by those who claim to be the great lights of the nineteenth century as vindicating his manhood, asserting the nobility of his nature, and elevating him to his true rank in the scale of being. To this the "movement party" of our times, following the spirit of the world, have come, and to this conspire all our popular philosophy, science, art, and literature.

Yet this brutal result should not surprise us. It lay in the natural course of things, and might have been foreseen by ordinary sagacity as inevitable, except by miracle, when Dante

instaurated the lay genius, and commenced the creation of a lay literature by the side of the sacred literature of the Church. The literature that leaves the intelligible world, and the high order of supernatural truth, which Almighty God has revealed for our instruction, and confines itself to the sensible world, to delight and captivate the natural man, is always that which is the most easily produced, and for which there is the greatest demand. It chimes in with our natural tastes and tendencies, and imposes no self-denial, no restraint, on either author or reader. Its authors may always, where the simple ability to read is general, count on a fit "audience," and not "few"; for to appreciate it exacts no preparatory discipline. In our fallen state falsehood and evil are natural to us, and we need no previous instruction, no previous training, to embrace them, or to be charmed with them. Error and sin, like Dogberry's reading and writing, come by nature, and there is no one who cannot err and sin without being taught, without violent effort, self-denial, or mortification. When we choose to err or sin, wind and tide are in our favor, and we can rest upon our oars. Any fool is competent to err; but it takes a wise man to avoid error, to know the truth and to practise it, or to lead others to know and practise it; and wisdom and virtue do not come by nature, are not natural to us in our lapsed state, and can be acquired only by hard and persevering labor,—by violence to all our natural tendencies, severe discipline, rigid self-denial, and painful mortification,—by a constant struggle against both wind and current, against the whole force of our nature, to which no man is equal, unless excited and assisted by Divine grace. It is not surprising, then, that, in an age when authorship is resorted to as a profession, as a livelihood, and when almost every body reads, popular literature and philosophy should regard only the human animal, the irrational elements of man's nature, and address only our natural tendencies to error and sin; or that the great body of the people, accustomed to no other intellectual food, and incapable, without a discipline they are far from receiving, of relishing any other food, should feel themselves flattered in being allowed to stand at the head of the *mammalia* family, and to look upon themselves as first cousins to the orang-outang and baboon. He who begins by reverencing the animal man will soon see in man nothing but the animal to reverence; and if things go on as they are now going, we must expect to see fetichism reëstablished among the poets, artists, and philosophers of the nineteenth century.

The sensitive soul is indeed integral in man, and the animal man is the same individual or person that we call the rational or spiritual man. Man is composed of body and soul ; by his soul he is related to the spiritual world, and by his body to the material world. Considered on the former side he is the rational man ; on the latter, the animal man. Yet he is the same man, the same individual, the same person, physically, let us consider him on which side we will, and he always acts with the unity which belongs to his nature. He never acts as intellect and will without sensibility, or as sensibility without some affection of reason ; for the soul is essentially rational nature, and also the life of the body ; for when bereft of the soul, the body is a corpse, incapable of performing a single function. What we call the irrational or animal soul must, then, undoubtedly, have its place and office in the physical economy of human life, and, physically, a share in every human act. Undoubtedly, therefore, the artist cannot move intellect and will without affecting it, and in some degree moving it also. He must, then, understand the instinctive and irrational nature, and study and even address the emotions, passions, and affections. This we grant ; but what we maintain is, that he must not do it from the direction of the ends to which they tend, or by presenting them their natural objects ; he must do it from the side of intellect and will, through reason, the teachings of revelation, and the precepts of the Gospel. He cannot, if he would, avoid presenting them more or less of sensible beauty, and with sensible beauty they are always pleased ; but he must not present that beauty in its nakedness, in the form which carries away sensibility in its natural direction ; he must clothe it with a higher beauty, a beauty not sensible, but ideal, spiritual, moral, celestial, and immortal, which is undoubtedly an achievement of great difficulty, and within the reach of none but the very first masters. It is precisely one of the miseries of our fallen state that we cannot indulge our natural taste for sensible beauty without danger ; and hence, to preserve our moral integrity, we are obliged to deny and mortify that taste. The earth has been cursed for our sake, and this curse, in no small part, is in the fact that the very beauties of nature, strewn in such rich profusion around us, the mountain and plain, the streamlet and lake, the river and ocean, the varied and smiling landscape, the many-colored and fragrant flowers, the glorious sunshine, the golden-tinted clouds, the starry vault of heaven, all that poets love to see and describe, and which, had we re-

mained in the state of innocence, would have given so pure a delight to our existence, have become to us in consequence of sin a temptation and a snare. The saints, though keenly alive to all that is beautiful in nature, are accustomed to restrain their eyes, to close them to the beauty which appeals to the senses, and to open them only to the contemplation of the beauty of truth and holiness. Yet if, in contemplating spiritual truth, the goodness, the love, and mercy of God, if, enraptured with the celestial beauty with which all truth and good of the spiritual order are always clothed to the mind and the heart open to them, we overflow with joy, and our whole body thrills with delight, as sometimes happens, we may accept with gratitude to God the sensible sweetness, for it is then a divine pleasure, as it were a slight, a very slight foretaste of heaven ; but we must never seek it, and above all we must beware of confounding it with the voluntary devotion which God demands of us, and of the false notion which some entertain, that we can press the sensitive affections into the service of religion, and make them helps to our growth in knowledge and virtue.

We add here, to prevent misconception, that we do not, in bringing every work to the test of Catholic doctrine and morals, necessarily exclude from trial all works not the works of orthodox and practical Catholics. We find in Plato and Aristotle much sound philosophy ; no little beauty in the ancient Greek and Roman classics ; and some in the masterpieces of poetry, music, and eloquence of modern Protestant and infidel nations. This is because all nations, ancient and modern, even the heretical and corrupt, have had some rays of truth and goodness from the Catholic sun furrowing their darkness. Catholicity, in the order of ideas or principles, we have said, is the truth, the whole truth, whether the truth evident *per se* to natural reason, or the truth pertaining to the supernatural order, and evident only as revealed and affirmed to us by supernatural authority. This is evident from the fact that theology is the queen of the sciences, and the Church is the supreme judge and interpreter, under God, of both the revealed law and the law of nature. The first order of truth, embodied in language and evident of itself to natural reason, is in some measure known to all men ; the second order, that pertaining to the supernatural, was, as to its substance, revealed in the beginning to our first parents, and has been preserved by tradition, and never entirely lost by any people. It is therefore retained, and in some measure known, even by heretical and unbelieving

nations and individuals. It is true, the works of heretics and unbelievers, whether ancient or modern, considered in relation to the merit of the operator, or as entitling one to eternal life, have no value ; for they are, as to the operator, defective both in their principle and end. The heretic or the infidel, the gentile or the Protestant, acts always from nature to nature, which is never enough for everlasting life, for that lies in the supernatural order. The noblest works of heretics and individuals avail nothing for salvation. Only Catholics do, or can, act from human nature elevated by grace, and for God as author of grace and the supernatural end of man ; and therefore none but Catholics can enter into heaven, as we are taught in the dogma, that out of the Church no one can ever be saved. But considered apart from the principle and end of the operator, and regarded only for what they are in themselves, the works of individuals not Catholics may have, under a philosophical and an artistic point of view, no inconsiderable degree of merit. It is thus that in purely metaphysical questions St. Thomas and the fathers cite the gentile philosophers, and good Catholics admire the Apollo and the Laocoön. But what we admire in the philosophy or art of heterodox nations and individuals is precisely that in them which conforms to Catholic doctrine and morals, and which has been inspired by those elements of Catholicity which they have retained after their lapse into heterodoxy and infidelity. So, though our rule obliges us to condemn as opposed to true art whatever cannot abide the Catholic test, we are still free, under it, to judge any work without inquiring whence it came or who has produced it ; yet we expect the masterpiece only from the Catholic who spends no small portion of his time at the foot of the crucifix, and the art of all pagan or heterodox nations will always betray its origin.

From these last remarks it must appear, that, as reviewers, we hold our business to be with the work presented for our judgment, rather than with the workman abstracted from it. We do not belong to the new school of criticism, if new it is, springing up amongst us, and which values a work of art only in so far as it is a revelation of the psychological character of its author, and lets us into the secrets of his interior soul. We cannot, with a bold but flippant critic on Mr. Dana, in a late number of the *Christian Examiner*, leave the consideration of the intrinsic merits or demerits of the works themselves, as revelations of the true, the good, or the beautiful, and proceed by their aid to analyze the author as a man, to dissect his moral

and mental constitution, and to set forth, to the wonderment of our readers at our own sagacity and penetration, what he is or is not in himself. This exceeds, in our judgment, both our province and our ability. The author, in so far as he enters into his work, that is, as strictly the *author* and distinguishable from the man, is, no doubt, the proper subject of criticism, but beyond he is not, for beyond he does not publish himself, and is not amenable to a literary tribunal. Because a man has seen proper to publish a poem or a series of tales and essays, it does not follow in our code of morals that we have the right to treat him as a psychological phenomenon, or to make him a psychological *study*. The man has a right to determine for himself how far he will and how far he will not publish himself, and so far as he does not publish himself he is a private man, just as much as if he had never published any thing at all. The end of art is not to reveal the artist. It is somewhat necessary in these democratic times, when there is a universal tendency to invade every man's privacy, to violate all private rights, and merge the individual in the public, or rather in the mob, to insist on this obvious fact, if we would preserve any degree of personal independence before the many-headed and meddlesome multitude. It will be a sad day for personal independence, freedom of thought, manly conduct, and strong and masculine literature, when your Edwin P. Whipples unrebuked sit in judgment on the interior character of your Richard H. Danas, and publish to the world their psychological lucubrations. No man of any native modesty, or delicacy of feeling, will then venture to lay before the public the creations of his genius, or the results of his deep thought and patient investigations, his fervent meditations, or private musings.

Moreover, the critic can never give a judgment of an author beyond his works that can be worthy of much reliance, for the workman always surpasses his work, and it is only an infinitesimal part of himself that any tolerable author does or can express in his writings. Only emptiness can tell all that it is. The man of true genius, great abilities, and full mind can compress only the smallest portion of what he is into words intelligible to all the world. He can fully open himself only to minds of a like order and cultivation with his own. Good readers are nearly as rare as good authors, and the best part of a really good author is lost upon the crowd even of his admirers. It is not seldom that he is pained to hear himself complimented for what he would blush to have meant, and what is

at best only the merest commonplace. The evil is already one of serious magnitude, and becomes and must become every day greater and greater as nominal readers multiply, and the proportion of genuine scholars to mere sciolists diminishes. Every body now-a-days fancies himself a fit judge of every thing, and is ready to swear that whatever is true, beautiful, or good to him, is so in itself, and that whatever transcends his puny understanding is a nullity. "The schoolmaster is abroad," we are told, and it is no doubt true ; but we think it were quite as well if he stayed at home, and formed scholars who might write as scholars for scholars. The world has not profited by leaving behind the old maxim, *ne sutor ultra crepidam*, and installing the Whipples as literary and psychological critics of the Danas.

We have dwelt so long on the canons of literary and æsthetic criticism, that we have reserved ourselves little time or space to apply them to the works before us. Nor can we proceed with the same confidence in their application that we have felt in stating them. They are founded in the eternal truth and nature of things, and we have been guided by our religion in determining them ; their application is an act of human judgment, in all cases fallible, and peculiarly so in ours, especially when the application is to be made to poetical or artistic productions, of which we are very indifferent judges. Art is the expression of the true and the good under the form of the beautiful ; the form of the beautiful is not created by the mind of the artist, is not projected from his mind, before having been drawn in from without, or from above ; it is real, objective, — the real and eternal form of the true and the good themselves, as they exist independent of our apprehension ; but it is not given to every eye to behold it, and it is only privileged minds, minds endowed with some portion of that extraordinary power called genius, and which escapes all definition, that can detect or embody it. We ordinary mortals can apprehend the true and the morally good, can know our duty and perform it ; but we are not privileged to see them always and everywhere under the form of the beautiful ; far less are we able to seize that form and embody it in our works. In so far as it is identical with the true and the good we can judge of it ; but in so far as it is distinguishable from them, — for distinguishable, though not separable, from them we conceive it may be, — we hold ourselves poorly qualified, either by nature or discipline, to determine its presence.

Mr. Dana's writings consist of moral and political essays, literary reviews and criticisms, and tales and poems. The essays are the most to our taste, and are the portion of his writings with which we have the most sympathy. Mr. Dana is no Red Republican, no radical, no revolutionist, but, without being hopelessly wedded to any particular form of political constitution, is a genuine conservative, a believer in the necessity of law, and in the almost forgotten fact that loyalty is a virtue. His essays, entitled *Old Times*, *The Past and the Present*, and *Law as suited to Man*, — the first published in 1817, and the last two, one in 1833, and the other in 1835, written with rare eloquence and grace of style, and clearness and force of expression, — prove very satisfactorily that he is far from holding what is called the "sacred right of insurrection," and from believing that all innovation is improvement, and that the surest way to protect liberty is to obliterate from the mind the notion of law which guaranties it, and to break down all the bulwarks the wisdom of our ancestors erected for its defence. Mr. Dana is one of the few men remaining amongst us that retain somewhat of the views and tastes of the better class of the Loyalist gentry in ante-Revolutionary times, and who have never adopted all the peculiarities of our modern democracy.

The American Revolution and Independence have had an astonishing effect in developing the material resources of our country, and in stimulating industrial activity and enterprise, but they have not had an equally salutary influence on our manners and morals, and our general habits of thought and belief. The tone of good society under the republic is below what it was in colonial times, and thought has lost in depth and soundness what it has gained in expansion. American society has not yet recovered the loss of the old Loyalist or Tory families, for the most part the *élite* of the colonial gentry. Democracy is great and glorious in the order of mere material industry and prosperity, when that industry and prosperity are able to thrive in spite of the government ; but it is not remarkably favorable to the growth of reverence, respect, and courtesy. Its fundamental principle is pride, — is, "I am as good as you, and will not bow or take off my hat to you," — and therefore its natural tendency is to lower the standard of morals and manners. It invariably tends to invade every man's privacy, to make war on all individual freedom and mental independence, and to deny to every one the right to think, to act, or to be, save as merged in the crowd, and going to make up the public.

Its natural tendency is to bring every thing down to a common average, to the level of the common mind, and to make public opinion the standard of doctrine and morals. It puts the people, or rather the mob, in the place of God, and makes all men taken individually slaves of all men taken collectively. Of all conceivable governments democracy is the most unfavorable to free and manly thought, to mental independence, to freedom and nobility of soul.*

* Let no one infer from our strictures on democracy that we are disloyal to the republican institutions of this country. In condemning democracy we have no reference to either of the two great political parties which divide our countrymen, for in the sense in which we condemn it, democracy is common to both parties;—we refer not to the particular measures of administration which either party advocates, for in this journal we are neither Whig nor Democrat; nor do we refer to the fundamental principles of the American Constitution, State or national, for we deny that the American Constitution is democratic or was ever intended to be democratic. The democracy we condemn relates neither to parties nor to measures of administration, but to the origin of power and the constitution of the state. We condemn as destructive of freedom *all* government of *mere will*, whether the will of plebeians or of nobility, of the people or of the monarch. We demand a government of law,—a government legal in its origin, in its principles, and in its administration, and such a government we hold the American government to be when rightly interpreted; and such a government we hold a democracy is not and never can be. Democracy, as the word is now universally understood, and rightly understood, is nothing but *mobocracy*. We are opposed, not to our American institutions, but to the democratic interpretation of them insisted on by the majority of our countrymen, and even by some few of our nominally Catholic fellow-citizens, who are Catholics in the old Anglican fashion, that is, Catholics who are for this world at any rate, and for heaven in so far as it demands no self-renunciation, and they are able to accommodate its livery to the service of the Devil. What we oppose is not the institutions, but the mobocratic principles, doctrines, and practices become so prevalent that no man of tolerable ability can hope to be elevated to any place of honor or trust unless he makes a public profession of them, and sets law and common sense at defiance.

For ourselves, we advocate not monarchy, not timocracy, not oligarchy, not aristocracy, not democracy, not ochlocracy, but simply legitimacy and legality, and precisely such, we hold, is the government which Providence through the wisdom of our ancestors has established in this country. To this form of government, and the laws made in conformity to its constitution, we owe civil allegiance, and are always ready to comply with all the demands of such allegiance. But the democratic doctrines floating in the minds of our countrymen outside of the constitution, we do not hold ourselves bound to obey; and we maintain that no man in this country can follow or encourage them without ceasing to be a loyal citizen, and becoming treasonable in his thought and deed. It is not we in opposing, but our countrymen in encouraging, these doctrines and tendencies, that are disloyal to American institutions.

In consequence of the natural influence of democracy, but an influence against which the framers of the Federal Constitution intended to guard, we of the present generation are far inferior in a moral and intellectual point of view to the generation that won our Independence, and which was formed under the colonial *régime*, as is evident to all among us old enough to have known that generation before it had wholly disappeared. Even the more ultra members of the revolutionary party, not excepting even Mr. Jefferson, entertained views far more profound, just, and conservative than it is common to meet among those who now pass for aristocrats or monarchists, because not absolutely mobocrats. Since even our own memory there was no party in the country that would own the name of democrat, and the term was rarely used, save as a term of reproach. Men would say, "We are republicans, but not democrats"; and the Whig party of to-day is more democratic than was the republican party under Jefferson and Madison. There was, when the War of Independence commenced, and till many years after Independence had been gained, and we had taken our place among sovereign states, something of loyalty in our disposition, and a general conviction in our minds of the necessity and obligation of law. The sound doctrines and moral habits that we had inherited from remote ancestors were not yet worn out, and we retained some precious elements of moral and social life. These are now gone, and our country passes into the hands of the generation formed under the practical operations of democratic convictions and tendencies, — a puny generation, so degenerated in mental and moral stature from its predecessors that one can hardly believe that it has really descended from them. They who with us see and deplore this constant deterioration of American society, will read these essays of Mr. Dana with great pleasure, and with thanksgiving that there is one writer amongst us, of the highest order of American writers, who dares intimate to his countrymen that their march of intellect is downward, not upward, and to labor to recall their attention to the good old things that have passed or are passing away. The chief regret we feel in reading these essays is, that he who wrote them has not followed them up and given us many more like them, a regret we seldom have occasion to feel in the case of contemporary essayists.

The literary reviews and criticisms prove that Mr. Dana has made criticism a study. We have been particularly pleased with the paper on *Edgeworths' Readings on Poetry*, in

which the sound sense and just and acute observations of the author are surpassed only by his wit and humor. The Edgeworth tales, if man had no end but to get on well in the world, to be respectable and prosperous here, without reference to an hereafter, would have been highly meritorious. The father and daughter were very respectable pagans. But the Edgeworth notions of education, and the Edgeworth utilitarianism, cannot be too severely ridiculed, and are as contemptible as the school system and school-books of Peter Parley. We have seen no reason to believe that the modern methods of education surpass those practised by the ancients, and we are strongly inclined to the belief, that the attempt to make a young child understand every thing is the most effectual way of preventing him from ever understanding any thing.

The paper on *The Sketch Book* is a fair and discriminating review of the earlier writings of Washington Irving. We were pleased to observe, that, while the writer is just to the many merits of Mr. Irving, he is not blind to his defects, and with great kindness and delicacy indicates them. We confess that, as much as we admire the inimitable Knickerbocker, we tire of his History before reaching the end, and in fact have never yet succeeded in reading to the last page. Irving has true wit and delicate humor, a lively and fertile fancy, a pure, chaste, and elegant style, but he is a little monotonous, and his uniform sweetness now and then cloy the appetite.

The elaborate paper on *Hazlitt's Lectures on the English Poets* is to our judgment the ablest and most characteristic of any in the collection. Of Hazlitt's Lectures themselves we cannot speak, for we have never read them, nor any thing else from the same author; but Mr. Dana's own criticisms are superior to any thing of the sort written on this side the Atlantic we remember to have read. We know nothing finer, more tasteful, acute, or just in the whole range of literary criticism than the remarks on Alexander Pope, and his poetry. We were delighted exceedingly to find Mr. Dana doing justice to Swift, in spite of the *Edinburgh Review's* attempt to exclude him from good society. Swift had his faults both as a man and as a writer; he is occasionally coarse, and in his *Tale of a Tub* downright profane; but he was taller by the head and shoulders than any of his Protestant literary contemporaries, and among all the celebrated writers of Queen Anne's reign the author for whom we have the most esteem and affection. We have no sympathy with his cynicism, whether it was real or

affected ; we regret his coarseness, and detest his Protestantism ; but we confess his rare genius, his satirical wit, his strong masculine sense, and have a profound respect for his political sagacity and wisdom. The political policy he advocated, and which the Whig Addison opposed, was wise and profound, and England is the sufferer to-day, and will be the greater sufferer hereafter, for having rejected it. His policy was to save the independence of the crown, to guard against parliamentary despotism, and protect and strengthen the country population against the urban population, that is, prevent the government from falling into the hands of fund-holders, stock-jobbers, merchants, and manufacturers, — a population that lacks stability, and fluctuates with the fluctuations of trade and the state of the markets, not only at home, but also abroad. Mr. D'Israeli, if we understand him, is attempting to revive this policy, but we fear it is too late ; the Reform Bill and the late Sir Robert Peel's free-trade measures, together with the changes as to the balance of property produced in Great Britain by the marvellous development of commerce and manufactures during the last sixty years, have given the preponderance hopelessly, we are inclined to believe, to the urban system, so zealously defended by Addison in the time of Swift. England's opportunity of recovering from the sad effects of the rebellion and revolution of the seventeenth century was lost when she called in the present House of Hanover, instead of the legitimate heir of her throne, and she must, we fear, reap the consequences of her wickedness and folly. Sacred rights are never violated with impunity, and the injured in the long run are sure to be avenged.

Mr. Dana rates Wordsworth as a poet higher than we have been in the habit of doing. Our early dislike of Wordsworth may have proceeded from our early admiration of Byron, and perhaps, since we have ceased to admire Byron, we ought to overcome our distaste for Wordsworth. Wordsworth did not lack the poetic temperament, and he has written, for an Anglican, some very good poetry. Many of his sonnets, we acknowledge, are very beautiful, although we dislike sonnets, as we do hexameters, in English, and we cannot deny that they produce the effect of true poetry on the mind and heart of the reader. He wrote, too, with an honest aim, and with such religious thought and feeling as he could have without being a Catholic. But he remains always too near the ground, and never rises above a respectable Greek or Roman gentile, save in words. His philosophy is, perhaps, higher and broader

than that of Locke and Paley, but it is still low and narrow, and now and then even verges upon pantheism. He is too much of an idolater of nature to please us, and we grow weary, half to death, of his interminable descriptions of natural scenery, mountain and lake, hill and dale, park and paddock, woodland and meadow, clouds and sunsets, especially in his *Excursion*. We can endure no poetry that gives us any description of nature, or merely natural objects, any farther than it subserves the action of the piece. All description, introduced for description's sake, however beautiful in itself, is a blemish. In poetry, in eloquence, in painting, in every species of art, the moral must predominate, be the principal, and the merely natural only the accessory, and must never, as Cole's pictures of the Voyage of Life, overlay the moral. Wordsworth seems to us to have formed a tolerably just conception of what poetry should be, but to have labored all his long life in the nearly vain attempt to realize it. He made poetry step down from her stilts, and walk on her own natural feet and legs, and so far he did good service, but we are afraid that he will have to answer for not a few of the sins of the more recent schools of the Brownings, the Barretts, the Tennysons, the Lowells, and their fellows, with which our present youthful generation is so grievously afflicted.

Of Mr. Dana's poems and tales, we can offer only a brief criticism. As a poet, he steers clear of the literary faults we have, rightly or wrongly, charged upon Wordsworth. He has a quick eye for external beauty, and he gives us some exquisite pictures of nature, but they never divert our attention from the action of the piece, or mar its unity, but for the most part help it on, and deepen the impression intended. He does not appear to have learned that rhythm is unessential to poetry, or that mere feeling without thought, clear and distinct thought, is the chief element in the composition of a poet. It is pretty evident, therefore, that his poems were written some years ago, and that he did not anticipate our recent discoveries. His rhythm is always good, and his poetical language is natural, easy, and, for aught we can see, is used as properly, as simply, as plainly, and as intelligibly as if he were talking prose. To us this is a great merit, but in these days it may be thought a defect. His diction is choice, and his style, clear, strong, terse, energetic, and free from all exaggeration and diffuseness. In his *Buccaneer* he compresses as much meaning into a single line as our younger poets succeed in getting into a score of stanzas.

In nothing he has written in his poems or in his *Idle Man*, the general title of the collection of tales, is there any thing that transgresses good taste, or ordinary morality, as understood by the better class of our Protestant countrymen. They are both marked by a certain moral aim, a certain religiousness, and, so far as words go, express a reverence for and belief in Christianity. Yet we feel when reading them that the author has never been really elevated above the natural order, and that the sphere in which he lives and moves lies far below the supernatural into which Divine grace elevates us, and in which are the secret springs of the Christian's life. The only sanctity we recognize in his works is forensic and imputed, not infused and intrinsic. Hence they fail to express the higher order of beauty, and to produce the effect we have always the right to demand of all productions claiming to be artistic. The supernatural in *The Buccaneer* is terrible, but neither beautiful nor sublime, — for it is infernal, not celestial ; demoniacal, not divine. And bad as Mat Lee was, we should have been better satisfied, since supernatural agency was to be introduced, if it had been introduced to save and not to destroy. As it is, the Spectre-Horse is simply terrible, and affects us as unfavorably as the *diablerie* of Hoffman.

Speaking in general terms of Mr. Dana's poems, and especially of *The Idle Man*, we are obliged to say, that the author, beyond the exquisite beauty of his style and diction, seldom attains to the truly beautiful. His *Edward and Mary* is a very sweet love story, pleasantly and delicately told, but it is only a story of ordinary human love, which in no respect rises above the natural order, and is as much within the reach of the gentile as the Christian. But the rest are, for the most part, dark, gloomy, and morbid. They are terrible, rather than beautiful, and recall too vividly the general effect of the novels of Godwin and Charles Brockden Brown. We do not mean to say Mr. Dana copies or imitates these writers, nor imply any thing against his originality both of style and thought, but he writes with the same morbid spirit that they do, and leaves on his reader a painful and unhealthy impression. His *Paul Felton* is a powerfully written story, but it is fearful. It displays in the most masterly manner the workings of a richly endowed mind, left to its own solitary musings, strong passions, and deep affections without steady principle, and grown morbid ; but scarcely any thing in the world would induce us to give it a second reading. The author in it is true to our morbid or fallen nature

placed in the circumstances he imagines, and subjected to Satanic influences ; but he must pardon us if we intimate, that, let the case stand with him now as it may, when he wrote the story of *Paul Felton*, he did not at all understand the philosophy of the case he so powerfully and fearfully sketched. His hero wanted two things, the infused habits of grace, and an enlightened conscience. The errors and defects of Paul did not arise from the solitude in which he was brought up, nor from his mingling so little in general society. Had the boy been baptized, had he been well instructed in Christian doctrine, and been under the direction of a wise master of spiritual life, the circumstances in which he was placed and his manner of life would have favored enjoyment and the growth of virtue. But as it was, he had nothing of the grace by which the Christian lives, and the little knowledge of Christianity he had was just enough to give him a scrupulous conscience in matters not of moment, and a lax one in all else.

Paul Felton is the conception of a Calvinist, and is an admirable illustration of Calvinism in real life. Calvinists have no adequate instruction in Christian duty. A few minor things they are taught, and if in regard to these they keep tolerably clear of sin, they are satisfied with themselves, and have no trouble of conscience, however grossly they may sin in matters of real spiritual magnitude. This is the case with the great majority of them. They satisfy themselves, and maintain their self-complacency on matters of little consequence, and leave the rest to take care of itself. They can without remorse destroy the widow's house, if they do not forget to make long prayers. If they "pay tithes of mint, and anise, and cummin," they can with a self-approving conscience pass over "the weightier things of the law, judgment, and mercy, and faith." But when one of them fails in small matters, his conscience takes the alarm ; he is filled with scruples ; he becomes morbid, he grows mad, and plunges into the most fearful crimes and hideous sins. The basis of this character is pride and spiritual ignorance, oftenest met with in persons of good natural parts, respectable literary and scientific attainments, but unaccompanied by proper spiritual or ghostly direction. Such was Paul Felton, the jealous and tyrannical husband, the leaguer with the Devil, the murderer of his wife and of himself, yet a man of tender conscience, persuading himself that he is in all acting in accordance with conscience, and under the dictates of a superior power.

Mr. Dana in stories of this sort offends Christian morality, not indeed because he paints great crimes, but because he paints them in unchristian colors, from the point of view of mere nature, without directing the mind to their remedy. The saints relate to us crimes of the deepest die, but they do it with inward sanctity of their own, and so as not only to inspire horror for the deeds, but a love for God and heroic virtue. Mr. Dana gives us, in contrast with his bold sketches or finished details of crime and sin, no glimpses of the justice and mercy of God, no gleams of hope in the Divine charity, no heroic sanctity to which the mind and heart, sickened with the disgusting views of sin and iniquity, can turn and find relief and refreshment. The effect on the reader of all the kind of writing he here gives us is bad, enervating, and tends rather to fit one to be a villain and a desperado, than to recall him from error and sin, and to fix his affections on the true and the holy. In meditating on the passion of our Lord, it is more wholesome to dwell on the ineffable love, the infinite mercy of God manifested in it, than even on our own sins for which our Lord suffered on the cross : for love to God is a nobler affection than simple hatred of sin. The sinner not unfrequently loathes the sin he continues to commit, but not loathing it because opposed to the Divine charity, or to the possession of God as his supreme good, he is rather the worse than the better for the loathing ; because the loathing only drives him deeper and deeper into iniquity, in the vain hope of curing, or at least of concealing itself. Finally, we see now and then a recognition in Mr. Dana's writings of the prevalent and fashionable doctrine of the purifying and ennobling influence of mere human love. This doctrine, however disguised, is nothing but the pander to lust. We know that woman's love, a mere natural sentiment, is half deified, and represented as thaumaturgic ; but we have no more confidence in either woman's or man's love as a principle of virtue than we have in any other natural sentiment, nor half so much. Marriage *may* sometimes reform the rake of his rakishness, as avarice will sometimes cure a man of intemperance and sloth, but it does not elevate him into the sphere of virtue. The fact is, nature is never sufficient, and always does and must disappoint those who rely on it. It must be elevated by grace, and charity must enter, pervade, and rule the domestic circle, or the domestic affections themselves can do nothing for real virtue. The state, and the family, as well as individual virtue, must have a truly religious basis, be based in

Christianity, and sustained by supernatural grace, or they are no better than castles in the air.

But we have extended our remarks to an unreasonable length, and must close. We have given Mr. Dana's works themselves a very inadequate review, and the author may feel that, in common justice, we should have entered more into detail. But our purpose has not been a regular criticism of his writings, but to discuss with some depth and clearness the subject they very naturally suggested, and that not for his sake, but for the sake of our young Catholic aspirants to literary and artistic excellence. As a writer Mr. Dana is morbid, and wants that mental serenity and that buoyancy of spirit which only the Catholic faith and fidelity to the Catholic Church can give. We see in his writings the absence of the operations of Catholicity on the mind and heart, and the presence of much Puritanic pride and scrupulosity. But we see at the same time a writer of great intellectual power, of true genius, and for the most part, so far as the form goes, of cultivated, pure, and delicate taste. His style may be studied as a model, and is among the very best specimens of pure English that has been written by one born and trained on this side of the Atlantic, and is rather that of an Englishman than of an American. His relative rank as a poet we stated in the brief notice of his works in our Review for last January, and though his works are not by any means all we could wish them, few if any American productions of the sort are more creditable to our literature.

ART. IV. — *Cuba and the Cubans, comprising a History of the Island of Cuba, its present Social, Political, and Domestic Condition; also, its Relation to England and the United States.* By the Author of "Letters from Cuba." With an Appendix, containing important Statistical Information, and a Reply to Señor Saco on Annexation, translated from the Spanish. New York: Hueston. 1850. 12mo. pp. 255.

THIS book, whose author, very much to our satisfaction, is unknown to us, may contain some valuable information on the subject of which it treats; but it has evidently been written for

the purpose of promoting a democratic revolution in Cuba, and of persuading our citizens to lend their aid in wresting that noble island from the Spanish Crown, and annexing it as a State to the American Union. This is sufficient to condemn it and its author in the minds of all honorable men, and especially in the mind of every American citizen who retains some respect for international rights, and some regard for the honor of his country.

A considerable portion of our countrymen have long coveted the possession of Cuba, and our government, pretending that there was danger of its falling into the hands of Great Britain, went so far a few years since, we believe, as to make overtures to the Court of Madrid for its purchase. But these overtures, of course, were not listened to, and the pretence proved so utterly unfounded, that the government has been obliged to abandon it. Still, the desire for the acquisition of the island has continued, and many persons have thought that it could be effected by inducing and aiding the native Cubans to revolt from Spain, establish themselves as an independent republic, and then apply for admission into the American Union. In accordance with a plan of this sort, a military expedition was set on foot within our territories in 1849, to assist the Cuban patriots, or pretended Cuban patriots, to revolutionize the island. This expedition was prevented for the time being from embarking by the intervention of the Federal government; but it has been renewed during the present year, and this time, successfully eluding the vigilance of the government, it actually effected a landing in small force, and, after a smart engagement, took possession of Cardenas, committed several murders, made the governor of the town a prisoner, burnt his palace, and robbed the public treasury. But meeting a determined resistance, and not finding the native Cubans as ready to flock to its piratical standard as it was expected they would be, it abandoned Cardenas, after holding possession of it for eight hours, and effected its escape, or return, to the territories of the United States, apparently for reinforcements, in order speedily to renew the attempt in stronger force, and with a better prospect of final success.

As to the character of such an expedition against a power with whom we are at peace, or of the attempt to wrest from a friendly power one of its provinces and annex it to the Union, no matter under what pretext, there can be but one opinion among honorable men, and since its failure, the American press

has been tolerably unanimous in condemning it ; but we may well doubt if the press would be thus unanimous in condemning it, if it had succeeded, or if there were a fair prospect of successfully renewing it. Had Lopez, the chief of the expedition, succeeded, we have too much reason to believe that he would have been hailed as a hero, and welcomed to a seat in the United States Senate by the side of the honorable Senators from Texas.

It cannot be denied that a portion, we would fain hope not a large portion, of the people of this country, have very loose notions of right and wrong, and, when blinded by their passions or stimulated by their interests, find little difficulty in converting the pirate into the hero, and piracy and murder into wise and honorable policy. To this portion of our citizens religion and morality, municipal laws, and laws of nations have either no meaning or an odious meaning when opposed to their interests or their passions, their thirst for gold or their lust for the acquisition of territory. Regarding the will of the people as the supreme law, and by a natural and easy process confounding the will of the people with the will of the mob, or the will of the people as the state with the will of the people outside of the constitution and laws, they hold that what any portion of the people wish and are able to do, they have the unquestionable and indefeasible right to do. Mistaking the sound and legal republicanism held by our fathers, and incorporated into our noble institutions, for wild and lawless radicalism, they assert the right of the people, or rather the mob, in every country, to rebel, whenever they please, against their legitimate sovereign, to overthrow with armed force the existing order whenever it ceases to suit their fancy or caprice, and to institute such new order in its place as shall seem to them good. Starting with this revolutionary principle, and assuming that all who avail themselves of it, and rise in arms against their sovereign, are necessarily the party of freedom, struggling for liberty, for the inalienable rights of man, they assume that the cause of such party is always the cause of justice, of humanity, of God, and therefore that we are all free to rush to their aid, to assist them with our sympathy, our counsel, our treasure, our arms, and our blood, irrespective of existing laws, the rights of sovereigns, or the faith of treaties. Hence we find them always sympathizing with rebels, or party at war with their rulers, applauding their prowess, rejoicing in their victories over the friends of order and legitimate authority, and mourning over

their defeat. And hence these see in the attempts of the pirate Lopez and his crew nothing but the practical application of their own deeply cherished principles.

The fact that Lopez, after his return to the United States, was greeted with loud and prolonged applause, when he assured the citizens of Savannah that he had not abandoned his enterprise, but had consecrated his whole life to the liberation of Cuba, indicates only too clearly that these principles are by no means unpopular, at least in certain sections of the country. Indeed, the number of those who, if not ready to join actively in such an expedition as Lopez and his associates fitted out, yet hold that the Cubans have a perfect right, and we a perfect right to assist them, to rebel against their sovereign, to revolutionize the island, and, with the consent of our government, to annex themselves to the Union, is much larger, we fear, than a good citizen who regards the honor of his country is willing to believe, — so little value is placed upon the rights of sovereignty, and so little respect is paid even to the rights of property.

Certainly, we are far from asserting or insinuating that any considerable portion of our citizens are sufficiently depraved to join actively in a piratical attempt like that made by the recent Cuban expedition, but such an attempt is not wholly incompatible with the political creed of perhaps a majority of our countrymen. According to the plan of the conspirators, the citizens of this country were to appear to the world only as the allies or auxiliaries of the people of Cuba. It was assumed that there was, or that there could be created, a Red Republican party among the Creole population of the island, and it was through these that possession of it was to be obtained. The Cubans themselves were to appear before the world as the prime movers of the enterprise and chief actors in it. They were to proclaim themselves a republic, independent of Spain, and we were simply to enlist under their banner, and to aid them in achieving their independence. Annexation would, it was supposed, follow republicanism and independence, as a matter of course. This was the plan, and we can see nothing in it inconsistent with the doctrines advocated by the whole body of American demagogues, and by nearly the whole American newspaper press. Once lay it down, as nearly all our politicians of late have been in the habit of doing, that the people may rebel against the sovereign authority of the state when they judge proper, and that, irrespective of pre-

existing constitutions and laws, they are sovereign and the legitimate source of all political power, and it is impossible for you to point out any thing wrong or censurable in the attempt to get possession of Cuba in the way proposed, that is, by rebellion, murder, and robbery. According to these principles, the Creoles of Cuba, however few in number, or insignificant in position, who were dissatisfied with the Spanish government, or uneasy and merely desirous of a change, had a right to assume to be the *people* of Cuba, in whom vests the national sovereignty, and to organize themselves into a provisional government, and speak and act in the name of the universal Cuban nation. If they had this right, on the same principles our citizens, as many of them as chose, had the right to treat them as the independent and sovereign people of Cuba, and as such to join with them, and assist them in effecting their independence, and consolidating their authority over the whole island; for according to the popular political creed of this country, democracy is the native inherent right of every people, the only legitimate form of government, and therefore the national sovereignty must always vest in the party struggling to maintain or to establish democracy. Either, then, we must say that Lopez and his crew are not censurable, except for their imprudence and ill-success, or abandon our popular political creed. If we hold on, as the mass of our politicians do, and no doubt will for some time to come, to the principles of that creed, it is only by a logical inconsequence that we can condemn the Cuban or any expedition of the sort.

But our politicians would do well to reflect that a people cannot hold and act on principles which would justify such an expedition, without placing themselves out of the pale of civilized nations, and authorizing the civilized world to treat them as a nest of pirates, and to make war on them as the common foe of mankind. Especially must this be so, when they avow and act on such principles against a power with which their government has treaties of peace and amity, as our government has with Spain. With such a people, having a popular form of government, which must in the long run, to a great extent at least, yield to the popular will, however expressed, no nation can live in peace; for they hold themselves bound neither by the laws of nations nor by the faith of treaties. No nation within reach of their influence can ever be safe from their machinations; and every one must be perpetually in danger of having them stir up its subjects to rebellion, and through them

to strip it of its territories, and finally blot out its national existence. Friendly relations with such a people are out of the question, and the common interests of nations and of society must ultimately league the whole civilized world against them to exterminate them, or to be exterminated by them.

We are too sincere a patriot and too loyal a citizen to believe that the majority even of those who adhere to these false and detestable principles are aware of the horrible consequences which legitimately flow from them. It is but common candor to regard them as better than their principles, and to presume that, in general, they do not understand the real nature of the doctrines they profess, and indeed seem to glory in professing. They are no doubt greatly blinded by their passions, and misled by their insane thirst of gold and territorial acquisition, but much of their error originates in misapprehension of the true nature of their own political institutions. These institutions are republican, indeed, and repugnant to both monarchy and political aristocracy, but they are not democratic, either in the ancient or the modern sense of that term. Anciently, as in Athens, where the word originated, democracy meant a government possessed and administered by the common people, in distinction from the Eupatrids, or nobles; in modern times, it means the absolute and underived sovereignty of the people, or the native and inherent right of the multitude to do whatever they please, and is necessarily resolvable into anarchy or the despotism of the mob. Our institutions are democratic in neither of these senses: not in the former, for they recognize no political distinction of common people and Eupatrids, lords and commons; not in the latter, for they recognize no political power in the people save as constitutionally defined and exercised in virtue of and accordance with legal forms, and they make it high treason to rebel against the state, or to levy war against its sovereign authority. Under our political system, the people are the *motive* force, but not the *governing* power, and are, theoretically, neither the government nor the source of its rights. The constitution and laws are above them. Suffrage is not with us a natural right, an incident of one's manhood, but a public trust conferred by law, and capable of being extended or contracted by municipal regulation.

But American politicians generally, not of one party only, for in this respect Whigs and Democrats do not essentially differ, have of late years overlooked this important fact, and, corrupted by French Jacobins, and English and Scotch radi-

cals, have sought to give to our institutions a democratic interpretation in the modern sense of the word. They cease to hold the laws sacred, and the constitution inviolable, and nothing is for them sacred or obligatory, but the arbitrary and irresponsible will of the multitude. According to them, the will of the people overrides constitutions and laws, and is the only authority to be consulted by the statesman, and, they are well-nigh prepared to say, by the moralist and the divine. He must be an obtuse dialectician indeed, who fails to perceive, when his attention is called to the point, that it is a necessary corollary from a democracy of this sort, that the people, or any number of persons calling themselves the people, have the right to rebel against the state when they choose, and change its constitution as they please. This doctrine, of course, strikes at all legality, all legitimacy, abrogates all law, municipal or international, renders loyalty an unmeaning word, and leaves the people, theoretically at least, in a state of pure anarchy and lawlessness. It denies all government by denying to government all sacredness and inviolability, and leaves us free to follow our own instincts, passions, lusts, and supposed interests, without regard to municipal law, the laws of nations, or the obligations of treaties. Our error lies in our adhesion to the fundamental principles of this false democracy, a democracy of foreign, not of native growth, and as anti-American as it is anti-national and anti-social. It is the prevalence of this false democracy amongst us that has in some measure blinded us, and rendered the mass of our people apathetic to the reprehensible character of the recent conduct of a portion of our citizens towards Spain, Mexico, and even Great Britain.

It, of course, will be easy for our demagogues and our radical press to call us hard names for these remarks, to denounce us as the enemy of free institutions and the friend of tyrants and aristocrats, and to drown the voice of truth and justice by senseless shouts of "Popular Sovereignty," "The Rights of Man," "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," or other popular watchwords which have convulsed the nations of the Old World, consecrated rebellion, and instituted the worship of the dagger; but it will nevertheless remain still true, that a large portion of the American people have lost sight of the principles of their own institutions, and embraced principles which they cannot avow and act on without deserving to be placed outside of the pale of civilized nations, and which, if continued to be held and acted on, must in the end sink us to the

level of the Asiatic Malays. There is no use in seeking to deceive ourselves. There is a spirit abroad among us, working in the very heart of our population, that, unless speedily exorcised, must ultimately, if our power continues to increase at its present ratio, make us the deadliest foe of Christian civilization that has arisen since Attila the Hun, and the early Saracenic and Turkish successors of the Arabian impostor.

It cannot be denied, and should not be disguised, that we are fast adopting the principles, and following in the footsteps, of the old French Jacobins. We are preparing to enter, and would that we could say we have not entered, upon a career of Jacobinical propagandism and territorial acquisition. Other nations see this, and therefore see in us the future disturbers of the peace of the world. Hence, while they admire our industrial activity, our enterprise and energy in the material order, they detest our principles, and hold our national character in low esteem. It is idle for us to cherish the delusion, that the estimation in which the nations of the Old World hold us is owing to our republicanism and free institutions. It is no such thing. It is because they see in us, as a nation, no loyalty, no high moral aims, no lofty principles of religion and virtue, but a low, grovelling attachment to the world, the deification of material interests, and the worship of the "almighty dollar." It is because they see us becoming democratic propagandists, and sympathizers with the rebels against legitimate authority, the peace and order of society, wherever we find them, and ready to decree an ovation to every popular miscreant, who, after having lighted the flames of rebellion and civil war in his own country, flies hither to save his neck from the halter it so richly merits. It is because we respect not the rights of sovereignty, the independence of nations, or the faith of treaties, and have proved ourselves capable of stirring up the citizens of a state with which we are at peace to a rebellion against its sovereign authority, for the sake of stripping it, through them, of a portion of its territory, and incorporating it into the Union.

Unhappily for our reputation, the recent military expedition against Cuba is not an isolated fact or an anomaly in our brief national history. It stands connected with our act of robbing Mexico of Texas, and annexing it to the Union. Texas was a Mexican province chiefly settled by American emigrants, who by settling it became Mexican citizens and subjects. These Americo-Mexicans, in concert with our citizens, and, it is said, with persons in high official station under our government, re-

belled against the Mexican authorities, and by means of volunteers, money, arms, and munitions of war from the States, succeeded in achieving independence. As soon as this was achieved, or assumed to be achieved, the Republic of Texas applied to our government for admission into the American confederacy. Her application was indeed rejected by Mr. Van Buren, who was then President of the United States, and whose management of our foreign relations, little as we esteem that gentleman, we are bound to say, were creditable to himself and to his country ; but it was renewed and accepted under his successor, and in 1845 Texas became one of the United States, and sent, as one of her representatives in the American Senate, the very man who is said to have concerted with President Jackson and others the robbery, and who certainly was the chief to whom its execution was intrusted. Here was a great national crime, not yet expiated ; and here was set a precedent not a little hostile to the nations that have territory contiguous to ours.

We acknowledge personally, with shame and regret, that, though opposed to the revolt of Texas from Mexico, and to the aid which she received from this country by the connivance of the government, we were, after her independence was an acknowledged fact, among those who, for certain political reasons, of less weight than we were led to believe, advocated her annexation to the Union. It is true, we repudiated the principles on which she and our countrymen defended her conduct, and we sought to make out a case of legality in her favor ; but, nevertheless, we were wrong, and are heartily sorry for what we did, and our only consolation is that we were too insignificant to have had any influence on the result, one way or the other. But be this as it may, the recent expeditions for revolutionizing and annexing Cuba are historically connected with this great national crime. No sooner had Texas been annexed than the rage for annexation seemed to have become universal. Mr. Yulee, the Jew-Senator from Florida, immediately brought forward in the Senate a proposition for the acquisition of Cuba. Mr. Dallas, Vice-President of the United States, in the same year, 1845, gave, at a public dinner, the annexation of Cuba, as a toast, and in 1847 wrote a letter in favor of the appropriation of that island, as essential to his plans for the aggrandizement of the Union. Early in 1845 the press began to advocate the annexation of California, another province of Mexico, and it should be remembered that Colonel Fremont, an officer

of the United States army, before he had learned that war existed between us and the Mexican republic, actually, by the aid of American residents, got up a revolution in that province, and declared it independent of the Mexican authorities. Here the game of Texas was begun to be played over again, and it is not insignificant that this same Colonel Fremont is sent to represent California in the Federal Senate, now that she is admitted as a State into the Union. There can be no reasonable doubt, that both California and New Mexico would have been annexed to the Union *à la* Texas, if the war with the Mexican republic had not given us an opportunity of acquiring them in a more honorable manner, that is, openly by the sword. It was, as the papers said, "manifest destiny," and it is a prevailing belief among our politicians that the annexation of the whole of Mexico, and even of Central America, is only a question of time. The fever of annexation broke out even on our northern frontier, and if Great Britain had not appeared to us to be a more formidable power than Spain or Mexico, the Canadian Annexationists and Red Republicans would have received all the aid they needed to sever their connection with the British empire, and to become incorporated with the United States. A war with Great Britain was not deemed prudent for the moment, and the annexation of Canada is, for the present, postponed. Pirate does not fight pirate, or even man-of-war, if the encounter can be avoided.

Now, in judging the bearing on our national character of the recent expedition of our citizens against Cuba, which it is well known both our people and our government are extremely anxious to possess, these facts must be taken into the account; and they show that it is not an isolated act, but one of a series of acts of like character, and of acts, too, which have received, at least in the case of Texas, even the sanction of the Federal government. What our citizens had done in the case of Texas and California, what was to prevent them from doing in the case of Cuba? and if the government connived at their conduct, and finally sanctioned it in the instance of fraudulently appropriating a province of Mexico, why should it not do the same in the instance of fraudulently appropriating a province of Spain? Viewed in the light of our previous conduct, the expedition to Cuba ceases to be merely the act of the adventurer Lopez and a few nameless and lawless individuals, the spawn of New York and New Orleans, Washington and Cincinnati, who were induced to engage in it, and becomes in some sort

an act for which the American people themselves are responsible, and other nations at least will, and have the right to, so regard it. The proposed Cuban republic, provisionally organized, had its juntas, clubs, or agents in our principal cities; the forces raised were chiefly our own citizens, under officers who had served under our flag in Mexico; the regiments were numbered and named after individual States, as if they had been United States troops; and the papers, — no bad index to public sentiment, — in announcing the killed and wounded in the attack on Cardenas, used the very terms they would have used if they had in fact been so. It is not unfair, then, to assume that the people of this country did to a great extent actually sympathize with that expedition; that they were so desirous of acquiring Cuba, and so indifferent as to the means, that their moral sense took no alarm at acquiring it in the manner we had acquired Texas; and that, if they regarded the proceedings as somewhat irregular, they yet were extremely apathetic to their moral turpitude. If, as no doubt was the fact, they were for the most part unprepared to take any very active part in furthering the nefarious proceedings, it is clear that they were not unwilling that they should go on and succeed. The expedition, if successful, would give us Cuba, the key to the Gulf of Mexico, open to us the final annexation of all the West Indies, liberate Cuba from the dark despotism of Spain, perhaps from the darker despotism of Rome, and introduce the oppressed Creoles to the advantages of our free institutions, of our Bible societies, and sectarian religion, and enrich us with the spoils of its churches and religious houses, supposed to be immensely rich. So the end would justify the means. If such had not been the public sentiment of our people, especially in our principal cities, and in the South and Southwest, the conspirators could never have carried on their operations within the jurisdiction of the United States in the public manner they did; they would have been denounced to the public authorities, and ample evidence would have been forthcoming for their conviction.

No doubt there was a large body of our citizens, passive in regard to nearly all public matters, that had never heard of Lopez, or the attempt to organize an expedition against Cuba, nay, who have not yet heard any thing of either; no doubt there was a respectable number of enlightened and moral citizens, who were from the first indignant at the very thought of setting on foot such an expedition within our jurisdiction, and

no doubt, again, that a large majority of our people, now the subject is brought distinctly before them, and its enormity pointed out, are prepared to repudiate it ; but it is still undeniable that the rumors of the attempt to organize such an expedition did not alarm the public mind, and the news of its embarking was received rather with approbation than horror. The iniquity of the proceeding did not strike the mass of the people till after " the sober second thought " induced by its ridiculous failure. The feelings and wishes, the sympathies, of that whole body of citizens who usually give tone to our community, and determine the action and policy of the American people, were decidedly with Lopez and his piratical associates, not in the least with the friendly power about to be so grievously wronged. This portion of our citizens, whose dominant sentiment ordinarily represents that of the country, for ordinarily the less, not the more, worthy public sentiment predominates, saw nothing morally wrong in the nefarious proceeding, nothing, indeed, but the somewhat bold application of their own principles. It is this undeniable fact that authorizes us to say that the Cuban expedition met the popular sympathy, and that the American people as a body are to no inconsiderable extent implicated in its guilt, if not actively, at least passively. It is this fact, again, which gives to that expedition its chief importance.

Even among those who opposed the proceedings in this case, as in that of Texas, comparatively few opposed them primarily and chiefly on the ground of their injustice to Spain, of their being a violation of the laws of nations, the faith of treaties, the rights of sovereignty, and the rights of property. They opposed the expedition for the same reasons that the South and Southwest favored it, because it was supposed that the acquisition of Cuba would strengthen the cause of negro slavery, and retard or wholly hinder its final emancipation. They reasoned that it must not be encouraged, because it was not an " Abolition " or a " Free Soil " measure. The question, therefore, was discussed, as far as discussed at all, after the manner of the English and American mind, on a collateral issue, not on its intrinsic merits. This of itself shows that the essential principle involved in it as a moral and international question was not regarded, even by not a few of the opponents of the expedition, as grossly immoral, and that even with them the rights of Spain, the laws of nations, and the faith of treaties, in themselves considered, counted for little, and were

worth urging only when favorable to the views and purposes of a certain portion of our own citizens. The controversy, as far it went on, was confined to a purely local and domestic question, and became only a branch of the general controversy which has been for some time raging between the Northern and Southern sections of the Union. It is this fact, again, which has deceived so many otherwise well-disposed citizens. If the independence and annexation of Texas had been discussed on its merits, not in its relation to negro slavery, a matter of great indifference to many of us, there was still moral soundness enough in the American people, we doubt not, to have saved us from the great national and international crime we committed; and if the independence and annexation of Cuba could have been presented to the American people in its true light, free from all connection with the same subject, we owe it to our countrymen to say, that we have no doubt that a majority of them would have repudiated the proposition with indignation. But the fact that it was not so presented and discussed was their own fault, and they must be held responsible for its consequences.

Thus far we have considered the Cuban expedition in its relation to the political principles and popular sentiments of the American people, as distinguished from the American government; but it is necessary to go farther, and consider the dispositions and acts of the government in regard to it. The conduct of the American people outside of the government, or rather of the active minority, by which they are usually represented, if not as bad as appearances indicate, is still gravely reprehensible, and extremely mortifying to all who are alive to the honor of their country. But notwithstanding this, the government itself may have had honorable intentions, and been really in earnest to discharge its obligations towards Spain, with whom it has treaties of peace and friendship. Is such the fact? Has it all along acted in good faith? Has it failed to perform its duty through incapacity, or has it aimed to do no more than necessary to save appearances, and to avoid an open rupture with Spain?

We wish to speak of the government with the loyal respect the citizen always owes to the supreme political authority of his country, and we do not allow ourselves rashly to judge its intentions. It was bound to peace relations with Spain by express treaty, made in 1795, and subsequently confirmed, the first article of which stipulates "that there shall be firm and in-

violable peace and sincere friendship between the two governments and their respective citizens and subjects, without exception of persons or places." Under this and other clauses of the same treaty, the United States were bound to use all necessary force to repress and punish all acts hostile to Spain, or any of her provinces or colonies, committed within their jurisdiction. The treaty, we need not say, is the supreme law of the land, and as binding on the citizen as on the government itself. The citizens of a state cannot be legally at war with a power with which their government is at peace, and their hostile acts are its acts if it neglect to use all its power, if needed, to prevent or chastise them ; for the government under the laws of nations, even in the absence of treaty stipulations, is responsible to foreign powers for the acts of all persons within its jurisdiction. Undoubtedly it is excused from all hostile intention, if it does all in its power to prevent hostile acts on the part of its subjects, or persons within its jurisdiction, or if, failing wholly to prevent, it is prompt to put forth its whole power to repress them, and bring the offenders to justice ; for no government can at all times and under all circumstances control the entire conduct of every person within its jurisdiction. But with this reserve, under the law of nations, the government is responsible for the conduct of all persons within its jurisdiction, and especially when the law of nations is defined, and, so to speak, intensified, by express treaty obligations. Our government was then bound to exert all its vigilance and power, if needed, to prevent the beginning or setting on foot within its jurisdiction, and much more the embarking, of the military expedition against Cuba. This was clearly its duty, and any thing short of this was short of what Spain had the undoubted right to expect and to require at its hands. It owed it, also, to Spain and to its own majesty to execute the full rigor of its own municipal law against the persons implicated in that expedition.

But our government, owing to the fact of its having connived at the rebellion of Texas, of its having, against the protest of Mexico, incorporated that province into the Union, and of its having gone to war with Mexico, and still further dismembered her, because she would not peaceably submit to be robbed of her territory, had given Spain ample reason to distrust its professions except so far as backed by deeds, and to regard it as capable of repeating its previous dishonorable and criminal connivance at rebellion, murder, and robbery. All the world knew that Texas had been wrested from Mexico by American citi-

zens, or persons within our jurisdiction, without opposition from our government, and it was by no means improbable, *a priori*, that what it had consented to see done in the case of Texas, it might be willing to have done in the case of Cuba. Spain had seen in our relations with Mexico the manner in which we were capable of interpreting our treaties of peace and amity with foreign powers, and might reasonably suspect us of being no further opposed to the Cuban expedition than was necessary to save appearances. This undoubtedly was the view taken by the movers and friends of the expedition; otherwise we can hardly suppose they would have dared, knowing, as they must have known, the stringent nature of our laws, to commit the acts they did within the Federal jurisdiction. Our government, if it acted really in good faith, was therefore bound, at least for its own sake, to more than ordinary vigilance and activity in preventing or suppressing the enterprise, and bringing its participants, aiders, and abettors to justice.

We doubt not the honest intentions of the government, but we must say that, so far from exerting this extraordinary vigilance or activity, it has undeniably failed in the full and prompt discharge of its duty both to Spain and to its own character. We are forced to this conclusion by a series of facts and considerations which seem to us to leave no room for doubt. The government can be said to have done its duty only on the supposition that it could not detect the proceedings of the conspirators, or that it lacked power to arrest them, or was unable to procure the evidence necessary to establish juridically their guilt. No one of these suppositions is admissible, least of all the second; for the government itself would not thank the friends who should undertake to defend it on the ground of its inability to fulfil its treaty obligations, and to execute its own laws. Such a line of defence the government would be prompt to repudiate, as it would place it in the most humiliating light before the nations of the world, and authorize them to refuse to enter into any treaty stipulations with it.

The proposition to acquire Cuba by means of revolutionizing it was before the country, and discussed in the public journals. Every body knew, or might have known, that, as far back at least as 1848, there was a movement concerted with American citizens, to be efficiently supported by us, going on in Cuba and some of our cities, to get up a republican revolution in Cuba, and that this revolution was intended to result in its independence and ultimate annexation to the Union. Of all this the

government could not have been uninformed. It was equally well known that the movement in certain sections of the Union met with great favor, that it accorded with the wishes of the country, and even of the government so far as the simple acquisition of Cuba was concerned, and throughout with the popular democratic creed of the great body of our politicians and of our newspaper press generally. Here was enough to place a loyal and competent government on its guard, and induce it to take active and efficient measures to preserve the peace relations between us and Spain, and to prevent its treaty obligations with that government from being violated by persons within its jurisdiction. Unhappily, it did nothing of the sort. Public men, men high in social, and even official station, were advocating the acquisition of Cuba, the press, especially at the Southwest, was busy manufacturing public opinion for the country, and urging the violation of the rights of property, the law of nations, and the faith of treaties, and the government was silent and inactive ; its organs were dumb, and it did and said nothing to give its deluded subjects any reason to believe that it would be more disposed to execute its laws against a Cuban, than it had been against a Texan, military expedition. Had the government been really loyal, really disposed to respect the rights of Spain, and to fulfil its duties towards her, it may be asked why it did not exert itself in the beginning to correct the false opinion that the citizens of this country have a right to engage in a project for revolutionizing a province or colony of a friendly power, and of wresting it from its lawful sovereign, as well as the grave error that they could do all this without implicating the government in their guilt. At any rate, would it not, since its past delinquency had made it necessary, have assured its misguided subjects in the outset, that it would not suffer them to make the attempt with impunity ? Yet it took no notice of what was going on, and suffered the false opinion to spread, till it became a power all but impossible to be controlled.

It is true that the military expedition fitted out in 1849 was prevented from embarking by the intervention of the government. But its destination was no secret ; and the adventurers were set at liberty, without even the form of a trial, permitted to retain their arms and ammunition, and suffered to disperse themselves over the Union without receiving the punishment, or any portion of the punishment, which our laws annex to the high misdemeanour of which they were unquestionably guilty. Why was not the full rigor of the law executed against them ?

Had it been, others would have been deterred from engaging in similar expeditions. The very fact that they were let off without being punished was well calculated to produce the conviction, unfounded we are willing to believe, that the government itself was at heart not ill disposed to their enterprise, and would do no more to prevent its execution than was strictly necessary to avoid an open rupture with Spain. It is idle to pretend that no sufficient proof could be obtained to convict them. Proof enough could have been obtained if the government had really wanted it, and earnestly sought for it ; for the real character and objects of the expedition were well known, were matters of public notoriety, and it is not likely that they were incapable of being juridically established.

As was to be expected, the impunity extended to the military expedition of 1849 served only to encourage another. That had failed in consequence of appointing its rendezvous within the jurisdiction of the United States. The new expedition had only to avoid that error, by assembling at some point without that jurisdiction ; from such point or points it could embark for its piratical attack on Cuba, free from the apprehension of being interrupted by the officers of the Union. It accordingly adopted that precaution, and, as is well known, with complete success. If it failed in its ulterior objects, it was owing, not to the vigilance or the activity of our government, but to the precautions taken by the Spanish authorities, and the unexpected loyalty of the Cuban population. The Cuban democrats appear to have been from home, and the Red Republican demonstration proved a complete failure, to the no small honor of our Creole neighbours.

The government could not have been ignorant of the attempt to set on foot this new expedition within its jurisdiction. No sooner had it dismissed the adventurers from Round Island, than military preparations were recommenced in New York, Boston, and especially New Orleans ; men were enlisted, drilled in the use of arms, and despatched to Chagres, or other points out of the Union, and all in the most public manner. The adventurers hardly attempted to conceal their destination, and ostentatiously displayed the cockade and colors of the proposed Cuban republic. The publishers of the *New York Sun* hoisted on their office the new flag of Cuba, and openly engaged in acts hostile to Spain. The advertisements and proclamations of the revolutionary junta were inserted in the public journals, and bonds made payable on the revenues of the

island of Cuba were issued, to procure money for raising troops and exercising them in the use of arms. The conspirators carried their effrontery so far as to insert in the public journals of Washington, under the very nose of the government, an advertisement announcing the formation of a permanent junta destined to promote the *political interests of Cuba*, that is, to revolutionize the island. These acts, done openly, before all the world, of a nature easily traceable to their perpetrators, could not have been unknown to the government, unless it chose to remain ignorant of them. The Spanish Minister, as early as the 19th of January of this year, called the attention of the government to them. The Secretary, Mr. Clayton, issued, indeed, a feeble and indolent circular, on the 22d of the same month, to the District Attorneys of Washington, New York, and New Orleans, enjoining upon them to *observe* what should be passing in their respective districts; but with no apparent result. These attorneys excused themselves from prosecuting the offenders, on the pretence that an overt act was necessary to justify the commencement of proceedings against them,—a pretence as creditable to their legal attainments as to their loyalty. The law declares, “That if any person shall within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States *begin*, or set on foot, or provide or prepare the means for, any military expedition or enterprise, to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominions of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people with whom the United States are at peace, every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanour, and shall be fined not exceeding three thousand dollars, and imprisoned not more than three years.”* The journals, by publishing the advertisements and proclamations of the conspirators, as well as the conspirators themselves, were guilty under this law, and liable to its penalties; for the law makes the very *beginning* or *attempt* to get up such expedition or enterprise a high misdemeanour, as these district attorneys, if lawyers, must have known perfectly well. The district attorneys were probably not unfavorable to the expedition, and had no wish to interfere with it any further than they could help, and the Secretary of State, though well disposed himself, probably did not judge it necessary to insist with energy on their performance of their official duties. The crimes had been committed in their districts, and it was

* *Statutes of the United States*, 1818, chap. 88, sec. 6.

their duty to have prosecuted the offenders, and nobody can really be so simple as to believe that they could not have obtained the requisite evidence for their conviction, if they had sought it. But the government ought to be responsible for their neglect, for they were its agents.

The conspirators continued their operations, without the government's taking any efficient measures to arrest them. On the 8th of May, the Spanish Minister, M. Calderon de la Barca, writes to the Secretary again, and from this date continues in frequent communications to furnish him with precise information and detailed proofs of the movements of the conspirators, till the final departure of the expedition from the United States. Yet till its final departure nothing could excite the Secretary to activity; but then, after the expedition had sailed, and there was no probability of being able to intercept it before it should effect a landing on the island, he despatched a vessel of war to the port of Havana, where there was no danger, and where there could be no expectation of encountering the pirates, with orders to *observe* the motions of vessels approaching that port, in order to *ascertain* if there had been commenced any military expedition or enterprise to be directed from the United States against the territory or the dominions of Spain!

This order strikes us as being little better than a mockery. To despatch a vessel of war on a cruise of observation to ascertain a well-known fact, — a fact already with detailed proofs before the government, — was, to say the least, wholly unnecessary, and calculated only to throw doubts on the good faith of the government. Then the fact that it was despatched only *after* the piratical expedition had embarked, when it was too late to intercept it, and to the port of Havana, the best guarded and least exposed port of the island, and where nobody expected the pirates would attempt to effect their landing, could only indicate either the extreme inefficiency of the government, or its good-will to the pirates, and wish not to interfere with their sport of murder and robbery. The fact of the non-interference of the government till the last moment, and its inefficient interference even then, are well calculated to throw doubts on its good faith, and to create a painful suspicion, which, however, we repudiate, that it was willing to connive at the expedition, — at least so far as to give it a fair chance of succeeding, if it could. At any rate, the facts we have detailed prove a culpable failure of the late administration in the discharge of its duty to Spain, and in the execution of the laws of the Union, and if Mr. Clay-

ton thought to obtain credit with honorable men for his vigilance and promptness, he made a mistake.

We cannot but remark that Mr. Secretary Clayton's language is far more energetic when he has some pretence for asserting that Spain has infringed or is likely to infringe the rights of American citizens. He had remained nearly apathetic while the conspirators were at work in fitting out their expedition against Cuba, and nothing could induce him to take efficient measures to arrest them. Our treaty obligations with Spain and our own laws were violated in open day, and he could at most only be induced to issue some indolent and tardy order to his subordinates to make observations. But when Spain, not exactly within her jurisdiction, but on a desert island close to her shores, takes a portion of the military expedition prisoners, he is incited to an unwonted degree of energy. The boot is on the other leg now, and he writes — we translate from the *Courier des Etats-Unis*, not having the original despatch before us — to Mr. Campbell, our Consul at Havana, — “If the facts relative to their capture are as reported, the President is resolved that the eagle shall protect them from all punishment except such as may be inflicted on them by the tribunals of their own country. Tell the Count of Alcoy to send them back to the United States, where they will find a punishment worse than any that he can inflict on them, if they are honorable men, in the reprobation they will meet from all right-minded persons, for having made an attempt against the good faith of a nation that prefers its reputation for integrity to all the Antilles together.” This is in some respects no less amusing than grandiloquent. The supposition that men enlisted in a piratical expedition are *honorable* men is somewhat comical, and the suggestion that they would meet a heavier punishment for their crimes in the public opinion of their own country than any the Count of Alcoy could inflict on them, when that public opinion was in favor of their enterprise, and so strongly in favor of it that the Secretary himself wellnigh lacked the courage to brave it, is original, and shows that the late Secretary of State has one of the qualities, if not of a statesman, at least of a poet. Then the flourish about the high estimation in which we hold our national reputation for integrity would be worth more if we had, or even deserved, that reputation. We bartered that reputation for Texas, for California and New Mexico, and might easily be supposed capable of bartering it again for Cuba and Porto Rico. The frail one should not challenge admiration for her virtue.

The prisoners taken on the islands of Las Mugerres and Contoy were, and it is well known that they were, a portion of the Lopez expedition, and had left the United States on a piratical enterprise against the dominions of Spain. They were pirates, and, under our treaty with Spain and the laws of nations, they were punishable as pirates. Spain had been invaded, her territory had been violated by our citizens, her subjects murdered, her treasury plundered, her public buildings burned, and the governor of one of her towns made prisoner; she was threatened with still further invasion from the same quarter, and with all the horrors of war. She had, under these circumstances, the right to protect herself by taking and hanging every individual she found engaged in the piratical expedition against her dominions. These Contoy prisoners, as they are called, were the comrades of those who had invaded her soil; they shared in their guilt, and were virtually pirates, and as such could not claim the protection of our government. To any demand of ours to Spain to give them up, it was sufficient for her to allege this fact, and that she had taken them in the right of self-defence, and should treat them according to the law of nations.

Our government could demand the release of these prisoners only on the ground that there was no sufficient evidence to connect them with the piratical expedition against Cuba; but of that fact Spain was a competent judge, and she had the full right to bring them to trial, and if convicted by her own tribunals, under the laws of nations, of being a part of that expedition, she had the undoubted right to sentence and punish them, without our having the least right to remonstrate. There was really nothing in the conduct of Spain with regard to the capture, detention, and trial of these prisoners of which we have the least right to complain. Spain was not obliged to wait till the pirates had actually set foot on her soil, and struck the first blow, before her right to arrest and punish them commenced. It was enough that their intention to invade her soil was manifest, and it was clear that they had embarked for that purpose. These Contoy prisoners were taken under arms near her territories, on desert islands, the usual resort of the adventurers. Undoubtedly they had not yet actually invaded Cuba, but the circumstances under which they were found lurking there sufficiently indicated their purpose, and pointed them out as a part of the expedition which had landed, committed its depredations, and retreated to Key West

within the jurisdiction of the Union. They might be there waiting the return of their comrades with reinforcements to renew their piratical attacks, and no one can be so ignorant of the rights of Spain as to suppose that she was bound to respect their hiding-place till they had acquired sufficient force to commence the actual murder of her subjects, and the sack and destruction of her towns. She had the right to make them prisoners, and, if she had the right to make them prisoners, the right to retain them a reasonable time for investigating their case, and of ascertaining their guilt or innocence. She did only this, and considering the inefficiency our government had displayed in protecting her from the piratical attacks of our own citizens, and that the expedition intended to operate against her from our territory had been defeated by her own exertions, without any efficient aid or act of ours, she had far more right to deem herself aggrieved by our peremptory demand for the delivery of the prisoners, than we to complain of her for detaining and subjecting them, or proposing to subject them, to a trial before her own tribunals.

We are quite sure that, if the case had been reversed, we should have given a brief answer to a like demand from the Spanish government. How, in fact, did we reason, when General Jackson marched with his troops into Florida, then a Spanish province, and took military possession of its capital, because the Spanish governor could not, or would not, restrain the Seminole Indians, as bound by treaty, from making predatory incursions into the territory of the Union? If the tables had been turned, and the military expedition had been intended to operate from Cuba against us, and the Spanish authorities had been as remiss and inefficient in preventing or repressing it as ours has been, the whole force of the Union would have been put in requisition, if needed, to lay all Cuba in ashes; and if we had detected armed adventurers from her ports lurking near our coast, watching a favorable opportunity to make a descent, we should have taken them prisoners, and with the briefest trial possible hung them up, every one of them, as pirates. Of this no man who knows our character, and our summary manner of dealing with those who violate our rights, can reasonably doubt. It would be well to remember that the obligations of the treaty between us and Spain are reciprocal, — that they do not bind her and leave us free, as one is tempted to think is our interpretation of them, but bind us as well as her, and what would be right in our case is equally right in hers.

The journals have been filled with loud complaints of the cruelty with which the Spanish authorities treated the Contoy prisoners while they detained them in custody. There is not a word of truth in these complaints, as the good plight of the prisoners when landed in the United States amply proves. They were well treated, and no unusual or unnecessary severity was exercised against them, — no further severity than that of guarding against their escape, and their intercourse with their sympathizers or accomplices. We are well aware that the mass of the American people, believing all the falsehoods and retaining all the prejudices of their ancestors current in the days of Queen Elizabeth, are prepared to credit any absurd tale of Spanish cruelty that any idle vagabond chooses to invent ; but this much is to be said of our countrymen, that they are probably unrivalled in the facility of believing every thing — except the truth. No people can surpass them in their ability to believe falsehood without evidence, or to reject truth though supported by evidence complete and irrefragable. It is one of their titles to the admiration of the philosophers of the nineteenth century.

We are not the apologists of Spain ; but we may say this much for her, that no nation has been more maligned, and no national character more vilely traduced, than the Spanish. There is no nobler blood in Europe than the brave old Castilian, and a more elevated or virtuous peasantry than the Spanish is not to be found in the whole world. Time was, and not long since, when Spain was the freest country in Europe, worthy even of all admiration for her noble political institutions. She was, at no distant date, the ruling European nation, surpassing in grandeur and power all that Great Britain now claims to be. Domestic dissensions, fomented by foreign influences, foreign and civil wars, French invasion, French philosophism, English protection, radicalism, rebellion, revolution, and the terrible struggle for her very national existence against the colossal power of Napoleon, in the zenith of his pride and his strength, have for the moment reduced her from her former relative position among European nations, and induced many in both hemispheres to forget the gratitude that is due her for her eminent services and eminent sacrifices to the cause of religion and European and American civilization ; but she is still a living and a noble nation, with a recuperative energy in her population to be found in no other population in Europe, and lowly as she lies at this moment to the eye of the super-

ficial spectator, she has in her all the elements of her former greatness, and before her a long and glorious future. She has still a believing heart, a loyal soul, and an inbred reverence for religion and morality. The spoiler's work is wellnigh finished, and the infidel and sacrilegious revolutionary storm has wellnigh spent its fury, and the day draweth nigh for her to put off her garments of sorrow, and to put on her robes of joy and gladness. She has had, no doubt, her faults, and will have them again, but as to her cruelty it is mildness itself in comparison with the tender mercies of the renowned Anglo-Saxon, who, after twelve hundred years of culture, seems still to cherish in his heart the habits and tastes of his piratical ancestors.

But our failure in the discharge of our duty to Spain extends farther than we have stated. Cuba, in consequence of our remissness and inefficiency, is still in danger of piratical attacks from our citizens, or at least of their attempts, in concert with disaffected Cubans, to get up a democratic revolution in the island, and involve it in the horrors of civil war. Spain has been put to great trouble and expense in defending that island from our machinations, which it was our duty to have spared her, and she is obliged to continue her armament and defences on the war footing, and that to defend her province from the hostile invasions of the subjects of a government which professes to be at peace with her. This is not an endurable state of things. Does it comport with our honor as a nation to suffer it to continue? Have we not the will and the power to restrain our lawless citizens, and to compel them to respect the rights and the property of a friendly power? Are we reduced either to the moral or physical necessity of compelling nations with whom we have treaties of peace and amity to arm themselves to the teeth, and everywhere keep watch and ward against the depredations of our American citizens and subjects? We would fain hope not, and we look with confidence to the new administration to take efficient measures to reassure Spain, to indemnify her for the wrongs she has suffered in consequence of our remissness, and to relieve her from the necessity of keeping up any extra garrison in Cuba to protect her possession of that island from the aggressions of persons subject to the government of the United States. We have full confidence that, in the hands of the present Secretary of State, the errors and blunders of his predecessor will be repaired, and that our foreign relations will be managed with wisdom and en-

ergy, with jealous regard to the rights and feelings of other nations, and to the dignity and honor of our own.

We hope, too, that our citizens will participate in the reaction against wild and lawless democracy, or Red Republicanism, which appears to have commenced in the Old World ; and that, remembering that justice exalteth a nation, while sin is a reproach to any people, they will retrace their steps, and return to the wholesome principles embodied in their fundamental institutions. It is time for them to pay less attention to the acquisition of territory, and more to the acquisition and maintenance of national honor. We have, morally considered, fallen to a fearful depth, but we have not fallen so low that we cannot, if we choose, rise again. We have prided ourselves on our institutions, and have claimed to be a model republic. We are not, as a people, wholly insensible to the opinions of the civilized world, and we wish all nations to admire our political institutions, and to model their own after them. This is all laudable enough. But we cannot expect them to do it, unless we retrace our steps, and show that we ourselves adhere to the principles of our institutions, and are governed by them.

Hitherto republicanism in the Old World has been associated in the minds of intelligent and honest people with barbarism, the absence of public and private virtue, contempt of religion, disregard of the most sacred obligations and relations, the loss of personal freedom, war on the Church, on morality, on property, on the family, and on society itself. It should have been ours to have proved by our example that this is only an accidental character of republicanism, and that a people may be republican, may dispense with kings and lords, without lapsing into barbarism or interrupting the progress of Christian civilization, — that such a people may be cultivated and moral, refined and religious, free and loyal, respecting the rights of God as well as the rights of man, preserving the sanctity of marriage, and the integrity of the family, respecting the rights of property, the rights of sovereignty, and the independence of nations, and maintaining peace and order under the reign of law. This should have been our mission, but we have been recreant to it ; we have been latterly identifying republicanism with democracy, and American democracy with the European, and doing our best to prove by our example, that in all lands democracy degenerates into license, becomes immoral, irreligious, and aggressive. We have been furnishing kings and aristocrats with strong arguments against republicanism, and in

favor of their system of government. Instead of aiding the emancipation of the oppressed of other lands, we have given their masters new reasons for withholding from them those franchises we so highly esteem, and have double riveted the chains of the slave. The Christian world may well exclaim, in view of our example for the last twenty years, "God save the king! for if licentious and despotic kings are bad, licentious and aggressive democracies are worse."

We are for ourselves neither monarchists nor aristocrats, but according to the best of our knowledge and ability a loyal American citizen; yet we cannot shut our eyes to the dangerous and utterly immoral and dishonorable career upon which the American people to a fearful extent have entered. It is difficult, it may be too late, to arrest them; but as one of the people, as one who yields to no man in his love of his country, and attachment to her government, we assure them that they will never secure true freedom and prosperity in the way they have thus far sought them. If they value national honor, if they love liberty, they must return to the recognition of law, the obligations of morality, and the duty of religious faith and worship. No nation can recede from law without falling into anarchy, or depart from God without precipitating itself into hell. All is not gold that glitters. All change is not improvement. All motion is not progress, and every novelty is not a conquest from the domain of truth. Let our citizens meditate these commonplaces, and form a more just estimate of themselves. They have territory enough, — quite too much; they have room for all the virtuous expansion of which they are capable; let them learn to be content with what they have, and that it is as base to steal a province from a neighbouring state, as it is to pick a neighbour's pocket, or to steal his sheep.

We have taken no notice of what is said about the tyranny with which Spain governs Cuba, for we have no authority to supervise her internal administration, and are bound to treat her as an independent and a Christian nation. We must annul our treaty with her before we can put her out of the pale of civilized nations, and we must put her out of that pale before we can have any right to supervise or interfere with her treatment of her own subjects. But what is said about Spanish tyranny and oppression in her colonies is all unfounded. Spain does not oppress and never has oppressed her colonial subjects, and Cuba would have far less real freedom as a democracy, than she enjoys as a province of the Spanish monarchy. So it was said

that the other American colonies of Spain were oppressed, and as far back as Jefferson's residence in Paris as the minister of the American confederacy, intrigues were begun with us to convert them into independent republics. We need only to compare what they are now with what they were under Spain, to comprehend the value of assertions as to Spanish tyranny and oppression. Let us leave Red Republican cant, learn to be just and honorable, and labor to secure liberty at home. So shall we best promote freedom abroad.

ART. V. — *Conversations of an Old Man with his Young Friends.* — No. IV.

C. NOTWITHSTANDING all you say, your doctrine is distasteful, humiliating, and repugnant to the natural instincts and aspirations of the human heart.

B. No doubt of it. But is that to its reproach, or to yours?

C. How can you expect us to embrace a doctrine repugnant to our feelings and tastes, that contradicts our natural tendencies and aspirations?

B. I do not expect you to embrace it by a natural predilection, and it is certain that you cannot embrace it without the grace of God moving and assisting you to do so.

Z. But is it not a sufficient condemnation of a religion, that it is contrary to our nature, above our natural strength, and can be embraced only by violence to our nature?

B. If our nature were sufficient of itself to attain the end for which its Maker has intended it, and if it had not fallen and become corrupt and enfeebled, perhaps so.

W. Surely our nature is all that God has made it, and it would be unjust on his part to demand of it what it is not able to do.

B. That all may be, and yet God may justly appoint us to a destiny above our natural reach, because he may provide us with graces and helps above our natural powers adequate to its attainment. And in this he would show himself, not only just, but superabounding in goodness. In our nature he has promised us only the good to which that nature by its own powers is adequate. But in the order of grace he provides something better, a far higher good for us, and furnishes us with sufficient

means to obtain it. Instead of murmuring at this, we should be grateful for it, and see in it an additional motive for love and gratitude to him.

Z. But why need this supernatural destiny be attainable only by violence to our nature? I see no reason why we might not have been so made that nature and grace should aspire to the same end, so that we might have followed our nature and grace at the same time.

B. Such, in a certain sense, was the case with us prior to sin. Prior to sin, our nature was turned towards God, was held by grace in subjection to his law, and it required no interior struggle to fulfil it, and attain our supernatural destiny. But by sin that grace was lost, and our nature became turned away from God, and inclined to evil. In consequence of this, our nature, that is, the flesh, is now opposed to God, and we can obey his law and live for our supernatural destiny only by doing violence to it. Hence you see that a religion may be very true, very holy, and indispensable to our salvation, and yet be very distasteful to the natural man, and altogether repugnant to the instincts and aspirations of the natural heart.

Z. But one cannot believe what he finds repugnant to his natural feelings.

B. That were some comfort, if it were true; but in the various vicissitudes of life, I find myself obliged to believe many things exceedingly repugnant to my feelings. There are a great many disagreeable truths even in the order of nature, which all of us are compelled to believe.

Z. I am in the habit of relying on my feelings, and when I find I cannot feel with you in what you say, I say at once I do not and cannot believe with you. I do not like your doctrine, for it sacrifices the pure feelings, the noble emotions, and the gentle affections of the human heart, to the cold propositions and rigid deductions of a dry and inexorable logic.

B. Such may be your habit, but the question for you to determine is, whether it be commendable or the reverse. If the propositions and deductions of logic are true, if they conform to reality, your feelings, emotions, and affections, which are opposed to them, are false, and are neither pure nor noble, and if followed lead into falsehood and sin. They are repugnant to truth, and therefore they, not the propositions and deductions, are in fault.

Z. But I am tired of dry and rigid logic, of the cold forms of the intellect. I want the heart, the warm and loving heart,

and the heart is a better guide to the truth than the understanding.

B. That is to say, you are a bit of a sentimentalist, too indolent to think, and simply disposed to lie at your length under a wide-spreading beech, and indulge the luxury of feeling.

“*Lentus in umbra
Formosam resonare doces Amaryllida silvas.*”

This is no uncommon case with young men, especially when smitten by the sweet face and laughing eyes of *Amaryllis*. But the state of mind you describe is not one to boast of, or to parade before the world. It is a state in which one is expected to say and do a thousand foolish things, but no one ever thinks of taking them as a proof of his good sense, or piety and orthodoxy. Man is not a block of marble, nor is he required to be a mere logic-grinder. The heart has its place and its office ; but, when used in a good sense, it means the will, not mere sentiment, and the will, as a blind faculty, never does or can act, save in reference to objects presented to it by the intellect, or that are intellectually apprehended. The heart, distinguished from the understanding, is no guide to truth, for it cannot apprehend truth, and it can be safely trusted only when it is enlightened or informed by intellectual apprehension.

Z. What I mean is, not that we are to follow blind feeling, but our intuitions, that is, the truth as intuitively beheld, rather than as drawn out into logical statements and formal propositions.

B. So that you can disport yourself in the vague, and never be called to an account for any thing you say, however false or absurd. Intuition, on the part of the subject, is an intellectual act, but in the intelligible order it is never a clear, distinct, conscious apprehension of the object, and one knows not that he knows what he intuitively apprehends, till he makes it an object of reflection, and logic is simply the instrument or form of the reflective understanding as distinguished from the intuitive. The intuitions are never practically available as intuitions. They must be embodied in language, and presented through it to the mind, before we can distinctly know what they are, or make any use of them. And the moment you begin to use language you are in the domain of reflection, and answerable at the bar of logic.

C. That is too metaphysical for my understanding. What is the reason you cannot talk in the plain language of common sense, so that simple men even can understand you ?

B. My young friends are too hard with me. They bring out doctrines which can neither be confirmed nor refuted without resort to metaphysical principles and distinctions, and the moment I attempt to subject them to these principles and distinctions, they cry out, 'That is too metaphysical, — give us common sense, and speak so that we can understand you. I am accused of making too much of logic, and overlooking the feelings and affections. You tell me these are trustworthy, and our surest guides to truth. I reply, the value of these is in the fact that they are informed by truth, and conform to it, and that they can be so only as we intellectually apprehend the truth; for truth is apprehended only by the intellect. The feelings can no more apprehend it than the eye can apprehend sounds, or the ear colors. Then you shift your ground, and tell me that they are our intuitions, not properly our feelings and affections, you mean. I acknowledge the fact of intuition, and that all our knowledge in the natural order, in the order of the intelligible as distinguished from the superintelligible, rests mediately or immediately on intuition for its evidence. But intuition of the intelligible, as distinguished from the sensible object, is, though apprehension, an unconscious apprehension, that is, in intuition we apprehend the object indeed, but do not take note of the fact that it is we who apprehend it. We do not consciously connect the apprehending subject with the apprehended object, and therefore the intuition is what Leibnitz calls simple perception, wanting the character of apperception, in which we apprehend both the object and ourselves as apprehending it. How, without adverting to this fact, am I to test the value of what you allege? And how, without understanding this, are you to be disabused of your error?

The truth, and the whole truth, of the intelligible order, is undoubtedly in our primitive intuitions, in which are all the principles or *data* of the speculative reason in the order of nature. But in the state of pure intuition this truth is not available, is never practical knowledge. It must become apperception first, and this it cannot become without reflection. Reflection is a turning back upon or rethinking the objects revealed in the intuitions. But as the intuitions in themselves, save when intuitions of sensible objects, are simple apprehensions, and not apprehensions which we are conscious of having, the reflective intellect cannot seize this object in them and make it the object of its own action. It must be presented in language, and therefore, as it must have been already embodied

in language, language must be a Divine revelation, not a human invention. Without language, intuition is very possible, but reflection is not possible at all ; and understanding by thought a reflective act, or an intellectual act in which the actor apprehends both the object perceived and himself as subject perceiving it, De Bonald is right in saying that man cannot think without language. Every human speech, however cultivated or however rude, contains the elements of all that is knowable, and through its medium is repeated, so to speak, in a tangible form, to the reflective understanding, what is revealed to primitive intuition. And when so presented, it is intuitively evident, because in intuition the intelligible object evidences itself.

Intuitions, then, are practically available only as evidencing and rendering certain the truth presented to reflection through the medium of language. They are not the fountain from which we primarily draw those truths by reflection, but the authority by which we know and assert them to be truths. You cannot, then, follow pure intuition, to the neglect of reflection, if you would, and you cannot reflect without language. But if you use language, you must make use of intellectual forms and logical statements, however great your repugnance to them, and the only question to be settled is, whether you make a good or a bad use of them. I have no more fondness for metaphysical systems than you have. I have and wish to have no metaphysical system of my own. I accept in metaphysics simply logic, or the right use of reason in its application to the various matters that fall under our observation, whether by revelation or intuition. The attempt to build up systems of philosophy, and of natural ethics, independent of theology, I cannot approve, and I hold it to be as foolish as was the attempt of the builders in the plain of Shinar to erect a tower whose top should reach to heaven. It has probably arisen from the apparent success with which speculative science was cultivated among the gentiles, and the use which the fathers made of it in their controversies with the heathen, and the scholastics in reducing Christian doctrine to the form of theological science. But the truth in the natural order, though barely possible to be known by our natural light, can without revelation be known only to a very few. The gentile philosophy was far enough from being perfect, and yet what perfection it had was by no means derived solely from the light of nature. No nation, people, or tribe has ever yet been abandoned to the simple light of nature.

A portion of the primitive revelation has been preserved to all in language, and some traditions of it have always been retained and transmitted from father to son, even in the most degraded and savage tribes. It is by virtue of these traditions of the revelations made to our first parents, embodied and preserved in every speech or language of men under heaven, that the gentile philosophy attained to what of perfection it had ; and it is the ignoring of these traditions, the discarding of the fuller revelations of the Gospel, and the attempt to build up a philosophy by simple natural reason, despoiled of whatever it has received from revelation, that has led modern philosophers into the monstrous systems of error which are boasted as the crowning glory of the modern world.

W. All that may be very plausible to those who understand it, but I still insist that a religion which contradicts my natural instincts and tendencies cannot be true. God gave me these instincts, implanted these tendencies in my nature, and as he can never be in contradiction to himself, he cannot have given me a religion that is repugnant to them.

B. That might be, if your nature was in its normal state ; but your nature has been perverted by the Fall, and turned away, as I have said, from God. Its instincts and tendencies now bear you from him, and therefore a religion which is to convert you and bear you to him must necessarily contradict them, and require their repression and mortification.

Z. That proceeds on the assumption that what your Church teaches is true, which I do not concede. I hold to the innate rectitude and perfectibility of human nature.

B. And for what reason ?

Z. It must be true, if what your Church teaches, of man's corruption by sin, his need of redemption, and the necessity of grace, is false.

B. If what the Church teaches in these respects be false, the innate rectitude and perfectibility of man must be true, conceded ; so if what she teaches be true, what you assert of this rectitude and perfectibility must be false. Pray, tell me on what authority you assert that you are right and that she is wrong.

W. She is wrong, because what she teaches is repugnant to our natural feelings and tendencies.

B. Why not, you are wrong, because your natural feelings and tendencies are repugnant to what she teaches ?

O. The Church has for eighteen hundred years been in the

world, and yet evil abounds, and therefore it is clear that her system is false. If hers is false, ours must be true.

B. But if evil abounds in spite of all the Church has done to eradicate it, how much more it must have abounded if there had been no Church !

Z. It is clear to every *enlightened* mind, that the cause of the evil suffered by society and individuals is all owing to the false system of the Church. Her system makes man of no account, places no generous confidence in human nature, and allows man to place no reliance on himself. Making him nothing, allowing him no rights before God, no strength, no virtue of his own, it is not surprising that he has done nothing, and does nothing, to meliorate his condition.

B. You probably regard the Church as an evil.

Z. Most assuredly I do, and were it not that I respect your feelings, I should speak of her in terms of the strongest reprobation.

B. That the Church exists is a fact in the world's history. It is either the work of Almighty God, or of man himself. If you say it is the work of Almighty God, you cannot maintain that it is an evil without blasphemy.

Z. I do not say it is the work of God. It is the work of men, — vile, crafty, wicked men.

B. Prior to the Church, then, there were vile, crafty, wicked men, capable of creating a great evil.

Z. Certainly.

B. It would seem, then, that there was evil before the Church, and you cannot say that she has caused all the evil in the world. How did your human nature, of which you predicate innate rectitude and perfectibility, become so corrupt as to produce the vile, crafty, wicked men who created so great an evil as you hold the Church to be ? And if men could without the Church become corrupt enough to create her, how does it follow that, if she were removed, all evil would be removed ?

M. I hold that the Church is of human origin, and now a most mischievous institution, which the good of society and of individuals requires to be abolished ; but I do not think that its originators were wicked men. They were governed by good motives, sought really to promote earthly felicity and to advance mankind, and I have no doubt that the Church in its origin was a good institution, far in advance of Paganism and Judaism, and for a long series of ages, that is, so long as it was in harmony with the intelligence of the times, it exerted a ben-

official influence. Its grand defect was in its inflexibility and want of expansive power. If it had only adopted the theory of development, and admitted the principle of progress into its code of doctrine and morals, it might have advanced with the advance of general intelligence, and continued to be a useful institution. The Church now does harm, because it is no longer in harmony with our times, because it has fallen behind the age, and labors to confine our intelligence to the beliefs, and our conduct to the morality, of the age in which it originated. In order to do this, it is obliged to repel all progress of intelligence, and to claim an authority over the minds of men which is tyrannical, and to which no man conscious of the rights and the dignity of his nature will submit.

B. That is your theory of the origin of the Church. I have not leisure to examine it at length ; but you cannot hold it and be a very rigid moralist. The men who founded the Church professed to erect her as a Divine institution, on certain facts. These facts, if facts, clearly and unequivocally established her Divine origin. Now, with regard to these facts, these men could not, humanly speaking, be deceived. They either knew them to be facts, or they knew them not to be facts. If facts, the Church is Divine, not human ; if not facts, these men lied when they asserted them to be facts, and were liars and impostors, and the Church was a lie and an imposition. Now, how can you say liars and impostors are good men, governed by good motives ? And how can you say a stupendous lie and imposition can be and do good even for a time ? Does the *enlightened* morality of the nineteenth century allow you to maintain such monstrous propositions ?

Z. I maintain no such thing, and believing the Church to be a sink of iniquity, I believe her origin was in wickedness, not in virtue.

B. Yet you see that you cannot easily explain the origin of that wickedness consistently with your doctrine of the innate rectitude and perfectibility of human nature.

M. For that reason I assign the Church a good origin, and believe it the work of good men.

B. Yet agree that it has become wholly evil, and now produces only evil.

M. Certainly.

B. If it was good in its origin, worked good for a time, and has from first to last been only what men have made it, how, if human nature has the innate rectitude and perfectibility you

assert, has it ceased to be good, and become productive only of evil ? The evil it now produces must have had a cause, and as the Church has, according to you, been all the time subject to human control, this evil can have had only a human origin, that is, it must have originated in the wickedness of the men who have managed the Church. How do you, with your views of the impeccability, perfectibility, and self-sufficiency of human nature, account for this wickedness ?

M. I would say the evil originated in ignorance rather than in wickedness.

B. Be it so. But according to you the Church was at first adapted to the wants of man and society, and for a series of ages aided progress. As human nature is perfectible, and inherently progressive according to you, Churchmen themselves, inasmuch as they as well as you share human nature, must have continued for a long series of ages to advance under the Church, and therefore at any point of time subsequent to her origin must have been more competent to mould her to the wants of that subsequent time than they were to fit her to the age in which they created her. Will you explain to me the reason of their failure to do so ?

M. They had lost sight of her real human origin ; had had so much experience of her benefits, that they had come to believe her really a Divine institution, and therefore were deterred by reverence and praiseworthy religious motives from effecting in her the changes and modifications really required.

B. And this coming to regard and to reverence as Divine what was really only a human creation, you take, I suppose, as an evidence of progress, of enlightenment, of the perfectibility of human nature !

M. My theory, I see, is not tenable.

W. The true cause, I apprehend, why the Church was not made to keep pace with the progress of intelligence was, that in the Dark Ages it had acquired great wealth and political power, and they who enjoyed these, who lived in luxury, and lorded it over the people, were selfish, grasping, ambitious, and would not suffer any change or innovation, lest they should lose them.

B. Do you approve their conduct ?

W. By no means.

B. They were wicked men, were they not ?

W. Certainly they were.

B. Yet they followed, I presume, their own natural instincts and tendencies.

W. No doubt of it.

B. Nevertheless, you hold to the innate rectitude, perfectibility, and self-sufficiency of human nature !

C. I take a very different view of the case. I believe Christianity was from God, that its first preachers were inspired and holy men, but through the ignorance and perversity of their immediate followers, who only imperfectly understood their doctrines, it began to be corrupted by an admixture of surrounding heathenism, and has been growing more and more corrupt down to our times, save the partial purification effected by the Reformers in the sixteenth century, and by their successors.

B. Yet human nature is impeccable, perfectible, sufficient of itself to attain its destiny, and there has been continuous progress in knowledge and virtue from the earliest ages down to the full blaze of the nineteenth century, when reformers are as thick as grasshoppers on an August afternoon !

P. I take a different view still. I believe that man has fallen, lies under sin, needs redemption, and can be redeemed and attain to his destiny only by Divine grace. Thus far I agree with the Church, and have no confidence in the sufficiency of human nature for itself. I believe also that redemption is through the atoning blood of the Saviour, and that the Christian Church, one and Catholic, was founded by Almighty God, as the ordinary medium of salvation. But the Bishop of Rome encroached upon the rights of his brethren, and gradually usurped power over the whole Church, and set himself up as the viceregent of God, and allowed no liberty of instruction, nor right of private judgment. From that time all manner of errors crept into the Church, the simple doctrines of the Gospel were overlaid with a mass of heathenish notions, and the pure worship instituted by the Apostles was corrupted by the introduction of the whole heathen ritual.

B. When did all that take place ?

P. Why, I cannot fix the precise date when it took place, but it began with Constantine, and continued from that time down, till Luther and Calvin sounded the note of Reform.

B. How do you suppose the usurper happened to be the Bishop of Rome rather than any other bishop ? Do you not hold that previously all the bishops were equal ?

P. It was owing to the fact that Rome was the capital city of the empire, and the church of Rome the richest and most influential church of the time.

B. If I recollect aright, when, according to you, this process of usurpation began, Rome had ceased to be the capital city of the empire. Constantine had founded Constantinople, and made it the capital of the empire, and the customary seat of the emperors of the whole empire was never afterwards at Rome. Your first reason, therefore, fails, and may be dismissed. Your second is no better. That the church of Rome was the richest church of the time is not a fact. It had been from the beginning one of the poorest, and was for a long time in splendor and wealth far inferior to many of the Oriental churches, such as those of Antioch, Alexandria, and Constantinople. Constantinople from the time of Constantine was a Christian city, while Rome remained long after a pagan city, and had pagan Senators as late as the time of St. Ambrose, Archbishop of Milan. The city of Rome was almost the last stronghold of paganism in the Western Empire, and had not been wholly Christianized at the close of the fifth century. None of these external causes you assign can explain why the usurper was the Bishop of Rome, rather than the Bishop of Constantinople, of Antioch, or Alexandria.

Then this usurpation does not strike me as a very feasible thing. Grant, if you will, — what in fact I deny, — that the Roman pontiff had a disposition to encroach, to usurp power, you must bear in mind that his disposition must have been met by the resistance of all the bishops in the world, who, you must presume, were as much disposed to keep their power as he was to usurp it. Now, supposing the eighteen hundred bishops of the Roman empire to have commenced with the fact and the right of equality, ignorant of the Papacy, and acknowledging no primacy of power in the Bishop of Rome, and each as determined to keep his power as the Bishop of Rome was to usurp it, what progress in usurpation do you imagine the Roman pontiff could have made? Suppose, as on your ground you must suppose, that each of these bishops had the disposition of the Roman, the odds against his success and in favor of them would have been far too great for one to be willing to bet on his head, or for any reasonable man to accept your theory.

But suppose the matter to be as you state, what is your remedy? If God has founded a Church, and taken no better care of it than you suppose, who can rely on it? If your theory be correct, God must have founded his Church, and then abandoned it to the care of men, and concerned himself no further with it, which is sheer Epicureanism, only transformed

from the natural order to the supernatural, and involves sheer atheism as its logical consequence, as much as it does when confined to the order of nature. If God abandoned his Church to the care of men, and they through their ignorance and perversity corrupted it, so that for at least eight hundred years the true Church was no longer to be found on the earth, what surety can you give, or have you for yourselves, that, even if you could restore it, as your fruitless efforts for three hundred years show you cannot, men would not soon corrupt it again.

Your grand error, my young friends, is in the denial of Providence. Some of you are out-and-out Epicureans, and hold that God made the world, gave it a kick, set it agoing, and bade it go ahead on its own hook and take care of itself; others among you do not say quite so much of the natural world. You are willing, one division of you, to say that he had so much regard for the world that he founded a Church for its redemption and salvation, and another division of you, that he made a revelation for its benefit; but you both agree that he abandoned the Church or the revelation immediately to its fate, — threw it upon the great concourse of men, and said, Here, take it, and make the most of it. I have no further concern with it. Here you deny the providence of God in the supernatural order. Now I beg you to reflect seriously on this denial. God has created the world from nothing, and it is only by virtue of his immanence in the world through that creative act that the world exists or does not return to nothing. But he remains thus immanent, and all created power is insufficient to annihilate or displace a single monad. By the same free act of his will by which he created the world he preserves it, and suffers no change in its physical constitution to take place but according to his own good will and pleasure. So also by his grace has he created the Christian order, or the “new creation,” the Church and all that pertains to it, and it subsists only by virtue of his immanence in it through his act of grace creating it, and were he to cease for a single moment to be so immanent in it, it would sink instantly back into nothing. So long as so immanent, it is and must be preserved, and all the powers of earth and hell strive in vain against it. Men may beat against it, and break their own heads in the shock, but they cannot move or injure it. There is, then, no medium between its entire indefectibility and its total ceasing to be. Your theory, whether you call it the Church or simply revelation, of its gradual, partial, or total corruption, is unten-

able, and you have no middle ground on which to stand between the Roman Catholic Church and the absolute denial of Christianity ; and if you deny Christianity, you have nothing but sheer humanism, the absolute divinity of human nature, putting man in the place of God, setting him in the temple of God to show himself and to be worshipped as if he were God.

ART. VI. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *The Scarlet Letter* : A Romance. By NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE. Boston : Ticknor, Reed, & Fields. 1850. 12mo. pp. 322.

MR. HAWTHORNE is a writer endowed with a large share of genius, and in the species of literature he cultivates has no rival in this country, unless it be Washington Irving. His *Twice-told Tales*, his *Mosses from an Old Manse*, and other contributions to the periodical press, have made him familiarly known, and endeared him to a large circle of readers. The work before us is the largest and most elaborate of the romances he has as yet published, and no one can read half a dozen pages of it without feeling that none but a man of true genius and a highly cultivated mind could have written it. It is a work of rare, we may say of fearful power, and to the great body of our countrymen who have no well defined religious belief, and no fixed principles of virtue, it will be deeply interesting and highly pleasing.

We have neither the space nor the inclination to attempt an analysis of Mr. Hawthorne's genius, after the manner of the fashionable criticism of the day. Mere literature for its own sake we do not prize, and we are more disposed to analyze an author's work than the author himself. Men are not for us mere psychological phenomena, to be studied, classed, and labelled. They are moral and accountable beings, and we look only to the moral and religious effect of their works. Genius perverted, or employed in perverting others, has no charms for us, and we turn away from it with sorrow and disgust. We are not among those who join in the worship of passion, or even of intellect. God gave us our faculties to be employed in his service, and in that of our fellow-creatures for his sake, and our only legitimate office as critics is to inquire, when a book is sent us for review, if its author in producing it has so employed them.

Mr. Hawthorne, according to the popular standard of morals in this age and this community, can hardly be said to pervert God's gifts, or to exert an immoral influence. Yet his work is far from being unobjectionable. The story is told with great naturalness, ease, grace, and delicacy, but it is a story that should not have been told. It is a story of crime, of an adulteress and her accomplice, a meek and gifted and highly popular Puritan minister in our early colonial days,—a purely imaginary story, though not altogether improbable. Crimes like the one imagined were not unknown even in the golden days of Puritanism, and are perhaps more common among the descendants of the Puritans than it is at all pleasant to believe; but they are not fit subjects for popular literature, and moral health is not promoted by leading the imagination to dwell on them. There is an unsound state of public morals when the novelist is permitted, without a scorching rebuke, to select such crimes, and invest them with all the fascinations of genius, and all the charms of a highly polished style. In a moral community such crimes are spoken of as rarely as possible, and when spoken of at all, it is always in terms which render them loathsome, and repel the imagination.

Nor is the conduct of the story better than the story itself. The author makes the guilty parties suffer, and suffer intensely, but he nowhere manages so as to make their sufferings excite the horror of his readers for their crime. The adulteress suffers not from remorse, but from regret, and from the disgrace to which her crime has exposed her, in her being condemned to wear emblazoned on her dress the Scarlet Letter which proclaims to all the deed she has committed. The minister, her accomplice, suffers also, horribly, and feels all his life after the same terrible letter branded on his heart, but not from the fact of the crime itself, but from the consciousness of not being what he seems to the world, from his having permitted the partner in his guilt to be disgraced, to be punished, without his having the manliness to avow his share in the guilt, and to bear his share of the punishment. Neither ever really repents of the criminal deed; nay, neither ever regards it as really criminal, and both seem to hold it to have been laudable, because they *loved* one another,—as if the love itself were not illicit, and highly criminal. No man has the right to love another man's wife, and no married woman has the right to love any man but her husband. Mr. Hawthorne in the present case seeks to excuse Hester Prynne, a married woman, for loving the Puritan minister, on the ground that she had no love for her husband, and it is hard that a woman should not have some one to love; but this only aggravated her guilt, because she was not only forbidden to love the minister, but commanded to love her husband, whom she had vowed to love, honor, cherish, and obey. The modern doctrine that represents the

affections as fatal, and wholly withdrawn from voluntary control, and then allows us to plead them in justification of neglect of duty and breach of the most positive precepts of both the natural and the revealed law, cannot be too severely reprobated.

Human nature is frail, and it is necessary for every one who standeth to take heed lest he fall. Compassion for the fallen is a duty which we all owe, in consideration of our own failings, and especially in consideration of the infinite mercy our God has manifested to his erring and sinful children. But however binding may be this duty, we are never to forget that sin is sin, and that it is pardonable only through the great mercy of God, on condition of the sincere repentance of the sinner. But in the present case neither of the guilty parties repents of the sin, neither exclaims with the royal prophet, who had himself fallen into the sin of adultery and murder, *Misere mei Deus, secundum magnam misericordiam; et secundum multitudinem miserationum tuarum, dele iniquitatem meam. Amplius lava me ab iniquitate mea; et a peccato munda me. Quoniam iniquitatem meam cognosco, et peccatum meum contra me est semper.* They hug their illicit love; they cherish their sin; and after the lapse of seven years are ready, and actually agree, to depart into a foreign country, where they may indulge it without disguise and without restraint. Even to the last, even when the minister, driven by his agony, goes so far as to throw off the mask of hypocrisy, and openly confess his crime, he shows no sign of repentance, or that he regarded his deed as criminal.

The Christian who reads *The Scarlet Letter* cannot fail to perceive that the author is wholly ignorant of Christian asceticism, and that the highest principle of action he recognizes is pride. In both the criminals, the long and intense agony they are represented as suffering springs not from remorse, from the consciousness of having offended God, but mainly from the feeling, especially on the part of the minister, that they have failed to maintain the integrity of their character. They have lowered themselves in their own estimation, and cannot longer hold up their heads in society as honest people. It is not their conscience that is wounded, but their pride. *He* cannot bear to think that he wears a disguise, that he cannot be the open, frank, stainless character he had from his youth aspired to be, and *she*, that she is driven from society, lives a solitary outcast, and has nothing to console her but her fidelity to her paramour. There is nothing Christian, nothing really moral, here. The very pride itself is a sin; and pride often a greater sin than that which it restrains us from committing. There are thousands of men and women too proud to commit carnal sins, and to the indomitable pride of our Puritan ancestors we may attribute no small share of their external morality and decorum. It may almost be said, that, if they had less of that external morality and decorum, their case would be

less desperate ; and often the violation of them, or failure to maintain them, by which their pride receives a shock, and their self-complacency is shaken, becomes the occasion, under the grace of God, of their conversion to truth and holiness. As long as they maintain their self-complacency, are satisfied with themselves, and feel that they have outraged none of the decencies of life, no argument can reach them, no admonition can startle them, no exhortation can move them. Proud of their supposed virtue, free from all self-reproach, they are as placid as a summer morning, pass through life without a cloud to mar their serenity, and die as gently and as sweetly as the infant falling asleep in its mother's arms. We have met with these people, and after laboring in vain to waken them to a sense of their actual condition, till completely discouraged, we have been tempted to say, Would that you might commit some overt act, that should startle you from your sleep, and make you feel how far pride is from being either a virtue, or the safeguard of virtue, — or convince you of your own insufficiency for yourselves, and your absolute need of Divine grace. Mr. Hawthorne seems never to have learned that pride is not only sin, but the root of all sin, and that humility is not only a virtue, but the root of all virtue. No genuine contrition or repentance ever springs from pride, and the sorrow for sin because it mortifies our pride, or lessens us in our own eyes, is nothing but the effect of pride. All true remorse, all genuine repentance, springs from humility, and is sorrow for having offended God, not sorrow for having offended ourselves.

Mr. Hawthorne also mistakes entirely the effect of Christian pardon upon the interior state of the sinner. He seems entirely ignorant of the religion that can restore peace to the sinner, — true, inward peace, we mean. He would persuade us, that Hester had found pardon, and yet he shows us that she had found no inward peace. Something like this is common among popular Protestant writers, who, in speaking of great sinners among Catholics that have made themselves monks or hermits to expiate their sins by devoting themselves to prayer, and mortification, and the duties of religion, represent them as always devoured by remorse, and suffering in their interior agony almost the pains of the damned. An instance of this is the Hermit of Engeddi in Sir Walter Scott's *Talisman*. These men know nothing either of true remorse, or of the effect of Divine pardon. They draw from their imagination, enlightened, or rather darkened, by their own experience. Their speculations are based on the supposition that the sinner's remorse is the effect of wounded pride, and that during life the wound can never be healed. All this is false. The remorse does not spring from wounded pride, and the greatest sinner who really repents, who really does penance, never fails to find interior peace. The mortifications he practises are not prompted by his interior agony,

nor designed to bring peace to his soul ; they are a discipline to guard against his relapse, and an expiation that his interior peace already found, and his overflowing love to God for his superabounding mercy, lead him to offer to God, in union with that made by his blessed Lord and Master on the cross.

Again, Mr. Hawthorne mistakes the character of confession. He does well to recognize and insist on its necessity ; but he is wrong in supposing that its office is simply to disburden the mind by communicating its secrets to another, to restore the sinner to his self-complacency, and to relieve him from the charge of cowardice and hypocrisy. Confession is a duty we owe to God, and a means, not of restoring us to our self-complacency, but of restoring us to the favor of God, and reëstablishing us in his friendship. The work before us is full of mistakes of this sort, in those portions where the author really means to speak like a Christian, and therefore we are obliged to condemn it, where we acquit him of all unchristian intention.

As a picture of the old Puritans, taken from the position of a moderate transcendentalist and liberal of the modern school, the work has its merits ; but as little as we sympathize with those stern old Popery-haters, we do not regard the picture as at all just. We should commend where the author condemns, and condemn where he commends. Their treatment of the adulteress was far more Christian than his ridicule of it. But enough of fault-finding, and as we have no praise, except what we have given, to offer, we here close this brief notice.

-
2. — *Nature, Progress, Ideas. A Discourse on Naturalism, in its various Phases, as opposed to the true Scriptural Doctrine of the Divine Imperium.* Delivered at Union College, July 24, 1849, before the New York Alpha of the Phi Beta Kappa Society. By TAYLOR LEWIS, LL. D., Professor of Greek in Union College. Schenectady: Van Debogert. 1850. 8vo. pp. 56.

DR. LEWIS belongs, we believe, to the Presbyterian sect, and is one of the ablest and most learned members of which that sect can boast in this country. We have seen several occasional discourses from him which indicate a high order of talent, thought rather profound than otherwise, and respectable scholarship. He appears to be a man of honest intentions, who really wishes to serve his country, by correcting many of the false notions of his countrymen, but unhappily is compelled by his Protestantism to stop short in following out the principles he adopts to their legitimate consequences.

The Discourse before us is the ablest and least objectionable of any thing we have seen from the Protestant side on the several topics it undertakes to discuss, and it leaves upon our mind the impression, that, had the author not been cramped by his Protestantism, it would have been all that we could wish. The author sees clearly the dangerous tendencies of the popular theories and speculations of the age, that they strike at the foundation of Christianity, — of even natural religion, philosophy, political government, and society itself. He sees also their shallowness, their want of real thought, and the deplorable ignorance and egotism of the men who follow or defend them. To a great extent he perceives and states the great and comprehensive truths opposed to them. His strictures on the modern notions of "the philosophy of history" are profound and just; his vindication of Providence against the rationalistic and pantheistic doctrines of the hour, which resolve Providence into necessity, and all history into the struggle and development of eternal ideas, excluding from all share in it both God and men, is creditable to his good sense, and to his desire to retain some vestiges, at least, of Christian truth; and his refutation of the modern doctrines of progress and socialism leaves little to be desired, considered in itself; but having to provide for his Protestantism, and to be able to maintain that it is from God, and Catholicity from the Devil, he is obliged in turn to assert principles of which the errors he wars against are only the necessary logical, as well as historical, results. This fact vitiates his whole discourse, and renders the many profound and important truths he sets forth in opposition to them of no scientific value.

All the errors he wars against have been refuted over and over again in the pages of this journal, and Professor Lewis successfully refutes them only on the ground and by the same arguments that we do. But we need not tell our readers, nor the advocates of those errors, that none but a Catholic has or can have any right to assume that ground, or to make use of those arguments. The Protestant can no doubt take that ground, and use those arguments, but in doing so he virtually condemns his Protestantism. No man who holds that the Protestant movement was a Divine movement can consistently object to the philosophy of history as held by Michelet and Morell, or with right profess to hold the views of history of "the pious, Scriptural, and unphilosophical," and the author should have added, Catholic, "Rollin." He who holds the right of private judgment, and justifies the Reformers in their rebellion against the authority of the Church of which they were members, cannot, except by a gross logical inconsequence, maintain the Divine origin of power, the sacredness of law, and the inviolability of government. Nor can he who rejects the authority of the Church, in order to assert the right of the individual to deter-

mine or define the law of God for himself, consistently make war on modern humanism and naturalism. Here is the difficulty every Protestant necessarily encounters whenever he undertakes to war against errors of the kind attacked by Professor Lewis. He can oppose to those errors only Catholic doctrines and arguments, and those same doctrines and arguments are equally opposed to his Protestantism, and the advocates of those errors know it as well as we do, and tell him that they in advocating them are the true Protestants, and that he in opposing them is false to his own principles. The great body of Protestants will believe him, no doubt, rather than them, for these errors are opposed to common sense, and what he opposes to them is in accordance with common sense. Every man so long as he speaks as a Catholic speaks in accordance with common sense, and when he avoids setting forth the special dogmas of his Church, the ordinary Protestant accepts at once all he says, without stopping to inquire whether in doing so he is or is not condemning in principle his Protestantism. Nevertheless, the errorists the learned and philosophical Professor attacks, and attacks with rare energy and ability, are, absurd as they unquestionably are, truer Protestants than he is, and far more consequent in their reasoning. He stands in relation to them and us, as Anglicans do in relation to us and Dissenters. Anglicans use the arguments of Dissenters against Catholics, and the arguments of Catholics against Dissenters; he uses the arguments of the humanists, as we call them, against Catholics, and the arguments of Catholics against the humanists. We have no space in this brief notice to justify these assertions by citations from the author's Discourse, but it is nevertheless true, that while he refutes in a masterly manner, by the aid of Catholic doctrine and arguments, the reigning errors of the day, he reaffirms them all in principle in the same Discourse, by his assumption of Protestantism as from God, as we may on another occasion attempt to show.

3. *A Sunday in London.* By J. M. CAPES, M. A. London: Longman, Brown, Greene, & Longmans. 1850. 16mo. pp. 291.

As a literary production this work deserves high commendation. It is written in a style of rare freedom and eloquence. The author has a brilliant fancy, a rich imagination, and a lively sensibility, and in this work proves that he could, if he would, rival the greatest of our popular authors of fiction. His work, under a purely literary point of view, is happily conceived and felicitously executed. We read it with interest, perhaps with too intense interest. It lays open the vices and horrors of London, that great capital of the commercial and industrial world, with the hand of a master, and every

scene presented appears to be actually passing under our eyes. There is through the whole an air of life and reality, and the characters introduced are all real, living men and women, with nothing shadowy or statue-like about them.

But having said thus much, we must, after our manner, find a few faults. Our readers know our general estimate of the author, from our article in review of his *Four Years' Experience*. He is, as they know, one of the Oxford converts. He was formerly an Anglican minister, and he is now a Catholic, devoting his fortune and all his powers to the cause of Catholicity. He is a man we must respect, and with whom we largely sympathize. But we fear that he is not wholly free from crotchets, or incapable of mounting hobbies. We are not sure that he judged wisely in selecting a German rationalist for his chief personage, and in making him comment on the various objectionable features in London society from the point of view of indifferentism. His German rationalist, for the most part, speaks in character, but in consequence he is made to utter sentiments which are by no means edifying to the Catholic. We do not pretend to have much knowledge of English society, but we must be permitted to doubt whether our Catholic friends do not commit a mistake in assuming, as so many of them do, that it is in no danger of becoming rationalistic. We were more amused than edified, some time since, by an article in *The Dublin Review*, praising Thomas Carlyle, and sneering at the suggestion that there was any danger of Englishmen becoming pantheists. We think this sneer ill judged, for to us there are clear indications of a rationalistic and pantheistic tendency even in England, and it will not answer to regard Puseyism as the true type of English Protestantism. The philosophy talked by Coleridge and poetized by Wordsworth is not unpopular in England, and that philosophy is at bottom transcendentalism, and transcendentalism is only another name for pantheism. Carlyle is an inveterate pantheist, and he is exerting a silent, but powerful, influence on English literature. The *Westminster Review* is rationalistic, and the *Edinburgh Review* is in reality infidel, while the *North British Review* has a decided neological leaning, and a socialistic tendency. There is no doubt that the mass of Englishmen, owing to the peculiar character of the Establishment, are indisposed to push their principles to their ultimate conclusions, and have been trained to say, as it suits their purpose, two and two make three, or two and two make five; but after all, the English mind is not wholly divested of logic, and it is becoming every year far more determined to be consequent, as the Puseyite movement on the one hand, and the Chartist movement on the other, clearly indicate. Our friends will find, or we are very much mistaken, that the body of the English people who do not become Catholics will slide into rationalism. We think the English Cath-

olic writers, regarding, as they generally do, the Establishment as their chief enemy in England, are not sufficiently alive to the danger of rationalism, which, in the several forms of eclecticism, transcendentalism, pantheism, and socialism, is the grand heresy of our age. We cannot but think that Mr. Capes would have done better, if he had shown less favor to his rationalist, and had chosen, instead of him, a Catholic to comment on the vices and crimes of London society from the point of view of Catholicity.

Then, again, we think Mr. Capes is riding a hobby when he proposes, as the grand specific for the cure of all the evils of London society, Sunday amusements. He brings his rationalist friend into contact with an excellent Catholic priest, who knows London well, and has devoted much time and thought to the means of curing its vices. He tells us that this priest has come to the conclusion, that these vices originate in the want of Sunday amusements, and can be removed only by furnishing them. A rare Catholic priest that, and worth crossing the Atlantic to see! The reasoning by which he supports this novel doctrine is admirable. The peasantry on the Continent are far more moral than the lower classes in London, but the peasantry on the Continent have Sunday amusements, and the lower classes of London have not, and therefore, if the lower classes had them, they would be as moral as the Continental peasantry. The conclusion does not seem to us to be necessary. A peasantry really religious and light-hearted is no doubt preserved from some vices by innocent amusements moderately enjoyed on holidays, after having attended to their religious duties; but that a dark, heavy, half-savage populace, destitute of religion and capable only of gross sensual pleasure, would be recovered from vice by having Sunday amusements provided for them, is more than we can believe. They would carry their vices with them into these amusements, and perhaps find in them only an occasion of still more degrading vice. Amusement or recreation for the people is certainly desirable, and, combined with other and far more efficient means of moral reform, it may no doubt do something; but taken alone, so far as our observation extends, it would have very little power to reform the vicious, or to prevent the occurrence of such vices as Mr. Capes describes as abounding in London. There is and can be no grand specific for the reformation of individuals or society outside of the Church. You cannot have a moral community without Christianity, and you can have no Christianity out of the Church. The men who cannot be reformed by the doctrines, sacraments, discipline, and worship of the Church, we may give up at once as irreformable. You need not hope to effect by moral-reform societies, temperance societies, Sunday amusements, state education, or any other of the methods the *philanthropy* of the age suggests, what she has been unable to accomplish.

We utter a truth here which we wish we could in some way beat into the head of this age. Not only Protestants, but even many Catholics, are unwilling to trust all to the Church, and to act only for her and under her direction. They, even when believing her God's Church, seem to distrust her efficiency, and are anxious to get up extra ecclesiastical associations, and movements auxiliary to her, to infuse energy into her, and to add something to the efficiency of Almighty God. Padre Ventura thought it would be a grand thing to form an alliance of the Church with the popular or liberal party of the age, and did what he could to persuade the world that such was the view of *Pio Nono*; but he got for his pains only the universal convulsion of Europe, the sacrilegious Roman republic, and the exile of the Sovereign Pontiff. Similar results attend all efforts to operate through or in unison with extra ecclesiastical movements. Even your temperance societies seldom do more than expel one vice by introducing another, and not always a lesser vice. Save so far as you can make a man a good Christian, you cannot eradicate a single vice from his heart, except by planting another in its place. The drunkard leaves off drinking, but takes to chewing opium, or becomes sober only to become avaricious, simply exchanging inebriety for avarice. You do not get rid of the hydra of evil by lopping off one of its many heads, nor does the lopping off of one head prepare the way for lopping off another. You must drug the monster himself, and destroy his inward vitality, which nothing but the grace of God through the sacraments of the Church can do. Almighty God founded his Church for the express purpose of destroying evil, of delivering men from vice, sin, and iniquity, and it is no unreasonable stretch of modesty to doubt our ability to add any thing to its perfection, or to its efficiency. He knew at least as well as we what was needed and what would answer the purpose; he was as well disposed as we to cure the vices of society; and it would seem to be no more than reasonable for us to be contented with his work, and to rely on it as the only efficient means of reform, and of good, whether social or individual. We make these remarks for others than Mr. Capes, and as for him, we are willing he should have Sunday amusements for his Londoners, but he must pardon us for doubting their efficacy.

-
4. — *Willy Burke; or the Irish Orphan in America.* By Mrs. J. SADLIER. Boston: Donahoe. 1850. 32mo. pp. 298.

THIS work has been written in consequence of a suggestion we made in our journal for last January, in noticing *The Orphan of*
NEW SERIES. — VOL. IV. NO. IV. 68

Moscow. Mr. Donahoe was pleased with the suggestion, and offered a prize for the best tale written in accordance with it, and did us the honor to appoint us as the judge to decide on the merit of the competitors, and award the prize. Several tales were sent in, some of them of great merit, but we awarded the prize to *Willy Burke*, by Mrs. Sadlier of Montreal, as being the most in accordance with the plan we had suggested. It is not often we praise a work written by a lady, for we are not in general partial to feminine literature; but in this case we are obliged to surmount our prejudice, and to pronounce *Willy Burke* an admirable story. It is written with great naturalness and simplicity, with real tenderness, and true pathos. The work is the genuine expression of a genuine Catholic Irish heart, and no one can read it without being forced to love and honor the poor Irish emigrant, and to wish to possess, reverence, and obey the Catholic religion, the source of all his virtues and his sure support and sweet consolation in poverty, in exile, in affliction, and under the injustice he receives from those who are ignorant of his religion and love not his nation. We commend this little book to all our young friends, and bid them take *Willy Burke* for their model, and we recommend all Protestants who are engaged in stealing our children from us in order to train them up heretics, and to do what they can to check the growth of the Catholic population in this country, to procure it, read it, and to ponder it well. They may learn from it that there is something better than is dreamed of in their philosophy. We welcome the appearance of this little book as an indication that the day for the sort of Catholic novels we formerly condemned has gone by, and that a new literature, equally popular, but far more Catholic and healthy, is beginning to make its appearance among us. *Willy Burke*, and *Loretto*, by the author of *Mohammed*, noticed in our last Review, are attempts in the right direction, and we trust are but the first fruits of a rich harvest that is to follow. We see announced as in the press, *John O'Brien, or the Orphan of Boston*. Having been permitted to peruse the manuscript, we can promise our Catholic friends that they will find it a work replete with interest, important hints, and valuable instruction, from one who is destined to rank among the most popular and powerful Catholic writers in the country.

-
5. — *History of the Christian Church, from its first Establishment to the present Century.* By the Rev. JOSEPH REEVE. First American Edition. Boston: Donahoe. 1850. 8vo. pp. 628.

WE have not read this History; but it is well known as enjoying the reputation of being the best popular compend of ecclesiastical

history in the English language. Mr. Donahoe has published it in a neat style, and furnishes it at the very low price of one dollar a copy. We are pleased to learn that it is meeting with a rapid and extensive sale. Every Catholic family should possess a copy of it, and it would do Protestants no harm to read it, unless they wish to remain in ignorance of Church history.

6. — *A Miniature Manual of the Sacred Heart.* Boston: Joseph A. Copes. 1850. 32mo. pp. 261.

THIS work is published with the approbation of the Right Reverend Bishop of this diocese, which is a sufficient guaranty of its piety and orthodoxy. It is a truly pious work, and will be found an admirable help in one of the sweetest and most profitable devotions in our Church. But we are sorry that we cannot commend it also under a literary point of view. The style lacks simplicity, clearness, and precision. The sentences are long, lumbering, and confused. Whether this is the fault of the author or of his translator we are unable to say, but we certainly expected from the translator or compiler of this work a greater mastery of English composition, and more ease, simplicity, grace, and delicacy of style and diction. We hope, before he suffers it to pass to a second edition, that he will give it a thorough revision. We know he is a man of fine taste and a cultivated mind, and we know no reason why we should be called upon to say our prayers in barbarous or unintelligible English.

7. — *In Memoriam.* Boston: Ticknor, Reed, & Fields. 1850. 12mo. pp. 216.

THIS poem, said to be by Tennyson, is presented us by its publishers in all the luxury of paper and type. We find our contemporaries in England and in this country speak highly of it, and rank its author at the head of living English poets. We suppose we must be destitute of the bump of poetry, for we certainly are unable to admire Tennyson, or to discover any other merit in him than harmonious verse and a little namby-pamby sentiment. We broke down before reading twenty pages of the volume before us. It is doubtless all our own fault, and owing to our inability to detect or appreciate true poetic gems. In brief words, Tennyson is not a poet to our taste. That he has a poetic temperament, we can believe; that he scatters here and there a real poetic gem in his works, we are not disposed to deny; but to us he is feeble, diffuse,

and tiresome. He strikes us as a man of feeble intellect, as wanting altogether in the depth and force of thought indispensable, not to the poetic temperament, but to the genuine poet. He seems to us a poet for puny transcendentalists, beardless boys, and miss in her teens.

-
8. — *Songs of Labor, and other Poems.* By JOHN G. WHITTIER. Boston: Ticknor, Reed, & Fields. 1850. 12mo. pp. 127.

MR. WHITTIER has some of the elements of a true poet, but his poems, though often marked by strength and tenderness, are our abomination. He is a Quaker, an infidel, an Abolitionist, a philanthropist, a peace man, a Red Republican, a non-resistant, a revolutionist, all characters we hold in horror and detestation, and his poems are the echo of himself. God gave him noble gifts, every one of which he has used to undermine faith, to eradicate loyalty, to break down authority, and to establish the reign of anarchy, and all under the gentle mask of promoting love and good-will, diffusing the Christian spirit, and defending the sacred cause of liberty. He approaches us in the gentle and winning form of an angel of light, and yet, whether he means it or not, it is only to rob us of all that renders life worth possessing. If he believes himself doing the will of God, he is the most perfect dupe of the Evil One the Devil has ever been able to make. He is silly enough, after having denounced Pius the Ninth in the most savage manner, and canonized the assassins and ruffians who founded the Roman republic, to think that he can pass with Catholics as not being their enemy, because, forsooth, he favored the Irish rebellion! Whoever denounces our Church or its illustrious chief is our enemy, and we would much sooner hold the man who should seek to deprive us of life to be our friend, than the one who should undertake to deprive us of our religion. With this estimate of Mr. Whittier, how can we praise his poems, or commend them to the public?

-
9. — *Elfride of Guldal, a Scandinavian Legend; and other Poems.* By MARKS OF BARHAMVILLE. New York: Appleton & Co. 1850. 12mo. pp. 186.

WHO Marks of Barhamville is we do not know. We have nothing to say of his poems.

10. — *Poems*. By J. G. SAXE. Boston : Ticknor, Reed, & Fields. 12mo. pp. 130.

MR. SAXE has skill and facility in versification, plenty of wit, and in satirical poetry possesses more than ordinary merit. He is no transcendentalist, and no philanthropist, two things which speak volumes in his praise. He laughs at our modern notions of progress and world-reform, and we give him our good word.

11. — *Lacon; or Many Things in Few Words: addressed to those who think*. By the Rev. C. C. COLTON, A. M. New York : Gowans. 1849. 16mo. pp. 504.

THIS is a new and revised edition of a book never worth the printing, although, like many other dull or mischievous books, it has found its admirers.

12. — *Researches respecting Americus Vesputius, and his Voyages*. By the VISCOUNT SANTAREM. Translated by E. V. Childe. Boston : Little & Brown. 16mo. pp. 221.

THIS is a work that shows a great deal of research, on a question of some interest to a few. It proves, we think, beyond doubt or cavil, that Americus had no right to give his name to this continent, as we had supposed every body already believed; but how the matter can be rectified now is more than we can see. This continent bears and will bear his name.

13. — *Oration pronounced before the Philomathean Society of Mount St. Mary's College, Emmitsburg, at the Annual Commencement, June 26, 1850*. By GEORGE H. MILES, Esq. Baltimore : Sherwood & Co. 1850. 8vo. pp. 30.

MR. MILES has genius, talent, and learning enough to place himself at the head of the literary men of this country, and with steady application and persevering labor he will one day do it. We might find a few faults, of a minor order, with this Oration, but upon the whole we are well pleased with it. That the author has taken a philosophical view of reverence, the subject of his Oration, in all respects, may be a question, and in some instances loyalty, rather than reverence, is, we think, the virtue he means. He seems to us also to speak of reverence rather as a sentiment than as a virtue, and to proceed as if the errors he condemns had a sentimental

rather than an intellectual origin. This, we apprehend, is only half true. That men have imbibed the spirit of disorder is certain, but they have also lost the intellectual apprehension of law, and they are to be recovered through the reason still more than through the sensibility. Nevertheless, the Oration is timely, marked by just principles, and full of important suggestions. We thank the author from the bottom of our heart for his denunciation of the paganism of Lorenzo the Magnificent, and, indeed, of the Medicean age, the most sad to a Catholic of any age since the birth of Christ, as might be inferred from the fact that it received the eulogiums of such a heathen as the philanthropist Roscoe. If any class of men ever deserved the curse of all good Christians they were the humanists of that age, among whom the snarling Erasmus and the lustful Henry, to whom Luther and Calvin were pigmies in evil, hold a distinguished rank. Since their time literature has become as really pagan as it was in ancient Greece and Rome, although infinitely inferior in depth of thought, and beauty and finish of form. We are thankful to find even one young American scholar who dares to be a Christian, and send polished gentilism to the Devil, from whom it came.

14. — *The Red Hand of Ulster: or the Fortunes of Hugh O'Neil.*

By Mrs. J. SADLIER. Boston: Donahoe. 1850. 32mo. pp. 328.

THIS is a well-written story, founded on a most interesting passage in Irish history, but far inferior to *Willy Burke*, by the same gifted lady. It has too much of the air of ordinary romance to suit our taste, and, had the authoress written, not a romance on *the O'Neil*, but a simple history of his unsuccessful attempt to recover the independence of his country, she would have given us a work more interesting as well as more instructive. We wish there were a good history of Ireland, at once readable and reliable. There is not a more remarkable people in Europe, nor one that has been more misunderstood, or that has so great a facility in making itself misunderstood. It never gets the credit it deserves, and somehow contrives to tell its own story so that the world will not believe it. No people in the world more readily place themselves as individuals at the point of sight of those with whom they associate, and the best conceivable companion is a cultivated Irishman; but the moment an Irishman, if a patriot, begins to write the history of his country, he writes in *Irish*, which few but Irishmen can understand, and which the Irish themselves understand and speak differently in every different locality. We are perplexed the moment we open Irish history, and thus far have found ourselves utterly unable to master it.

One thing, however, is perfectly clear to us, that Ireland for seven hundred years has suffered wrongs at the hands of England that would have extinguished any other people, or a people less tenacious of national existence, or possessing a less remarkable recuperative energy. England, at this moment, we believe, is really desirous of doing something to repair the wrongs she has for so many ages been inflicting upon her; but, unhappily, she will adopt no measure for the benefit of Ireland that is not openly or secretly hostile to the religion of Ireland. Here arises all the difficulty of removing the political and social grievances of that beautiful island. If England could make up her mind to legislate for Ireland without looking to the extirpation or oppression of the Catholic religion, it would be the easiest thing in the world to remove all the grievances of which the Irish people complain, and to secure to them a degree of prosperity every way equal or superior to her own. There is nothing but England's heresy that is in the way of England's justice to Ireland, and the experience of three hundred years, we should suppose, might have taught her that the only way to effect any good for Ireland is to regard her as a Catholic country, that must be governed as such or not at all. The government colleges would have been a blessing to Ireland, if they had been established, as they should have been, under the supervision and control of the Catholic hierarchy. As they are, they are only a curse, a source of discontent, of complaint, and of dislike to the government on the part of those who would naturally be its warm friends. All good Catholics see in them only an engine designed for the destruction of Catholicity by diffusing indifferentism. Every measure England adopts for Ireland has a sinister design of this sort, and it is this fact that renders the government of Ireland to her a matter of so great difficulty and perplexity. All Catholics are not like the Catholics of England in the days of Queen Elizabeth, preferring allegiance to an illegitimate sovereign to obedience to the legitimate Pontiff and Vicar of Jesus Christ. There are Catholics who prefer the soul to the body, and religion to life, who would rather die of starvation in streets and lanes than turn heretics and damn their souls to all eternity, and it is the glory of Ireland that she has abounded in Catholics of this sort. England ought to know this, and to give up her ungodly and fruitless attempt to extirpate Catholicity from "the Island of Saints."

Nevertheless, England's loss is our gain, and her oppression of the faith in Ireland builds it up in this country, and wherever the English tongue is spoken. Perhaps a Catholic people may yet grow up from the children of Irish emigrants that will call England herself to an account for her cruelty and wrongs to their ancestors. The large infusion of Celtic blood into the American population will greatly modify, in a few years, the American character; for

the Celtic element has a tenacity of life unknown to the Saxon or Norman, and in the long run is sure to triumph over these and become the predominating element, as we have seen in the case of the Norman and Saxon invaders and settlers in Ireland. America may yet avenge Ireland's wrongs on England; but we hope it will be only the Christian's revenge, that of freeing England from heresy, and restoring her to the Church as an integral part of Christendom.

15. — *History of the French Revolution of 1848.* By A. DE LAMARTINE. Translated by F. A. Durivage and W. S. Chase. Boston: Phillips, Sampson, & Co. 1850. 12mo. 2 vols. pp. 245, 270.

M. LAMARTINE seems to have written this work to show that he is a great man, and ought not to be suffered to sink into the insignificance to which he is inevitably doomed. He is a man of very considerable ability, and undeniable eloquence, with some passable instincts, all of which are worse than ruined by his intolerable vanity. A great share of the revolution rests on him, and he must bear its odium, and the peculiar odium of daring to inaugurate a revolution and of not daring to follow it to its legitimate results. Of all the actors in that tragi-comedy called the Revolution of February, 1848, there is not one for whom personally we have less respect than for Lamartine, but we see clearly the hand of Providence in using him for a time to check the disastrous consequences of his own rashness and folly. As to the republic he proclaimed, it is as good as dead, and its history may well be written. What will succeed it, it is now difficult to foresee; but we shall not be surprised any day to learn, either that the empire is reëstablished, or that the Bourbons are restored in the person of Henry the Fifth.



